


**PATTERNS OF RECRUITMENT OF THE HIGHLAND  
REGIMENTS OF THE BRITISH ARMY,  
1756-1815**

**Stanley Dean MacDonald Carpenter**

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of MLitt  
at the  
University of St Andrews**



**1996**

**Full metadata for this item is available in  
St Andrews Research Repository  
at:**

**<http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/>**

**Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:**

**<http://hdl.handle.net/10023/12633>**

**This item is protected by original copyright**

THE UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS

PATTERNS OF RECRUITMENT OF THE HIGHLAND  
REGIMENTS OF THE BRITISH ARMY,  
1756 to 1815.

A Thesis Submitted to the  
Department of Modern History of the  
Faculty of Arts in Candidacy  
For the Degree of  
Master of Letters

Department of Modern History

BY

STANLEY DEAN MacDONALD CARPENTER, B.A.

ST ANDREWS, SCOTLAND

MAY 1977



Patterns of Recruitment of the Highland Regiments of the  
British Army, 1756 to 1815.

Stanley Dean MacDonald Carpenter. Dept of Modern History.

In the years following the military defeat of Jacobitism in 1746 and the legal destruction of the Highland clan system, the Highlands of Scotland provided many thousands of troops for service in the British army and especially in the numerous Highland corps, both Fencible and regular of the line as well as Volunteer and Militia, which were raised after 1756.

Although other Highland corps, the Argyleshire Highlanders raised in 1689, the Black Watch composed of the amalgamated Independent Companies in 1739 and Loudon's Highlanders embodied in 1745, had been raised prior to 1756, the great fear of Jacobite activity and of arming the Highlanders on the part of the English political nation, prevented the extensive use of Highlanders in the British army throughout the first half of the 18th Century. With the renewal of war with France in 1756, however, the need for troops was crucial. William Pitt the Elder succeeded in persuading the Cabinet and King George of the great advantages of employing Highlanders in army service. Not only did this action remove the disaffected Highlanders from the country and employ them against the foreign enemies, the policy opened up a storehouse of willing, aggressive, loyal and first-rate troops for the wars of the 18th and early 19th Centuries.

Thousands of Highlanders enlisted in the Highland regiments and as many as 100,000 men served from 1793 to 1815, a figure out of proportion to the population of the region in the 18th Century. Not only the pressures of a rapidly rising population and unemployment, but also the appeals to clan loyalty and

duty to one's superior served to bring out the Highlanders in great numbers. The area of heaviest recruitment proved to be the northwest Highlands and Islands where the pressures of population and unemployment were most heavily felt. This region was also the most conservative and traditional, a phenomenon brought about by the relative isolation from the modernizing influences of Lowland Scotland.

The over-recruiting of the Highlands, especially after 1800, led to the eventual collapse of Highland recruiting. Not only was the surplus manpower severely drained, but appeals to clan loyalty and spirit had diminished in strength, especially under the impact of a changing economy and the growing alienation of clan chieftains to their tenants and the erosion of the patriarchal social system.

Several factors were of importance to the patterns of recruitment of the Highland regiments such as the matter of financial arrangements. Bounties became increasingly important as the recruiting efforts began to falter. The growing dependence on non-Highlanders, particularly Lowlanders and Irish, clearly indicate the breakdown of Highland recruiting. This thesis, then, examines in detail these major themes and patterns of recruiting for the Highland regiments from the beginning of the Seven Year's War to the final defeat of Napoleonic France in 1815.

I, Stanley Dean MacDonald Carpenter, do attest that this thesis, Patterns of Recruitment of the Highland Regiments of the British Army, 1756 to 1815, is an original work researched and composed by myself, and has not been submitted in candidacy for any other higher degree at any University.


29<sup>th</sup> April 1977.  
Date.

  
Candidate.

ii.

The candidate, Stanley Dean MacDonald Carpenter, was admitted in October 1975 under the provisions of The Resolution of the University Court, 1967, No.9, Sections 1, 2 and 3 to pursue a two year course leading to a Degree of Master of Letters (M. Litt.) in Arts. The study was carried out under the supervision of the Department of Modern History, Scottish History, Faculty of Arts.

29th April 1977.  
Date.



Candidate.

I testify that the candidate, Stanley Dean MacDonald Carpenter, has studied under my supervision in a course leading to a Master of Letters Degree in Arts since October 1975, and that the candidate has fulfilled all regulations for the Degree as set forth by the Resolution of the University Court, 1967, No.9.

29/4/77  
Date.



Bruce P. Lenman,  
Supervisor.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS THESIS.

- OSA ..... For The Statistical Account of Scotland by  
Sir John Sinclair, Bart.
- SHR ..... Scottish Historical Review.
- SHS ..... Scottish Historical Society.
- Vol. .... For Volume. Arabic or Roman numerals are used depending  
upon how presented in work.
- pp. .... From page X to page Y or pages.
- p. .... Page.
- 2.3 ..... Notation for Sections as used in the Appendices and notes.  
2.3 stands for Chapter II, Section 3. Similarly, 5.2  
stands for Chapter V, Section 2.

All footnotes are given at the end of each Chapter. The \* denotes a  
note at the foot of page either adding further explanation or reference  
to Appendix.

Footnotes ... For the sake of brevity, especially as many titles of  
older works are quite lengthy, a partial title and the  
author's name is given so as to be easily identifiable  
but not cumbersome. For reference to the full title of  
a work with details of publication and date, see the  
Bibliography.

Spellings and Punctuations ... In the case of quotations of the text  
of letters, documents manuscripts, and so on, the  
original spelling and punctuation has been reproduced  
without alteration. Deletions within the body of a  
document are notated with ....

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Statements .....	i
Abbreviations .....	iii
Chapter I. <u>The Clan Military Culture</u> .....	1
Section 1.1 .....	1
Section 1.2 .....	3
Section 1.3 .....	15
Chapter II. <u>Government Policy, Reconciliation and the</u> <u>Raising of the Regiments</u> .....	24
Section 2.1 .....	24
Section 2.2 .....	29
Section 2.3 .....	34
Section 2.4 .....	39
Chapter III. <u>The Dynamics of Recruiting</u> .....	48
Section 3.1 .....	48
Section 3.2 .....	54
Section 3.3 .....	63
Chapter IV. <u>The Origins and Background of the Recruits</u> .....	72
Section 4.1 .....	72
Section 4.2 .....	77
Section 4.3 .....	86
Section 4.4 .....	92
Chapter V. <u>The Breakdown of Highland Recruiting After 1793</u> ....	100
Section 5.1 .....	100
Section 5.2 .....	110
Section 5.3 .....	115
Section 5.4 .....	120



## TABLE OF CONTENTS, CONTINUED

Conclusion .....	127
Section 1 .....	127
Section 2 .....	130
Section 3 .....	132
APPENDIX A <u>List of Regiments</u> .....	135
APPENDIX B <u>Letters, Documents, etc.</u> .....	139
APPENDIX C <u>Charts and Statistics</u> .....	143
APPENDIX D <u>Photocopies</u> .....	144a
SOURCES .....	145

## CHAPTER I.

### The Clan Military Culture.

## CHAPTER I.

### SECTION 1

#### Clan Warfare as a Natural Extension of Environment.

Between the years 1756 and 1815, a tremendous number of troops were drawn from the Highlands of Scotland for service in the army of Great Britain in the form of Regulars of the line, Fencibles for home service in the British Isles and Volunteers or Militia for part time local service. The ease with which these troops were raised was directly related to the military, social and economic structure of the traditional clan system. The eventual breakdown of the pattern of relative ease in recruiting in the 1790's was due in some measure to the erosion of the traditional culture and values.

Before examining the dynamics and patterns of recruitment for the Highland corps after 1757, attention should be focused on the military and social structure of the pre-1745 period in order to build a framework upon which the system of Highland recruiting may be more easily discerned.

Prior to the demise of the old patriarchal clan system in the latter half of the 18th Century, constant warfare had been carried on among the clans. Very elaborate systems of alliance and counter-alliance were developed and altered. Foreign princes, notably those of Norway, Lowland Scotland, England and regional Irish rulers periodically vied for alliances with the various Highland clans as counters to the activities of rival kingdoms in the power struggles of pre-modern Europe. Given the fierce internecine warfare of the clans as well as the belligerency between rival princes, it was not unnatural for the clans to develop along the lines of a military society.

The topography and lack of natural abundance of the Highlands and Islands encouraged the development of war-orientated cultures. The Grampian Mountains, liberally supplied with glens, valleys and a western seacoast of very irregular features meant that very large, conclusive battles were not as easily fought as in the lower and flatter areas. Great movements of large forces, except by dangerous sea passage was quite difficult given the geography of the region and decisive engagements were rare until the period of the several Jacobite uprisings after 1688. For this reason, small scale warfare could be extensively carried on over a number of centuries without seriously threatening the existence or life style of the native population.

In terms of material support for a society, the Highlands were also rather deficient. Arable land was at a premium and agriculture was susceptible to the occasional harshness of a northern climate. Agriculture and food production remained at a barely subsistence level for most of the pre-1745 period and often depended heavily upon imports of meal from outside areas. Other natural resources, including mineral wealth such as iron and similar metals were also in short supply.

Given those aspects of patriarchal tribalism, geography and lack of natural resources, the system of warfare developed in the area was a natural extension of the controlling factors. The nature of clan warfare developed within this culture was to have a tremendous impact upon the recruitment of troops from this area in later years.\*

---

\* It is not the place of this thesis to discuss in detail the development of the clan system or its structure, rather, those aspects which bear upon the recruitment for the army after 1756 only are dealt with, notably, military organization and the hierarchy of classes and their role in the clan army.

## SECTION 2

### The Military State of the Clans Prior to 1745.

Despite the accepted theory that all clansmen were directly descended from a common ancestral progenitor, social divisions within a clan evolved as a usual condition of human society. Not unnaturally, the divisions of this society were along the lines of most other types of a community development. The form taken by the Highland society was that of a ruling figure supported by a small aristocracy, with a larger body of lesser gentry, below which was the most numerous group, the common people. At the pinnacle of the society was the clan chief or ceann cinne who occupied the hereditary position based upon direct lineal descent from the common ancestor.<sup>1</sup> The Tanist would be the heir to the chieftainship, though not necessarily the eldest son as in the law of primogeniture practiced elsewhere in Europe. By the Law of Tanistry, the heir was named by the chief and the chieftainship would often devolve onto a younger brother of the chief rather than the eldest natural son. Since the state of the society required a competent military leader, this type of succession was quite necessary and provided a reasonably stable military command structure.<sup>2</sup> The Highlanders recognized the importance of a stable command and thus avoided the turmoil which often accompanied minority and Regency periods in European societies.

Following the chief in seniority were the ceanntighe or the various heads of the houses.<sup>3</sup> In many cases these were the close relations to the chief or the prominent families of the district, the cadet branches. The senior cadet of each clan was known as the Toshich and generally

was responsible for the collection of rents. With the introduction of Norman style baronies, the Toshich often became the baron baillie of the district among those clans powerful enough to be styled baronies.<sup>4</sup>

Below the principal heads of houses would be the Duine Vaisle or the gentry of the clan.<sup>5</sup> Again, many of these lesser aristocrats would have been distantly related to the chief or would be sons and relations of the principal cadet branches of the clan. From among this class would be drawn the bulk of the tacksman or "goodmen".<sup>6</sup> These individuals would be granted large leases, called tacks, from the lands held by the chief. The tacksmen would then subdivide their holdings, granting portions to lesser tenants who comprised the small farmers class and from whom the tacksman collected rents out of which he paid his own rent to the superior proprietor. Tacksmen were quite often of the same family as the primary land owner even in districts where multiple families had combined to form compound units either through mutual alliance or conquest. In 1775, for example, of 13 major tacksmen on the Clanranald estates, 10 were of the surname MacDonald. Eleven of Cameron of Lochiel's 13 major tacksmen were Camerons, while 11 of 12 on the Fraser of Lovat estates were of the family Fraser.<sup>7</sup>

Most tacksmen would have been reasonably secure materially and financially prior to 1745 and most remained so during the latter half of the 18th Century. The Parish Minister of Lochgoil-head in Argyle described the tacksmen there as very respectable both morally and intellectually. The Reverend MacDougall goes on to state that: "The tacksmen are opulent, comfortably lodged and live with great decency".<sup>8</sup> Though it can not be positively asserted that all tacksmen lived well, it is fairly certain that a great majority would have been more materially secure than would the average small tenant or ordinary clansman.

Below the tacksman on the social scale would be the small tenant who held his land from the tacksman, and therefore, indirectly from the chief. This body of small farmers would be reasonably secure in their possessions and could manage a few material goods with some cattle, the principal market product of the Highlands. Below the small tenant would be the large group of agricultural labourers and artisans who provided valuable services in terms of goods and labour.

Within the structure of clan society, there existed a number of offices and societies, usually relating to military matters.

Surrounding the chief would be the Gille-coise or band of Hanchmen.

These office-holders would be the primary servants of the chief and would be as follows:<sup>9</sup>

- 1) Bladair or spokesman,
- 2) Bard,
- 3) Piobaire or piper,
- 4) Gille-piobaire or piper's servant,
- 5) Gille-mor or bearer of the chief's sword,
- 6) Gille-casfluich who carried the chief over rivers,
- 7) Gille-comhstraithaim or keeper of the horses,
- 8) Gille-Trusatneis or baggage man,
- 9) Gille-ruithe or running footman.

Within a clan would be found a small and elite society of a military nature known as the Luchdtachk or the chief's band. This body was selected from among young men of the best families and in most cases would have been appointed by the Tanist.<sup>10</sup> This group of young men was highly trained in military skills, the use of arms and athletic endeavours. It was their responsibility to accompany the chief and, in reality, formed a personal bodyguard of very highly skilled warriors.<sup>11</sup> These members of the chief's bodyguard were often required to prove their martial talents, an exercise which usually took the form of a raid on a neighbour's cattle stocks.

The Luchtachk was formed into distinct companies called cathrans

and as such, engaged in cattle stealing raids upon neighbouring clans, and more especially, the Lowland areas when possible. The great zeal with which these raids were carried out no doubt played some part in the Lowlander's great fear and loathing of the mountain men.

Very often, these raids into other parts of the country or into a rival clan's territory, had an economic motivation. In an area where agriculture was carried out on purely a subsistence level, the only significant cash product was cattle, mainly the long-haired Highland breed. A raid, of which the ultimate purpose was the thievery of an enemy's cattle stock, was considered honourable as well as necessary. Indeed, one's own stock was susceptible to theft from another band. There were, however, ways to limit the amount of cattle stolen, all of which were only minimally successful. Money was sometimes paid for the return of stolen stock and was known as tasgal.<sup>12</sup> It must be noted that this fee was not always paid. A second method of protecting one's stock was the payment of black-mail. In essence, the owner paid a certain sum of money in return for which, the receiver would protect the stock and agree not to steal the cattle himself. Again, this system did not always work as well as hoped.\* A chief generally received a share of the spoils of a raid and often as much as two-thirds of the total which, therefore, provided an economic motivation for the continuation of this type of activity.<sup>13</sup>

Raids could also be of a belligerent nature as well. In a relatively hostile system, this method of sorting out grievances was often the only method of resolving the matter in an area where there

---

\* See Appendix B for Graham of Gartmore manuscript dealing with the practice of paying black-mail.



existed little or no rule by central government or national law. These military actions might range from petty harassment up to full-scale battles and might be of a simple nature such as redress for an insult or one of a number of clashes resulting from extended clan feuds such as that which existed between the Campbells and the MacDonalds.

Although much of clan warfare consisted of petty cattle raids or harassment, major engagements on a larger scale did occur, especially after 1688. Prior to that time, clan warfare had been carried out primarily by the military societies and gentry class of the clans. With the rise of Jacobite militarism, however, the bulk of the clan tenantry were called up for service. In such a case, the entire tenantry of a district or clan would be summoned for duty. There are several reported methods for mobilizing a clan army for general action; however, the most important seems to have been the "burning cross" or cran-taraidh.<sup>14</sup> By this method, an animal, usually a goat, was slain and a partially burned cross with a scrap of cloth attached was dipped in the animal's blood. Utilizing a system of relay runners bearing the cross, the whole of the district could be alerted in a very short time.<sup>15</sup> It is thought that the burned and bloody cross signified a threat of "fire and sword" to those who did not immediately obey the summons.<sup>16</sup> Lord George Murray is reported to have been the last clan chieftain to summon his tenantry by means of the fiery cross late in 1745 after his declaration of allegiance to Prince Charles Stuart. Variations of this method are known. On the Seaforth estates in Caithness and Ross, a barrel of burning tar would be placed on the highest point of land, called Tulloch-ard, and would be the signal for the armed clansmen to assemble at Donan Castle the following morning.<sup>17</sup>

When the entire clan was engaged in an action, the internal

organization was very much like that of a European regiment of foot. This would not be unusual owing to the large number of Highland gentry who had served in the armies of Europe previous to the Jacobite uprisings. Ranks and appointments depended very much on seniority rather than military efficiency.<sup>18</sup> There are conflicting reports as to whether the field officers were the chief's sons or the elder cadets though it is thought that the Toskich or eldest cadet would lead the van on the march and would command the right of the line in battle.<sup>19</sup> The various companies would be divided along family or geographic lines, each with 2 captains, 2 lieutenants and 2 ensigns.<sup>20</sup> The heads of the major families would serve as the captains while the subalterns would be made up of the gentry of the district.<sup>21</sup>

In the order of battle, the gentlemen and larger farmers of the clan held the first rank. This is not unusual as their higher economic status allowed for better weaponry. The lesser armed would take the rear ranks, usually armed with agricultural tools.<sup>22</sup> The clan regiment was generally drawn up into a formation of three ranks deep and in a wedge-shape called the ceinneach-cath.<sup>23</sup> The psychological element in combat was not overlooked in clan warfare. Companies were arranged by families and one would always be placed among brothers, cousins and other relations. This method of grouping was designed to give an emotive stimulus, especially when one saw close relations being killed or wounded.<sup>24</sup> In this type of warfare, the bards and pipers took on an added importance as they shouted the clan war cries or piped the clan regiment into battle.<sup>25</sup> The piper actually laid aside his pipes and charged with the men; however, his playing would have had the desired psychological effect prior to an engagement.

The basic tactical manoeuvre of this type of warfare was the quick

charge with broadsword, targe and Lochaber axe. This method of combat could have devastating effects even upon disciplined troops as witnessed at Killiecrankie in 1689 during the first of the Jacobite uprisings with the destruction of General Mackay's army, most of whom were trained regulars. Similar results were seen at Falkirk and Prestonpans in later rebellions.<sup>26</sup> In the early part of the 18th Century, many of the more affluent clansmen acquired firearms. Clan tactics merely adapted these weapons to the mode of attack rather than altering the basic tactic. Those with firearms would discharge some yards from the enemy and continue into his line utilizing the traditional cutting weapons.

As to the actual numbers engaged in warfare of this type, there is very little statistical evidence. Some indication, however, is given in the Statistical Account for the Parish of Kilchrenan and Dalavish in Argyle. According to the writer, 80 volunteers responded to the Duke of Argyle's summons within 24 hours. The population of the parish at that time was near 1000 persons, therefore, this number would have represented a goodly proportion of the adult male population capable of bearing arms.<sup>27</sup> The total number of Highlanders under arms cannot be adequately calculated since they tend to drift in and out of both armies, but in particular, the Jacobite forces. Charles never had at any one time more than 6,000 clansmen under his command. Nevertheless, a goodly portion of the available clan troops were active in the '45.

The final engagement of inter-clan warfare occurred at the Battle of Mulroy in 1688 between a party of the MacIntoshes and Colin MacDonald of Keppoch or "Coll of the Cows".<sup>28</sup> From 1689 until 1746, the martial energies of the Highlanders was taken up in the several uprisings, either in support of or opposition to the deposed House of Stuart. In each of

the three major uprisings of 1689, 1715 and 1745, clans came out in arms in greater numbers than had been seen in the internecine warfare of previous periods. Traditional Whig families such as the Campbells, Grants, Munros and Mackays raised their followings for the House of Orange in 1689 and the House of Hanover in subsequent rebellions. Major engagements of this period utilized the mode of clan warfare of previous centuries and it initially worked quite well against the Royal troops. The Highland charge, however, met its demise at Culloden due to the development and perfection of the bayonet as a defensive weapon and the Stuart cause was ultimately defeated in April 1746.

Many Highland chiefs, though Jacobite in sympathy, refused to join Prince Charles in 1745. Due to the efforts of Duncan Forbes of Culloden, Lord President of the Court of Sessions, some Jacobite chiefs were induced to raise troops in support of the government, notably Macdonald of Sleat and MacLeod of MacLeod.\* The end of the Stuart threat after 1746 effectively terminated the raising of clan levies in the Highlands for any purpose other than government service.

Reforms legislated by the Hanoverian government and Parliament legally ended the traditional structures upon which the clan system was supported. More importantly, fundamental changes were taking place in the Highlands which were to have a remarkable impact on the nature of Highland society. The effects of an economic revolution to the south and the opening up of the Highlands to intercourse with the rest of the world through trade were the ultimate factors in the

---

\* See Appendix B for letter to Duncan Forbes from the Marquis of Tweeddale on this matter.

demise of the ancient clan system.

The traditional authority of the chief stemmed from two paramount powers, that of ward-holding and the right of heritable jurisdictions. Through the system of ward-holding, the tenant owed personal and military service to the superior, either the tacksman directly or the chief indirectly through the system of subdivided holdings. In exchange for this service and a fixed rent, the tenant held ward lands for his own use from the tacksman.<sup>29</sup> The second power of the chief was that of heritable jurisdiction which, in the absence of royal authority in the Highlands, gave to the chief or local magnate the right to arrest, try, judge and punish all persons accused of crimes in his district or area of influence.<sup>30</sup>

In exchange for service, both military and labour, the chief or superior was required to return favours particularly in time of famine when the landowner was expected to furnish emergency food supplies. By the Law of Kincogish, the chief was answerable for every member of his clan and was expected to protect his followers.<sup>31</sup> The primary duty of the chief in return for service was to provide land on which the clansmen could maintain a reasonable standard of subsistence. The obligations to the superior took on various forms in addition to military service. On the Isle of Skye, for example, every able-bodied male was required to render 6 day's service per year in road maintenance and construction.<sup>32</sup>

Following the final Jacobite rising, Parliament enacted legislation to undercut the authority of the chiefs, and, in doing so, destroy their ability to successfully raise their tenantry, by forced means, in revolt against the standing government. Consequently, the Heritable Jurisdictions Act of 1747 was enacted which stripped the proprietor of his right to resolve legal matters on his estates. The act established a system of

Justices of the Peace and Sheriffs to enforce royal law in the Highlands.<sup>33</sup> Although many of the government offices were given to large estate owners and clan chiefs, the exercise of arbitrary legal decision was no longer possible, and, as crown officials, these officers were answerable to royal authority. A sum of £580,000 was paid to several estate owners as compensation for the loss of this traditional privilege.<sup>34</sup> To undercut the ability of chiefs to force their tenants out in arms, the system of ward-holding was made illegal and military service was replaced by a "reasonable money payment" for lands held in tack or from a subdivided tacksman's estate.<sup>35</sup>

Following the rebellion of 1715, "An Act for the Disarming of the Highlands" was enacted in 1725. This attempt at destroying the military capability of the Jacobite clans was only partly successful as the bulk of arms surrendered came from the loyal clans.<sup>36</sup> A more successful measure, the Disarming Act of 1747, abruptly curtailed the clan's abilities to stage successful revolts. In addition to making the carrying of arms illegal, this act proscribed the wearing of the Highland clothing and the playing of the bagpipe, as both were seen as motivators of rebellion and dissent.<sup>37</sup> Stringent penalties were given to violators of these laws and a first offence for the wearing of any item of proscribed clothing meant a 6 month prison sentence. On a first conviction for carrying arms, a £15 fine was levied. A second conviction on either charge generally meant a sentence of 7 year's transportation to the colonies, usually Georgia in North America.<sup>38</sup>

A goodly number of estates were forfeited as penalty for rebellion after the uprisings of 1715 and 1745. In 1752, the Forfeited Estates Commission was established to oversee the administration of estates lost through Jacobite activity. Despite the efforts of the Commission and Crown officials to collect rents, many tenants continued to pay their

rents to the former proprietor.<sup>39</sup> The paying of rents to exiled Jacobite nobles and chiefs through their agents in the Highlands was common, particularly after the 1715 revolt. In the Parish of Glenshiel in Ross, William, Earl of Seaforth, continued to receive rent monies from his forfeited estates in Kintail after his exile for participation in the risings of 1715 and 1719. Collection parties frequently were attacked in this district while attempting to collect the rents.<sup>40</sup>

The legislative efforts of the government did succeed in destroying the traditional underpinning of the patriarchal clan system with the abolition of ward-holding and rights of heritable jurisdiction. Government could not, however, destroy through legislation the affections and attitudes towards superiors developed over centuries of habit. Feelings of obligation to the hereditary patriarch continued strongly for many years, particularly in the northwest and islands. A petition dated 16 September 1777 from the tacksmen of Skye to their proprietor, MacLeod of MacLeod, is illustrative of the feeling of obligation and support for the hereditary chief. Although the motivation for this petition may have been the removal, in that same year, of the tacksmen on Lord Macdonald's Skye estates, the accepted theory of mutual support between the chief and his clansmen is the dominant theme of this document.<sup>41</sup>

We the undersigned tacksmen, tenants and possessors on the estate of Norman MacLeod of MacLeod, Esq., wishing to shew our attachment to the family, and our desire to contribute as far as our ability will admit, towards the support of their interest, and preservation of their estate, do hereby, in the hope that it may enable MacLeod and his Trustees to re-establish his affairs, and preserve the ancient possessions of the family bind ourselves and our successors for the space of three years to pay an additional rent of one shilling and six pence in the pound of the rent now payable, on condition that, as our principal motive for becoming under this burden is our attachment to the present MacLeod, to the standing of the family and our desire of the estate being preserved entire, that we

shall be freed therefrom if we should have the misfortune to lose him by death or if any part of the estate should be sold within the above-mentioned time.

The notion of one's duty to the superior was still viable late in the 18th Century despite the efforts made through legislation to break down the clan attachments. Colonel David Stewart of Garth relates an episode which occurred in the American Revolutionary War at the Battle of Green Springs, Virginia, 6 June 1781. A private of the 76th Regiment, Macdonald's Highlanders rushed in front of Lieutenant Simon Macdonald of Morer exclaiming:<sup>42</sup>

You know that when I engaged to be a soldier, I promised to be faithful to the King and you. The French are coming, and while I stand here neither bullet nor bayonet shall touch you except through my body.

The episode may be a bit stylized; nevertheless, the sentiments of the event and speech are quite clear.

The attachment to traditional values and attitudes towards superiors had a great impact on the efforts of recruiting throughout the remainder of the century. These attitudes were eventually broken down, not by legislation or coercion, rather through the influx of alien ideas and theories of commerce, industry and education. These changes profoundly altered the complexion of Highland society in the century following Culloden. This change of attitudes and tradition was to exert a strong influence on the state of recruiting for the army, particularly after 1793 as will be examined in Chapter V. But the old attitudes towards clanship and military service to the superior did provide a great abundance of manpower for the army in the seventy-year period from the '45 to the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The remnants of clan culture provided a basis upon which the government successfully used to draw men from the Highlands and the old military structure of the clans provided a solid basis for the internal structure of the subsequent regiments.



### SECTION 3

#### Scots in Service prior to 1745.

Although the first standing Highland regiment of the line was not embodied until 1740, the tradition of military service had been strong in Scotland for some years. A great many Scots served in the British forces during the 17th and 18th Centuries, but the tradition of Scots in the service of foreign nations dates to a much earlier period.

The first known instance of a permanent Scots corps in foreign service dates from 1421 when a Scots regiment was in the service of France.<sup>43</sup> This corps continued in the French army for roughly two centuries. In the 17th Century, it was known variously as le Regiment d'Hebron (Hepburn's Regiment), le Regiment Douglas and Dumbarton's Regiment, depending upon the colonel of the period.<sup>44</sup> In 1661, the Regiment was placed on the English establishment as the Scotch Regiment of Foot and later became the 1st Regiment of Foot (The Royal Scots) in 1751.<sup>45</sup> This corp's extremely lengthy existence brought about the nickname "Pontius Pilate's Bodyguard" which dates from 1643.<sup>46</sup>

The Dutch and Swedish services were equally popular with Scots, both Highland and Lowland. During the Thirty Year's War of 1618 - 1648, the chief of the Mackays raised 3,000 of his clansmen and tenants for the Protestant Army and served under the Swedish King, Gustavus Adolphus.<sup>47</sup> The number of Scots serving in the army of Gustavus Adolphus has been placed as high as 12,600, many of whom would have been Highlanders.<sup>48</sup> There were also during this period six Scottish regiments in the Dutch service known as The Scots Brigade.<sup>49</sup>

As well as enlisting for foreign service, Scots were quite frequently found in the English service (British after 1707). In the first half of the 18th Century, a quarter of all officers serving in the British Army were Scots.<sup>50</sup> Clearly twenty per cent. of the regimental colonels were of Scottish origin.<sup>51</sup> Of these, 19 were titled nobles, 7 were sons of nobles and 10 were Baronets. Of the total, 25 served as members of Parliament while 12 Peers represented the Scottish nobility in the House of Lords.<sup>52\*</sup>

A primary motivation for service in the army was that of economics. Many of the established aristocracy and gentry of Scotland could not command the higher incomes of their English counterparts. With usually large families to support, the price of a commission could well be worth the cost in terms of removing a son from the burden of the household. Traditionally, then, a greater proportion of Scots served in the army than the English, relative to the populations of each country.<sup>53</sup> It is interesting to note that Highland officers were more inclined towards the foreign service than the British, and a great many officers of predominantly English regiments were of Lowland Scottish origin.<sup>54</sup>

Not all Highlanders opted for service with the continental powers, however. The first Highland regiment to do active service in the British army was the Argyleshire Regiment. A warrant was issued to Archibald Campbell, 10th Earl of Argyle, in 1689 for the raising of a Highland corps of 600 men from his estates.<sup>55</sup> This regiment saw active service against the Jacobite forces commanded by Viscount Dundee in that same year in favour of the deposed King James II. The notorious episode of Glencoe in 1692 was, unfortunately, the work of this regiment

---

\* Figures given represent the period 1714 to 1760.

(Campbell of Glenlyon's Company), though it must be realized that the soldiers were merely the instruments of the instigators of the scheme, the Master of Stair and other of King William's ministers in Edinburgh.<sup>56</sup>

In 1693, the Argyleshire Highlanders were posted to Flanders with the army under the command of King William where they were engaged in many of the significant battles of the War of English Succession or King William's War.<sup>57</sup> The Argyleshire Highlanders were disbanded in Flanders in 1697.<sup>58</sup>

The Crown of Scotland had exercised nominal control over the Highland areas since the 15th Century with the fall from power of the house of MacDonald, the Lords of the Isles; however, it was not until the final defeat of Jacobitism in the 18th Century that firm, uncontested control was a political reality. Until that time, the King and royal government had been compelled to rely upon the alliances with various powerful clans, notably the Campbells, to maintain some form of sovereignty over much of the Highlands. Some attempt was made to police the Highlands through the use of Independent Companies of troops raised from among the loyal clans. Given the power of the local chiefs and magnates, the primary purpose of these troops was not to carry out the King's justice in all quarters, a feat quite impossible before the 18th Century. Rather, the early companies were designed to demonstrate that the Crown did intend to exercise sovereignty over the whole of Scotland. These companies did attempt to control the more blatant acts of theft and black-mail.

The first Independent Companies were raised as early as 1624 when two units of twenty men each were stationed in the Highland districts.<sup>59</sup> Companies of varying strength were maintained in the Highlands throughout the 17th Century and were finally disbanded in 1717 following the unsuccessful revolt of 1715.

After the defeat of the Jacobite forces under the Earl of Mar, the

Hanoverian government determined upon a stricter policy of control over the activities of the Highland Lords and clans. General George Wade was dispatched to the Highlands to undertake that responsibility. Throughout the 1720's and 30's, General Wade constructed 246 miles of military roads into and throughout the Highlands utilizing the labour of the most important group of Independent Companies to be raised.<sup>60</sup>

The second thrust of the plan to oversee the activities of the clans was based upon a suggestion from Duncan Forbes of Culloden who proposed the plan to re-raise several companies from among the loyal clans for the purpose of protecting the populace, eliminating the practices of black-mail and cattle theft and to guard against Jacobite activity. General Wade raised, in 1725, six companies of Highland troops for these purposes as well as for the construction of the road system.<sup>61</sup> Three companies of 110 men each were recruited from the tenants of Lord Lovat (Fraser), Sir Duncan Campbell of Lochnell and Grant of Ballindalloch. Three companies of 70 men each were raised from and captained by Campbell of Finab, Campbell of Carrick and Munro of Calcairn. These companies were later augmented to 110 men each. The six Independent Companies were given the name Am Freiceadan Dubh, or Black Watch, by the Highlanders.<sup>62</sup> In 1738, Duncan Forbes recommended to Lord Milton, The Lord Justice-Clerk, that four or five regiments of Highlanders should be raised as regulars of the line from among the clans of Jacobite sympathy in order to undercut potential pro-Stuart activity.<sup>63</sup> Forbes' recommendation was only partially accepted, however.\* With the outbreak of war with Spain in 1739, known as The War of Captain Jenkins' Ear, and followed by the opening of general hostilities on the continent in 1740 with the War of Austrian Succession, troops were required for service

---

\* The text of the letter to Lord Milton is found in Appendix B.

against the Spanish and later the French. In 1739, the six Independent Companies were augmented to ten and went onto the establishment as the Highland Regiment of Foot with the Earl of Crawford as its colonel.<sup>64</sup>

Originally designated the 43rd, the Highland Regiment saw its first combat at Fontenoy in 1745 under Colonel Sir Robert Munro of Foulis.<sup>65</sup> The Regiment was renumbered 42nd in the reorganization of 1751 and was designated the Royal Highland Regiment of Foot in 1758. The title of Black Watch remained the nickname until 1861 when the full title became the 42nd (The Royal Highland) Regiment, The Black Watch.<sup>66</sup> This first permanent Highland corps was in Flanders during the uprising of 1745 and took no active part in suppressing the rebellion.

During the uprising of 1745-46, other Highland troops were raised, both regulars and Independent Companies. Through the efforts of Duncan Forbes, 18 Companies were raised to patrol the areas vacated by the Jacobites in order to prevent further recruitment for Prince Charles' army and to retard the raising of funds from among the Jacobite clans. The greatest success of Forbes was the inducement of several Jacobite chiefs to raise Companies from among their tenants for the government service. Among these chiefs were Sir Alexander Macdonald of Sleat and the MacLeod of MacLeod.<sup>67</sup> In September 1745, Forbes was empowered to raise the Companies which he did with great alacrity.<sup>68</sup>

The service rendered by the Black Watch in the Flanders campaign coupled with the need for replacement troops, induced the government to raise a second Highland regiment of the line. A Warrant was granted to Lord Loudon to raise a corps with commissions dated 6 June 1745. This new regiment patrolled the west Highlands and was involved in the Rout of Moy where Charles was saved from capture by a small body of Lady MacIntosh's tenants. In fairness, it must be pointed out that Loudon's Highlanders had not been properly drilled and equipped when the

emergency of the uprising thrust them into immediate duty without adequate discipline. Lord Loudon's Highlanders were disbanded in 1748 after some service against the French in Flanders.<sup>69</sup>

Until 1740, the raising of Highland units had simply been reactions to conditions in the Highlands rather than for foreign service except in the case of the Argyleshire Highlanders. The Independent Companies had been raised to enforce the King's law whenever possible and to prevent flagrant thefts and disturbances. The embodiment of the Black Watch in 1740 began a new era for the Highland soldier. With the final defeat by arms of Jacobitism as a viable threat to the Hanoverian accession, clan warfare and rebellion were no longer possible. After 1746, the martial energies of the clansmen were turned against the foreign enemies of Great Britain. Considering the extreme fear of a recurrence of Jacobite militarism and the sincere doubts about allowing Highlanders under arms after 1746, it is rather surprising that the Black Watch was not disbanded with Loudon's in 1748. The policy of keeping the Highlanders disarmed remained in force until 1757.

William Pitt, in need of troops for the new war with France, recognized the incredible potential for raising troops in the Highlands for foreign as well as home service. His policy and that of the government during the period immediately following the '45 will be dealt with in Chapter II.

Having examined the background to the raising of the Highland regiments from 1757 onwards, this thesis will now turn to the matter of the actual dynamics of recruiting in the Highlands from 1756 to 1815; the position of the governments, the attitude of the chiefs and landowners; and the various factors and conditions in the Highlands during this period of continual warfare which affected the pattern of recruitment and the ability of the government to draw troops from the Highlands during this period.

Section 1.2. The Military State of the Clans Prior to 1745.

- 1) Skene, The Highlanders of Scotland, p. 114.
- 2) Op. cit., p.106.
- 3) Op. cit., p.114.
- 4) Op. cit., p.115.
- 5) Op. cit., p.116.
- 6) Logan, James, The Scottish G  el, p.124.
- 7) Gray, Malcolm, The Highland Economy, 1750-1850, p.139.
- 8) Sinclair, Sir John, The Statistical Account of Scotland, Vol. 13, p.186.
- 9) Logan, op. cit., p.127.
- 10) Op. cit., p.108.
- 11) Op. cit., p.126.
- 12) Op. cit., p.142.
- 13) Op. cit., p.143.
- 14) Op. cit., p.103.
- 15) Barnes, R. Money and C. Kennedy Allen, Uniforms and History of the Scottish Regiments, p.21.
- 16) Logan, op. cit., p.103.
- 17) OSA, Vol. 6, p.244.
- 18) Barnes, op. cit., p.21.
- 19) Skene, op. cit., p.114.
- 20) Logan, op. cit., p.127.
- 21) Barnes, op. cit., p.21.
- 22) Logan, op. cit., p.127.
- 23) Op. cit., p.111.
- 24) Op. cit., p.116.
- 25) Op. cit., p.127.
- 26) Brown, Peter Hume, History of Scotland, p.9.
- 27) OSA, Vol. 6, p.271.

- 28) Mitchell, Dugald, History of the Highlands and Gaelic Scotland, p.528.
- 29) Brown, Op. cit., p.330.
- 30) Paton, James, Scottish History and Life, p.185.
- 31) Logan, op. cit., p.123.
- 32) MacLeod, Rev. Canon Roderick C., "The Western Highlands in the Eighteenth-Century", p.46.
- 33) Daiches, David, The Paradox of Scottish Culture, p.6.
- 34) MacLeod, op. cit., p.36.
- 35) Mitchell, op. cit., p.662.
- 36) Brown, op. cit., p.211.
- 37) Paton, op. cit., p.185.
- 38) Mitchell, op. cit., p.664.
- 39) Paton, op. cit., p.159.
- 40) OSA, Vol. 7, p.129.
- 41) MacLeod, op. cit., p.39.
- 42) Stewart, David, Sketches of the Highlanders, Vol. 11, p.120.

### Section 1.3. Scots in Service Prior to 1745.

- 43) Barnes, op. cit., p.22.
- 44) Thomson, Gladys Scott, "A Scots Officer in the Low Countries, 1714", p.66.
- 45) Wickes, H.L., Regiments of Foot, p.1.
- 46) Op. cit., p.2.
- 47) Scobie, I.H. Mackay, An Old Highland Fencible Corps, p.10.
- 48) Steuart, A. Francis, "Scottish Officers in Sweden", p.195.
- 49) Johnston, S.H.F., "The Scots Army in the Reign of Anne", p.7.
- 50) Hayes, James, "Scottish Officers in the British Army, 1714-1763", p.25.
- 51) Op. cit., p.26.



- 52) Op. cit., p.27.
- 53) Op. cit., p.23.
- 54) Op. cit., p.26.
- 55) Holden, Robert MacKenzie, "The First Highland Regiment: The Argyllshire Highlanders", p.27.
- 56) Op. cit., p.33.
- 57) Op. cit., p.36.
- 58) Op. cit., p.40.
- 59) Mitchell, op. cit., p.595.
- 60) Brown, op. cit., p.213.
- 61) Paton, op. cit., p.159.
- 62) Mitchell, op. cit., p.595.
- 63) Op. cit., p.594.
- 64) Op. cit., p.595.
- 65) Wickes, op. cit., p.63.
- 66) Op. cit., p.62.
- 67) Culloden Papers, p.246.
- 68) Op. cit., p.219.
- 69) Adam, Frank, The Clans, Septs and Regiments of the Scottish Highlands, p.447.

## CHAPTER II.

### Government Policy, Reconciliation and the Raising of the Regiments.

## CHAPTER II.

### SECTION 1

#### The Need for Troops in the Last Half of the 18th Century.

Between the years 1756 and 1815, Great Britain was involved in several wars on the European continent as well as in various parts of the colonial world. Within this sixty-year period, no fewer than 36 years were in a state of declared war, primarily with the great powers of Europe, especially France and Spain. Much of the inter-war years were burdened with colonial conflicts, primarily in the North American colonies and the growing British trading empire in India.

From the early 1750's growing pressure had been exerted on the coastal colonies of British North America by France and its American Indian allies. The French colonials, who controlled eastern Canada and much of what is presently the American mid-west, were apprehensive as to the plans for westward expansion of the British colonies. The American Indian, who had been previously forced out of coastal areas, was equally concerned and reacted fiercely and violently to any sign of expansion. King Philip's War and Pontiac's War were both attempts to unite the several tribes on the north western frontier in opposition to westward expansion by the colonists.

Although it was British colonial policy to limit as far as possible the push across the Allegheny and Appalachian mountain ranges, this policy was only partly enforceable. Settlements west of the Appalachians such as Boonesboro in eastern Kentucky were already beginning to make inroads into Indian domains. Indian resentment at these incursions in the 1750's was used to their advantage by the French, also fearful of colonial expansion beyond the coast.

On 8 July 1755, a force of 1373 British regulars and colonials under General Edward Braddock were ambushed on the Monogahela River.<sup>1</sup> This event led to a more serious consideration on the part of the government as to events in the colonies. In May 1756, war was declared on France, thus legalizing the unofficial war which had been taking place in America for almost two years. Known as the Seven Year's War in Europe and the French and Indian War in America, this conflict was fought largely over colonial interests. The engagements which were of importance to the future of British and French colonial interests were fought in the West Indies, India and Canada rather than in Europe.\* Upon the cessation of hostilities in 1763, Great Britain had expanded its overseas possessions at the expense of French and Spanish colonial interests. Canada and parts of the French West Indies and India were ceded to Britain as well as Florida from the Spanish.

The second great war of the last half of the 18th Century was, again, a colonial affair ~~but with~~ land fighting in Europe proper. The War of the American Revolution (1775-83) which ended with the Treaty of Paris, was, primarily, an internal revolt by a sizeable number of rebels in the American colonies excluding Canada. By 1778, France was actively engaged in the conflict by materially assisting the American revolutionaries and harassing the operations of the Royal Navy with the threat of invasion of England. By 1781, French troops were engaged on the American continent and were largely responsible for the surrender of Lieutenant-General, The Earl Cornwallis, and his force of 6,000 troops at Yorktown, Virginia, on 19 October 1781, a defeat which effectively terminated the revolution in favour of the colonists.<sup>2</sup> In 1780, the Dutch and Spanish governments declared war on Britain, though their contributions to the war were minimal.

Although the defeat at Yorktown ended major military action in America,  
 \* This refers to colonial land engagements which were carried out with naval support. The Royal Navy also played a major role in securing the Mediterranean area as well.  
 See Fontesque for naval role in Canada and Quebec

the war continued for two years against the European enemies while treaty negotiations were carried on. The fighting occurred primarily in India and the West Indies.

From 1792 to June 1815, most of the European continent was engaged in active warfare. This was the period which saw the rise and decline of the Revolutionary French Republic followed by the Empire under Napoleon Buonaparte. The War of the French Revolution from 1792 to 1801 and the Napoleonic War of 1803 to 1815 had been set in motion by the French Revolution of 1789, an event which created continued turmoil and instability in France which forced Europe into a period of twenty years of conflict. War between France and Britain began in 1792 and culminated in the disastrous campaign of H.R.H. The Duke of York in Flanders in 1794-95. The Treaty of Amiens in 1801 temporarily ended hostilities; however, Great Britain again declared war on France in May of 1803.<sup>3</sup> The wars with Buonaparte continued until finally resolved at the Battle of Waterloo on 18 June 1815.

Throughout much of this period, British forces were engaged in the Indian subcontinent against native levies raised by the various provincial rulers. To a great degree, local princes such as Hyder Ali and Tipoo Sahib were used as instruments of French policy to harass British trading interests as well as to draw off troops which might have been utilized elsewhere. Although India was the domain of the East India Company since the early 17th Century, it had been British colonial policy for most of the 18th Century to provide troops for the protection of the company's interests, which were seen as vital to the overall British economy. The first regular troops arrived in 1748 under the command of Admiral Boscawen and were posted to India in increasing numbers after that date. By the early 19th Century, much of India had been pacified or was under direct British rule as a result of

military activity.

Throughout the entire period of more or less constant warfare, a primary concern of the government was the raising and maintenance of British troops both at home and overseas. Traditional mistrust and neglect of the standing army, which had been reinforced by the military abuses of the Cromwellian Interregnum, meant a usual lack of trained and combat-ready troops when war was inevitable. Efforts to raise troops from the English, Irish and Welsh counties was of only limited success. Not even the use of the military press gang or the offering of bounties as high as £3 for regular regiments and £6 for Guards regiments were sufficient to raise the required numbers in a short amount of time.<sup>4</sup> \*

At the outbreak of the American War in April of 1775, for example, there were 11,500 British troops stationed in North America. By mid-1776, prior to Lord Howe's successful invasion and capture of New York, the number of troops had risen to 27,000 with a contingent of 2,000 Royal Marines.<sup>5</sup> In order to raise troops to replace those sent overseas and for casualties, emergency methods were employed. Although the rank and file of the army had traditionally been filled out by convicts released from the prisons and gaols in lieu of serving active sentences, three regiments of the line were manned almost entirely by convicts during the American War.<sup>6</sup> The difficulties experienced in 1775 were the normal pattern of recruiting throughout the 18th Century. Considering the bad reputation of the services and the poor rate of pay, it is not surprising that the army generally attracted only the poor, destitute and desperate.\*\*

---

\* This amount paid at the beginning of the American War. Bounties rose rapidly during the 1790's to the end of the Napoleonic War.

\*\* Pay for a private soldier had only risen to 1s. per day by the 1790's and this was before stoppages for mess, uniform, shoes, barber, necessaries and so on.

This period was before the development of 19th Century European nationalism by which time, appeals to patriotism could more easily fill the ranks.

As the British colonial empire swelled through successful conquests and the gradual withdrawal of France from the colonial sphere, the British commitment in number of troops grew. Difficulty was had in providing garrisons in peacetime, particularly in Ireland where rebellion was a constant threat. In order to meet the requirement for troops to maintain garrisons as well as to meet the need overseas, special measures were taken to alleviate the problem of manning. Among the steps taken after 1758 was the embodiment of several Regiments of Fencibles, either cavalry or foot, to be used only for home service or in Ireland. From 1759 to 1783, eight Fencible regiments were raised, six of which were from Scotland.<sup>7</sup> Between 1793 and 1802, a total of 60 battalions of Fencible troops were raised for service.<sup>8</sup> Many of the Fencible corps served in Ireland and were involved in quelling the rebellion of 1798. Others served in the home islands and provided a trained, armed and disciplined body of troops able to resist an invasion attempt. The greatest value of these troops was the subsequent releasing of line regiments for overseas duty and also to serve as a training and replacement depot for the regular regiments.

Despite such measures as the creation of Fencibles, raising of bounties and use of convicts, adequate numbers of troops were not easily found. New resources of manpower were required if Britain was to meet the commitment for both home defence and overseas activity. The Highlands could provide the necessary resources, but anti-Jacobitism was the fundamental obstacle to the recruiting of the Highlanders prior to 1757.

## SECTION 2

### Government Policy, William Pitt and the Crisis of 1756.

The British government in 1756, faced with a massive overseas troop commitment, utilized a traditional method to alleviate the shortage of trained men by hiring mercenary troops from Hesse and Hanover. The war with France escalated and the British forces suffered severe checks and defeats such as the loss of Minorca in the spring of 1756.\* Apathy in the American colonies led to a further erosion of the British position as Americans were initially reluctant to enlist in the army in their own defence. The hiring of Germans and the home recruitment fell far short of the necessary manpower requirement.

The government of the Duke of Newcastle had attempted to alleviate the crisis through the augmentation of several battalions of foot, the raising of new regiments of dragoons and the reform of the Royal Marines who were placed under Admiralty control.<sup>9</sup> General Ligioner had been the motivating force behind the Newcastle reforms. The moves proved insufficient, however, and the loss of the post of Oswego in New York and the general lack of British success contributed to the fall of the Newcastle government. In its place was brought in a war government under the Duke of Devonshire with William Pitt as principal minister for the war effort.

Pitt moved swiftly. Two paramount actions were undertaken in the years 1756-57 to bolster the crippled British military establishment. An act for the raising of Militia in England and Wales was adopted in December 1756 which allowed for the raising of 30,000 recruits for home

---

\* For account of the siege of Minorca and the early battles of the war, see Portescue, Volume II., pages 297-301.



service. The German troops of Hanover and Hesse-Cassel were returned to the continent as the Militia took up the responsibility of home defence, even though the full complement could not be raised.

The second, and perhaps most crucial policy for the future, was the raising of two regiments of foot from the Scottish Highlands. This was a bold manoeuvre by Pitt. Fears of Jacobite activity were of great concern to the British governments of the post '45 period and any attempt to arm the Highlanders was seen as folly.

Proposals to raise regular regiments of the line on the basis of undercutting Jacobitism had been made previously from prominent Whigs in the Highlands, notably Duncan Forbes in 1738. Following the Jacobite rising of 1745, the Duke of Argyle again suggested the raising of troops from among the disaffected clans; however, the proposal was again refused.<sup>10</sup> In addition to the legislation designed to destroy the ability of the clans to take arms against the government, other measures were taken which included the removal of stands of arms from cities and burghs near the Highland line such as Aberdeen.<sup>11</sup>

Government policy between the quelling of the uprising and the renewal of war with France was that of subjugation of the clans and the removal from their possession of all possible means of revolt.

On 8 July 1748, Lord Findlater wrote to the Duke of Newcastle:<sup>12</sup>

It is said that there is an intention to turn the two Highland regiments into Independent Companies to be sent to the Highlands .... I am sure it would prove a most pernicious scheme, for it would effectually spread and keep the warlike spirit there and frustrate all measures for rooting it out .... It would be dangerous to scatter such a number of military Highlanders in their own country .... No Highlander ought to be employed in the Highlands, but a small number of picked ones to serve as guides for the regular troops.

Despite the fact that the great majority of the Highlanders under arms in 1748 were of the loyal clans, especially the Campbells, Munros,

Grants and Mackays, anti-Jacobite feeling was at such a level that very little distinction was made between those who had fought for and those who had fought against the Stuart cause. Official policy during this period, then, would not allow the raising of troops from the Highlands despite the very sound arguments put forth by such notables as Forbes and Argyle.

With the outbreak of war in 1756, the official anti-Jacobite position came under new consideration, though at a low key. The Duke of Newcastle tentatively proposed raising regulars from the Highlands, but King George would not accept the plan.<sup>13</sup> The proposal lay dormant for that year. The military reversals of 1756, though, caused a re-thinking of the policy towards the Highlands.

In late 1756, the Duke of Cumberland recommended the raising of Highlanders through the utilization of former rebel chieftains in a letter to Lord Albemarle using the pseudonym, "Germanicus-Britanicus".<sup>14</sup> Pitt readily accepted the idea but was faced with the task of convincing the Cabinet and King George. Pitt's argument was that by removing those of the disaffected clans from the Highlands and engaging them in fighting the French, a two-fold purpose could be accomplished. Firstly, a new area of recruitment would be opened utilizing the martial nature of the Highlands and thus alleviating the chronic shortages of manpower to fill up the depleted ranks of the army. Secondly, by removing from the Highlands those most prone to rebellion, the government could supervise the activities of these men in service while consequently removing the necessary supporters that any Stuart attempt would rely upon. This was, in essence, the argument put forward by Forbes and Argyle. Pitt argued that it was far better to have the Jacobites fighting the French than fomenting disaffection in the Highlands.<sup>15</sup> The argument was persuasive and the need for

troops imperative. The Cabinet was convinced as to the soundness of Pitt's proposal. The King acquiesced and issued a Royal Order dated 1 January 1757 for the raising of 2,000 troops in the Highlands.<sup>16</sup>

The first of the regiments to be raised was the 77th or Montgomery's Highlanders under Colonel Archibald Montgomery, son of the Earl of Eglinton. Eighty Gaelic-speaking non-commissioned officers were posted from other line regiments to train the new battalions which were to be composed primarily of men who had been out in rebellion in 1745 or who were of the Jacobite clans.<sup>17</sup> A mixture of loyal and rebel clansmen was achieved in the 77th as the list of recruitment by companies and region demonstrates.<sup>18\*</sup>

<u>Officers</u>	<u>Where Company Raised</u>
Lt.-Col. Montgomery .....	Atholl
Major Grant .....	Strathspey and Urquhart
Major Campbell .....	West Highlands
Captain Sinclair .....	Sutherland and Caithness
Captain MacKenzie .....	Glasgow and Ross-shire
Captain Gordon .....	Edinburgh and Aberdeenshire
Captain A. MacKenzie .....	Perthshire and Aberdeenshire
Captain MacDonald .....	Edinburgh and Skye
Captain Munro .....	Fairn Donald
Captain MacKenzie .....	Kintail

Areas of intense Jacobite activity were concentrated upon such as Kintail, the northwest regions and Ross-shire, home of the MacKenzies. A goodly number of the recruits from the loyal areas were mixed with the former Jacobites. The combination was to prove successful as this regiment gave excellent service while on duty in Canada and America.

The second Highland regiment embodied in 1757 was the 78th or Fraser's Highlanders, raised and commanded by Simon Fraser, eldest son of Lord Lovat who had been executed in 1747 for his role in the '45.

---

\* See Appendix D for copy of commission as Major of Alexander Campbell in 77th and signed by William Pitt.

Young Simon Fraser had been forced into the revolt by the machinations of his father and was subsequently pardoned in 1750. The Fraser estates and title had been forfeited, therefore, Fraser operated as a commoner with no land or tenants. Despite this handicap, he managed to raise some 800 men in a period of weeks, largely drawn from his family's former estates.<sup>19</sup> Again, as with Montgomery's Highlanders, the rank and file were largely recruited from the areas of formerly Jacobite sympathy. And, as with the 77th, the 78th gave excellent service in North America. Both regiments were disbanded in 1763.\*

Pitt's gamble had been a success. The martial inclinations of the Highlanders had been turned from anti-Hanoverian to pro-government and the last hope of the Jacobite cause had been quashed. Pitt claimed credit for having first raised the Highland regiments after 1746. It is true that he had been the minister responsible for doing so; however, the original idea was not his own. Years afterwards, Pitt, then the Earl of Chatham, proclaimed to Parliament:<sup>20</sup>

I sought merit where it could be found ..... It is my boast that I was the first minister who sought for it and found it in the mountains of the north. I called for it and drew into your service a hardy and intrepid race of men whom the jealousy of party had made a prey to the artifices of our enemies.

Speech of 14 January 1766.

By 1763, over 65,000 Scots were in the services, many of whom were Highlanders and many more were to serve throughout the next 60 years.<sup>21</sup>

---

\* A number of other Highland regiments were also raised for the Seven Year's War. See Appendix A for a complete listing.

### SECTION 3

#### Reconciliation and the Reasons for Raising.

Government policy toward the Highland corps until the mid-1790's was one of indifference as to the manner in which the regiments were raised. The press gang and the ballot box methods of procuring recruits in other parts of the country were largely unnecessary in the Highland regions for the Fencibles and regulars of the line. Official policy was to grant warrants for raising, supply a certain number of officers and funds for the cost of bounties, recruiting expenses and the initial uniforms and equipment. It was then left to the raiser to procure the troops in whatever manner he deemed necessary. The relative freedom given to the raiser in his activities was certainly an inducement to many of the Highland aristocracy to offer to raise a regiment and there were a number of landowners or prominent persons who were willing to do so for a multitude of reasons. In some cases, financial considerations and patronage were the primary motivators. After the successful implementation of the policy of allowing Scottish aristocrats to raise Highland corps after 1757, it became a very desirable undertaking and actually became quite fashionable in the 1790's. Landowners made continuous offers to raise units, many of which were accepted, as evidenced by the proliferation of regular and Fencible Highland units after 1793. Indeed, so many corps were embodied by the early 19th Century, that many recruits were drawn from non-Highland districts. This factor prompted the War Office in 1809 to remove the Highland dress and other distinctions from a number of regiments such as the 72nd, 73rd, 74th, 75th, 91st and 94th.<sup>22</sup>

Of more immediate concern in the mid-18th Century to many Highland notables was the loss of titles and estates as a result of participation

in the Jacobite rebellions. In return for service to the nation, which usually meant the raising of troops, estates were returned to their previous owners or heirs. Through this policy, not only did the Crown manage to reconcile a number of former Jacobites, but also received a great many troops in the process.

Three examples of the success of the policy of reconciliation are worthy of note. Simon Fraser had been pardoned for his role in the '45; nevertheless, the Lovat estates were held by the government. Despite this handicap, Fraser raised his regiment, the 78th, for the Seven Year's War and proved himself to be a talented military commander, attaining the rank of Brigadier-General in 1771. For his distinguished military service, Fraser was given the Lovat estates in 1774 for the sum of £20,983.<sup>23</sup> This amount represented the debts on the estate which were required to be cleared before he could take possession. In order to pay the debt incumbrance, rents were raised. Much of the remainder of the sum was recovered through the successful manipulation of patronage which was made possible through the raising of a Highland corps, therefore, the raising of a Highland regiment was a viable means of restoring a family's position, a factor not overlooked by many of the owners of forfeited estates and titles.

The title of Baron Fraser of Lovat was not restored until 1837; however, Simon Fraser did, through his efforts recover the land.<sup>24</sup> So successful was the raising of the 78th in 1757, that General Fraser again raised a corps of 2,340 troops in 1775 for service in the American Revolutionary War. The 71st, or Fraser's Highlanders, was officered by at least 6 clan chiefs, 2 sons of chiefs and several lesser chieftains or their sons.<sup>25</sup>

Following the successful example of Simon Fraser, Lord MacLeod, the heir to estates in Cromarty, raised a regiment for the American War in

1777 which was numbered the 73rd Regiment. MacLeod had fled to Sweden following the '45 despite a pardon on the grounds of his youth. He served for 27 years in the Swedish service, rising to the rank of Lieutenant-General.<sup>26</sup> In 1777, MacLeod returned to Great Britain and offered to raise a battalion from among his former tenantry in Cromarty and Lewis. A total of 1,100 men were raised initially of which 840 were Highlanders, the remainder being Lowland, Irish or English.<sup>27</sup> A second battalion was subsequently raised. Of the total of 2,200 troops, over 1,800 were from the Cromarty estates.<sup>28</sup> For his services, Lord MacLeod was allowed to purchase the forfeited estates of the Earldom of Comarty in 1784 at a cost of £19,000 or that amount of debt accrued on the estate.<sup>29</sup>

A third instance of this type concerned the heir to the Earldom of Seaforth, Kenneth MacKenzie, a grandson of the late Earl whose estates had been forfeited for his role in the uprisings of 1715 and 1719. In 1777, MacKenzie was allowed to purchase the estates of his grandfather and the following year, offered to raise a Highland regiment which became the 78th, Seaforth's Highlanders.<sup>30</sup>

The policy of reconciliation with the former rebels was, by any standard, an incredible success. Not only did this policy remove the underpinnings of previous Jacobite success, that of disaffection with the Hanoverian government, but it also offered a great scope for royal patronage. An underlying motivation for allowing Jacobite chiefs to raise troops was the need for the final reconciliation of the Scottish aristocracy to the Act of Union. Since 1707, the Scottish aristocracy had been relegated to an inferior status to that of England. Frustration over the lack of access to government patronage had been a primary root cause of disaffection and Jacobitism. An important tool of Crown patronage throughout the 17th and 18th Centuries had been the granting

of warrants to raise regiments. Through the granting of such warrants, the government signalled to the Scottish nobility and gentry that it had finally accepted them as equal partners in the Union, thus ending a half-century of bitterness and frustration. A further extension of this policy was the granting of new titles. In 1777, Macdonald of Sleat was made Baron Macdonald on the Irish Peerage as a result of the new policy towards the Highland aristocracy. Lord Macdonald raised the 76th Regiment, Macdonald's Highlanders the following year.

Other factors affected decisions to raise Highland corps. Some regiments were raised at great expence to the officers. Other officers, unable to advance through ordinary means, raised troops from among their kinsmen for promotion. Allan Cameron of Erracht had been retired in 1783 on half pay as a Lieutenant in Tarleton's British Legion.<sup>31</sup> In 1793, his offer to raise a Highland corps was accepted and the 79th Cameron's Highlanders was embodied. No bounty money for recruitment was provided for this regiment by the government, therefore, it was at a great expence to himself and his officers that Cameron managed to recruit his regiment. He was promoted to colonel, a considerable rise in rank. Cameron went to great lengths to raise a purely Highland corps and originally only Gaelic speakers were taken into the ranks.<sup>32</sup>

Frank Adam, writing on the history of the Highland regiments, proposes the theory that the 89th Regiment, the first of the Gordon's Highlanders, was raised in 1759 by the Duchess of Gordon and her second husband, Major Staates Long Morris, to counteract the political influence of the Duke of Argyle. The future Duke of Gordon was still in his minority at that time.<sup>33</sup> The theory does not seem unreasonable considering the friction and jealousies between the great houses of Scotland during the period.

Many factors were involved in the raising of regiments. Initially, some regiments were raised in exchange for the return of forfeited



properties or titles as with MacLeod or MacKenzie. Family prestige was also of importance. Finally, by the 1790's, the raising and commanding of a Highland regiment had become so popular that lesser gentry such as Cameron of Erracht were willing to go to great expense to raise and equip a regiment despite the lack of government money. And, certainly, extra income could be generated by a regiment, particularly in a period of rising prices and ostentatious living by the aristocracy of Scotland when traditional revenues were proving insufficient to meet costs.\*

---

\* Chapter III, Section 3, deals with the financial aspect in depth.

## SECTION 4

### Types of Regiments, 1740 to 1815.

The response to the government's efforts at raising troops from the Highlands was considerable after 1757 as indicated by the great number of all types of regiments embodied. There were, during this period, five distinct types of Highland corps embodied either for home defence or service overseas. These corps were: regiments of the line and their reserve battalions; Fencible regiments of foot; County Militia; Volunteer regiments; and finally, Local Militia. Between the years 1740 and 1815, 86 battalions were raised in the Highlands for army service excluding the Volunteers and Local Militia. The numbers raised were: 50 battalions of the line of which 34 were employed on foreign service;\* 29 battalions of Fencibles; 3 battalions of line reserves; and 7 battalions of Militia.\*\* A complete listing of the Fencible and line regiments is given in Appendix A with dates and details of service.

The Fencible regiments served in Great Britain and Ireland and were primarily for home defence. Of the 45 battalions raised in Scotland between 1759 and 1802, the majority were either Highland or recruited predominately in the Highlands as was the case of many border regiments.<sup>34</sup> Although there had existed some Fencible corps since 1759, the terms of service and regulations governing the raising of Fencibles were finally legislated in 1778. The Comprehending Act of 1778 established

---

\* The remainder never left Great Britain or were drafted into other regiments as replacement troops. See Appendix A.

\*\* For lists of Volunteers and Local Militia, see Stewart, Volume II, Pages 437-438.

that Fencibles were:<sup>35</sup>

- 1) voluntarily enlisted (bounty of 3 guineas in 1778),
- 2) service confined to Scotland except in case of invasion,
- 3) men not to be drafted into other units,
- 4) officers to be nominated by raiser.

A breakdown of the Fencibles raised from the Highlands shows that the bulk were embodied between 1793 and 1802.<sup>36</sup>

- 1) 1759-63 - 2
- 2) 1778-83 - 4
- 3) 1793 - 5 (Bredalbane Fencibles had 3 battalions)
- 4) 1794 - 11
- 5) 1795-1802 - 5

Service for the Fencibles was eventually extended to Ireland where many served throughout the 1790's. The Fencible corps provided replacement troops for the line regiments on a regular basis and served as a valuable training depot. In June 1800, for example, 800 Fencible troops were taken from those serving in Ireland into the depleted ranks of the 21st, 71st, 72nd, 79th and 92nd regiments to fill out those unit's full complement. All were volunteers and received bounties of 10 guineas while officers received regular commissions based upon the number of privates volunteering.<sup>37\*</sup>

With the outbreak of war in the 1790's, the need for home defence troops was imperative. Accordingly, in 1793, William Pitt the Younger advocated the raising of a Scottish and Irish Militia. English political opinion, however, would not support the raising of Militia in these countries.<sup>38</sup> The fear of Jacobitism and the new concern over French-style Jacobinism prevented the creation of Militia and the Fencibles were raised as an alternative. The recruitment for the Fencibles was not by forced ballot and through the appointment of officers by the Crown, the Fencibles were considered less susceptible to anti-government activity.<sup>39</sup>

The English Militia dated from 1757 but attempts to create a

---

\* See Appendix B for text of circular letter sent to the Colonels of Fencible regiments in Ireland.

Scottish Militia in 1760, 1776, 1782 and 1793 were defeated in Parliament, and it was not until 1797 that fears of Jacobitism had subsided to a degree which allowed for the passage of the Militia Act of 1797 in July of that year.<sup>40</sup>

The Act called for the raising of 6,000 troops to serve only in Scotland and for the duration of the war plus one month.<sup>41</sup> The Scottish Militia was chosen by ballot in each parish and a balloted man could pay a fine of £10 to the Deputy Lieutenant of the county in order to hire a replacement volunteer should he wish not to serve.<sup>42</sup> Those to be balloted were to be fit men between the ages of 18 and 23 and those exempted included all married men with two or more children, sailors, apprentices, articled clerks, University lecturers, schoolmasters, clergy, parish constables and those already serving in any of the armed forces.<sup>43</sup> The terms of service were quite generous and those disabled were eligible for pensions. Any former Militia soldier could practice any trade in any corporate town without having to pay the mandatory fees. The officers were made up of the local gentry in order to create an atmosphere of trust and local familiarity.<sup>44</sup> The captains and subalterns were appointed on the local level by the Lord Lieutenant of each county while the Crown appointed the Majors and Colonels.<sup>45</sup>

Despite careful measures to insure acceptance of the Militia by the populace, a goodly amount of disruption and riot occurred in Scotland from June to November of 1797 and the implementation of the Act was postponed until March of 1798.<sup>46</sup> Particularly strong resistance occurred in Aberdeen, Athole and the south western Lowlands. Many reasons for this resistance to the raising of the Militia have been advanced. The rise of Jacobin ideas coupled with mistrust of the government's intentions generated some discontent. A very real fear of being posted to other parts of the country contrary to the limitations of service was manifested in opposition to balloting. Finally, unlike the English Militia where local clergy

carried out the balloting, Scottish schoolmasters were called upon to carry out this duty and, respected though they may have been, many schoolmasters lacked the force of authority needed to carry out an unpopular measure.<sup>47</sup>

An interesting feature of the returns for 1797 is the very low number of balloted men from Highland counties as compared with the Lowlands. This was perhaps attributable to the great drain of men for the regulars and Fencibles by that year:<sup>48</sup>

<u>Highland Counties</u>		<u>Lowland Counties</u>	
Inverness-shire	- 95	Fife	- 176
Cromarty	- 11	Perth	- 263
Ross	- 81	Forfar	- 185
Sutherland	- 27	Aberdeen	- 244

Due to the lack of manpower, the initial quota for the Scottish Militia establishment was reduced from 6,000 to 5,468.<sup>49</sup>

With the disbanding of the Fencibles after 1802, the responsibility for home defence devolved onto the Militia. A new Act of 26 June 1802 increased the Scottish Militia establishment to 7,950 troops and augmented the 10 battalions to 15.<sup>50</sup> The initial battalions were of 600 privates each and were apportioned over the country as follows:<sup>51</sup>

<u>Regiment</u>		<u>County</u>
1st	John Campbell	Argyle, Bute, Inverness, Dumbarton;
2nd	Lord Seaforth	Caithness, Cromarty, Ross, Moray, Nairn, Sutherland;
3rd	Duke of Hamilton	Lanark;
4th	Lord Dalkeith	Dumfries, Kirkcudbright, Peebles, Roxburgh, Selkirk, Wigtown;
5th	Duke of Montrose	Clackmannan, Fife, Kinross, Stirling;
6th	Lord Aboyne	Aberdeen, Banff;
7th	Lord Glasgow	Ayr, Renfrew;
8th	Lord Douglas	Forfar, Kincardine;
9th	Duke of Buccleuch	Berwick, Lothians.

A third force for home defence was the Volunteer regiments. These local bodies were created in 1798 on the suggestion of Henry Dundas and were disbanded in 1802. The Volunteers evolved from earlier local citizen military units called Armed Associations. Efforts at organizing such

bodies had been previously made often with limited success.<sup>52</sup> The Lord Lieutenants were made responsible for the raising of the Volunteer regiments after 1798 and government support made the raising of such corps easier than had been the case with the former Armed Associations. Although sanctioned by the government, the Volunteers were funded by private subscription and no pay was given unless the troops were actually called up for duty. As a result, the government had little control over the discipline of the Volunteers; however, these regiments could be quite advantageous in efforts at repelling any invasion or domestic insurrection, therefore, their existence was an integral aspect of the home defence strategy.<sup>53</sup>

The system of Volunteer regiments affected the efforts at raising the Militia since they were not conscripted by ballot and training in the Volunteers exempted one from being balloted in the Militia.<sup>54</sup> Because of the conflict, the Volunteer regiments were replaced in 1802 by the Local Militia which was selected by ballot. No substitutes were allowed and no bounty was given. By 1809, 66 regiments of Local Militia had been created in Scotland with a total of 45,781 men under arms.<sup>55</sup> The Local Militia filled the defence gap created by the disbanding of the Fencible regiments and the weakness of the Scottish Militia. The Local Militia was the predecessor of the present Territorial Army Volunteer Reserve.

With the great success in raising troops from the Highlands for the Fencibles, the Duke of York proposed in 1797 a plan for the raising of 9 brigades of Highlanders to be commanded by clan chiefs and to be raised from each chief's district and clansmen. The non-commissioned officers were to be drawn from the Fencible regiments and the officers from either the line regiments or from the half-pay lists with a promotion in rank as inducement to serve. The plan called for the raising of 15,000 troops to be regimented along clan and district lines.<sup>56</sup>

The plan was circulated by Henry Dundas to all major Highland chiefs and landowners in February 1797. The proposal met with some scepticism as a letter from MacPherson of Cluny to the Duke of Gordon illustrates:<sup>57</sup>

Your Grace must be very sensible that this county has already been much drained by different levies - so much so that, if the number now proposed were taken out of it, there would be a great danger of a total stop being made to the operations of husbandry.

Letter of 6 March 1797.

Negative reaction to the plan caused it to be abandoned and the Militia and Volunteers were raised in 1798 instead of the Clan regiments.

## NOTES FOR CHAPTER II.

### Section 2.1. The Need For Troops in the Last Half of the 18th Century.

- 1) Fortescue, J.W., The History of the British Army, Vol. II, p.286.
- 2) Fortescue, Vol. III, p.394.
- 3) Fortescue, Vol. V, p.175.
- 4) Kemp, Alan, The British Army in the American Revolution, p.3.
- 5) Op. cit.
- 6) Op. cit.
- 7) Scobie, I.H. Mackay, An Old Highland Fencible Corps, p.3.
- 8) Op. cit., p.4.

### Section 2.2. Government Policy, William Pitt and the Crisis of 1756.

- 9) Ayling, Stanley, The Elder Pitt, Earl of Chatham, p.197.
- 10) Green, Walford Davis, William Pitt, p.83.
- 11) Bulloch, John Malcolm, Territorial Soldiering, p.xxii.
- 12) Op. cit., p.xxi.
- 13) Ayling, op. cit., p.192.
- 14) Green, op. cit., p.83.
- 15) Ayling, op. cit., p.192.
- 16) Green, op. cit., p.84.
- 17) Fortescue, Vol. III, p.306.
- 18) Bulloch, op. cit., p.xxv.
- 19) Stewart, David, Sketches of the Highlanders, Vol. II, p.19.
- 20) Paton, James, Scottish History and Life, p.191.
- 21) Scobie, op. cit., p.2 (from Scots Magazine 1763).

### Section 2.3. Reconciliation and the Reasons for Raising.

- 22) Adam, Frank, The Clans, Septs and Regiments of the Scottish Highlands, p.472.
- 23) Op. cit., p.453.
- 24) Anderson, William, The Scottish Nation, Vol. II, p.263.



- 25) Adam, op. cit., p.453.
- 26) Op. cit., p.445.
- 27) Stewart, op. cit., Vol. II, p.84.
- 28) Adam, op. cit., p.445.
- 29) Op. cit.
- 30) Op. cit., p.459.
- 31) Op. cit., p.468.
- 32) Op. cit., pp.468-469.
- 33) Op. cit., p.451.

Section 2.4. Types of Regiments, 1740 to 1815.

- 34) Scobie, op. cit., p.361.
- 35) Bulloch, op. cit., p.xxxv.
- 36) Scobie, op. cit., p.6.
- 37) Op. cit., p.269.
- 38) Western, J.R., "The Formation of the Scottish Militia in 1797", p.1.
- 39) Stewart, op. cit., Vol. II, p.301.
- 40) Bulloch, op. cit., p.xiv.
- 41) Western, op. cit., p.3.
- 42) Op. cit.
- 43) Op. cit., p.5.
- 44) Op. cit., p.13.
- 45) Op. cit., p.15.
- 46) Op. cit., p.10.
- 47) Op. cit., p.3.
- 48) Bulloch, op. cit., p.xlvii.
- 49) Op. cit.
- 50) Op. cit., p.lii.

- 51) Western, op. cit., p.17.
- 52) Bulloch, op. cit., p.lvi.
- 53) Op. cit.
- 54) Op. cit.
- 55) Op. cit., p.lxiii.
- 56) Seaforth Muniments, H.M. Register House, Edinburgh, GD 46/6/34.
- 57) Bulloch, op. cit., p.xlii.

### CHAPTER III.

#### The Dynamics of Recruiting.

### CHAPTER III.

#### SECTION 1

##### The Importance of Clan and District Associations.

The manner in which a Highland regiment was raised, whether regular or Fencible, varied little from the period of the early Black Watch in 1740 through the 1790's. In the Highlands, regiments were raised as a result of an offer from a regional magnate and, as has been pointed out, required little prompting from the government. Whether raised by former Jacobites seeking the restoration of forfeited properties or for reasons of prestige, the pattern for each regiment was similar.

Not every offer advanced was accepted, however.\* Once the government had decided to embody a particular corps, a contract was drawn up with the raiser. A Warrant or Beating Order was issued by the Secretary at War which authorized the raiser, with the King's authority, to recruit a regiment.\*\* The raiser, by the terms of the Warrant, was entitled to nominate all or some of the officers, subject to the Crown's approval. For example, the Warrant for the raising of the 98th Argyleshire Regiment issued on 10 February 1794 to the Duke of Argyle states that:<sup>1</sup>

His Majesty leaves to Your Grace the nomination of all officers being such as are well affected to His Majesty, and most likely by their interests and connexions to assist in raising the corps without delay, who if they meet with His Majesty's approbation may be assured they will have commissions as soon as the Regiment is complete. The officers (if taken from Half-Pay) to serve in their

---

\* An offer by the city of Aberdeen in 1778 was declined, for example.

\*\* See Appendix B for the text of the Warrant issued to Colonel Baillie for the raising of the Reay Fencibles.

present rank, if taken from Full-Pay to serve with one step of promotion; the gentlemen named for ensigns are not to be under 16 years of age.

Money for recruiting and equipping the regiment would be paid in gross, from which, subject to bounty restrictions, the officers would negotiate deals with the potential recruits.<sup>2</sup> Money for recruiting expenses was placed in a common fund known as the stock-purse from which officers would draw upon and which was maintained by the Regimental Paymaster.\* Any surplus funds were divided among the company captains and field officers. In time of war, governments often granted extra allowances to compensate for the increase in bounty monies required to attract volunteers.<sup>3</sup> A detailed description of the system of bounties and other financial transactions in recruiting is found in Section 3.

By the terms of the contract, the colonel or raiser was obligated to recruit and maintain the numbers of his regiment and a base figure of 500 of all ranks was the lowest that a corps was allowed to fall below which, individual units were subject to disbandment. This proved to be a serious matter as the supply of men diminished and great numbers were lost in combat and by disease after 1793. The manner in which a colonel or raiser obtained his recruits was generally of little concern to the government as long as the required quotas were reached. A letter to Lord Macdonald granting him Carte Blanche permission to raise the 76th Regiment, Macdonald's Highlanders in 1777 in any manner from among his tenantry attests to the great leverage granted to the Highland magnates in the raising of their regiments. Should the raiser be unable to meet the obligations in numbers, the government was quite

---

\* The Lord Macdonald papers contain a goodly number of account returns for officers recruiting the Regiment of the Isles, H.M. Register House, GD 221/100.

willing to buy the existing recruits and distribute them to other standing units.\*

Although the legal foundation of the old patriarchal clan system had been destroyed by legislation following the '45 and the subsequent opening up of the Highlands through the construction of roads and commercial enterprise, much of the ties of kinship and the role of the chief as father and protector remained throughout the 18th Century. Edward Burt, who provides much insight into the internal workings of the clan system prior to 1747, commented on the position of the clan chief:<sup>4</sup>

... he is their idol; and as they profess to know no king but him ... so they will say, they ought to do whatever he requires without inquiry.

As late as the 1790's, the feeling of obligation towards the traditional leader was still of some importance and is commented upon by several writers for the Statistical Account. The Reverend Mr. Andrew Gallie, writing for the Parish of Kincardine in Ross and Cromarty, states of his parishioners:<sup>5</sup>

They still retain a sacred regard for the clan and family they are sprung from; but it must be allowed that this feeling is on the decline.

And on military matters, Colonel David Stewart of Garth states that:<sup>6</sup>

The Highland chiefs and landowners were not followed from mercenary motives, but from a patriarchal, hereditary and chivalrous attachment to their persons and families.

While Stewart may perhaps be accused of romanticism; nevertheless, the sentiment of his statement illustrates a fundamental aspect of Highland society during the latter half of the 18th Century; old

---

\* See Appendix D for photocopy of letter stipulating these conditions dated December 1777.

clan loyalties to family and chief were still of paramount importance at that time. As late as 1799, the Countess of Sutherland could appeal to her clansmen to enlist in the 93rd Sutherland Highlanders as a test of duty and devotion to the chief and sovereign.

This feeling towards clan and chief was a valuable asset to the government which was wise enough to utilize the tremendous potential for manpower possible through the successful manipulation of clan loyalties. Old clan hatreds and anti-Hanoverian sentiment were successfully transferred to foreign enemies after 1746. The old aristocracy of the Highlands, the chiefs and tacksmen, were the key figures in this transmission and the primary reasons for the great success of Highland recruiting.

The problem of how to successfully harness the clan sentiment for the government's benefit was approached in what was proven to be the proper manner as shown by the great success of the policy. By granting the right to determine officer's appointments to the colonels or raisers or by specifying that they be chosen from among the gentry of the region, the clan and regional ties were maintained.

The lists of original officers for the Reay Fencibles provide an excellent illustration of the importance of the gentlemen tacksmen officers. In 1793, 21 families held major tacks on the estates of Lord Reay in north western Sutherland. The Colonel, Hugh Mackay Baillie, was a cousin of the future Lord Reay, Eric, while the Lieutenant-Colonel, George Mackay of Bighouse, was a major tacksman. The Major was a native of Armadale, but had married into a Mackay family and was a career officer. Of the captains, 7 were major tacksmen and 2 were relations of the Colonel and the Lieutenant-Colonel, Captains Lamington Baillie and Colin Campbell Mackay. The Reays carried 21 Lieutenants on the rolls at raising. Of these, 10 were the sons of major tacksmen or relations of the field officers. Only 2 of the

Lieutenants were career officers recruited from other corps to add military experience and expertise. Of the 8 Ensigns, 4 were again sons of the major tacksmen while 2 of the remaining were professional surgeons. The Captain-Lieutenant, who actually commanded the Colonel's Company, was James Mackay of Skerray whose house supplied Lieutenants Hector Mackay and William Mackay.<sup>7</sup>

The various companies were raised predominantly from the estates of the tacksmen officers. The Bighouse Company of the Lieutenant-Colonel was raised entirely from the Mackay of Bighouse Strathalladale estate. The Mackays of Skerray raised their troops not only from their tacks at Skerray, but also from parts of Farr and Strathnaver. And finally, Colonel Baillie of Rosehall and Captain Lamington Baillie's Companies were enlisted largely from their Rosehall estates.<sup>8</sup>

The policy of granting commissions to tacksmen was tremendously successful in the Fencible regiments and the importance of the tacksman's traditional role as the middleman between chief and clansman was successfully used by these corps. The case of the regular regiments of the line was somewhat different regarding amateur tacksman officers. Although they were to play a significant role in the raising of their tenantry for service, there was a definite need for trained, experienced officers as opposed to the gentlemen amateurs so abundant in the Fencibles.

General Wemyss' Warrant for the raising of the 93rd Sutherland Highlanders in 1799 specified that the Lieutenant-Colonel and Major should come from the half-pay lists or promoted from the full-pay lists of other regiments. The 8 Ensigns were to be gentlemen of at least 16 years of age and of the tacksman class, thus giving some scope for Patronage. The remainder of the officers were appointed by the government either from full or half-pay and some were taken from the disbanded Sutherland Fencibles, thus allowing for trained officers from the Sutherland area.<sup>9</sup>



Local gentry were, however, quite prominent in the first gazetteing of officers to the 93rd as the government attempted to appoint men with local backgrounds. Of the 7 Captains, 5 were from the major area of recruitment in Sutherland. Four of the 11 Lieutenants were local gentry while 7 Ensigns were of the local tacksmen families. It is significant to note that a close examination of the returns of the original officers shows that all ranks above Ensign were posted from other regiments and of the whole, 2 were drawn from the half-pay lists. Of the Captains, only 2 had held commissions in the Sutherland Fencibles and one in the Reay Fencibles. The remainder had served in various Scottish or English regiments.<sup>10</sup> This illustrates rather dramatically the predilection of the Highland gentry towards military service. As a result, the government had at hand a great repository of Highland officers to post to newly formed Highland regiments to not only maintain the important clan and regional ties but also to provide the benefit of their experience and training.

The significance of the clan gentry and tacksmen to the recruiting prospects of a Highland regiment is quite well illustrated in numerous statements by various writers and two are reproduced as examples of the great importance of the role played by the officers who were native to the region of recruitment. Colonel Stewart suggests that:<sup>11</sup>

To the south of the hills, no recruits could be obtained without money. In the north money had its place, but in raising soldiers, it was less regarded than the character and family of the person recruiting, and whose fortunes the young soldiers converted themselves.

Colonel Cameron, in his Memoirs, stated that "beyond all question, it was the personal and family influence which then filled the ranks of the Highland regiments."<sup>12</sup>

## SECTION 2

### The Methods of Recruiting in the Highlands.

Recruiting for the Highland regiments took on many forms in the period prior to the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Several methods were of primary importance and include the practices of recruitment for rank, recruitment by rank, appeal to clan obligations and loyalties and conscription. These several methods of raising troops as well as the importance of the non-regular regiments in supplying men to the regulars is now dealt with in this section.

The system of recruitment for rank has been condemned by some writers as bringing into the service a great number of "bad characters" and other undesirables.<sup>13</sup> This criticism may have some foundation, but it was a necessary expedient of the times. The Prime Minister, William Pitt, initiated the practice in 1793 in order to raise a large number of troops in a short period of time. Officers currently holding regular commissions were given a step in promotion for a certain quota of men raised, while civilians were granted commissions based upon the number of troops delivered.<sup>14</sup> Previous to 1793, the system of raising for rank in the Highlands had only been used for the Independent Companies.<sup>15</sup> After 1793, the 78th, 79th, 92nd and 93rd Regiments were all raised using this system. As an example, officers of the 2nd Battalion of the 78th Regiment were given commissions as follows: 100 men for Lieutenant-Colonelcy, 90 for a Majority, 50 for a Captaincy, 25 for a Lieutenancy and 20 for an Ensigncy.<sup>16</sup>

The system of recruiting soldiers by rank rather than for rank had been the normal procedure for decades in the Highland corps prior to 1793. The crucial difference in the two systems was the factor of pre-appointment to a commission followed by the recruitment of troops

as opposed to the recruitment followed by commission based upon the numbers delivered. Earlier officers did perhaps have more discretion in choosing potential soldiers for the service as their commission had already been assured. The generally accepted ratio for the period of 1740 to 1790 was 35 men for captains, 25 for lieutenants and 15 for each ensign. These figures did vary from regiment to regiment but represent an approximate sampling. In the papers of MacPherson of Cluny is found a letter dated 1761 to Colonel Graeme, commanding the 105th Regiment, wherein MacPherson defends his nephew, a company captain, who was only able to raise 64 men for his company. Since no subalterns had been appointed to assist in the raising of this company, this figure represents a very large body of men for one officer when the expected total was near 35.<sup>17</sup>

Other records suggest more reasonable figures. For example, returns of recruits attested by 12 April 1793 by Lieutenants Morrison and Maine of the Bredalbane Fencibles show 13 men each while the return for Captain Ronaldson is 28. This regiment is reported to have had no difficulty in raising troops and eventually three battalions were embodied.<sup>18</sup>

Officers who were unable to meet the requirement set for their rank were obliged to pay a fine into the Regimental Paymaster's Account out of which funds were drawn to fill the vacancies. In the Bredalbane Fencibles, the fine was set at 2 guineas and this sum was paid as a bonus to the officer who recruited the extra man to fill the vacancy.

In the earlier part of the 18th Century, and in various Fencible regiments where recruitment was strong, a number of officers recruited more than their quota. These surplus men were organized into a single replacement company and were known as supernumeraries. If a man was

rejected on the grounds of medical, financial or general unsuitability, his place was filled by a recruit drawn from the supernumerary company and the officer who had first recruited the replacement received a bonus of 5 guineas per man taken into the ranks.<sup>19</sup> It was, therefore, to the great advantage of every officer to not only meet his quota, but to exceed it.

The purchasing of commissions, a system which existed in the British army until the Cardwell reforms of 1871, was not confined to the Lowland and English regiments. A number of Highland officers managed to receive their commissions and rank advancements through this system. The financial arrangements of this system are discussed in Section 3 in depth. Although 20th Century hindsight condemns the purchase of officer's commissions, the motivation for allowing often inefficient and incompetent officers into the service upon a monetary payment, was the attempt to make the army incapable of anti-government activity. This system was also a great tool for government patronage as well as a source of income for those who undertook the raising of a regiment.

Fencible regiments proved to be extremely valuable as replacement troops for the regular regiments and Highland officers were quite prone to take advantage of this situation. Stewart of Garth suggests that many officers raised Fencible troops in order to obtain a start in the service and endeavoured to move up in the ranks by transferring men to the regular line regiments. This system was not always a success and many Fencible officers remained in a static position.<sup>20</sup> A goodly number of Fencible officers as well as those from the Militia and Volunteers did succeed in transferring into regular battalions. Captain Colin Campbel Mackay, who commanded the Grenadier Company of the Reay Fencibles is typical of these officers. In 1805, Mackay raised

a Grenadier Company for the 2nd Battalion of the 78th Regiment. Through the system of recruitment for rank, he was granted a Captaincy. Many of the troops were from his Strathalladale estates and had served under this officer with the Reays in Ireland prior to 1803.<sup>21</sup>

With the officers chosen for a new Highland corps, whether through family patronage, purchase of commission or the promise to raise a certain number for rank, the more difficult task of raising the 1,000 or so rank and file per battalion was begun, a process which might take several forms ranging from appeals to clan loyalty to various methods of local conscription.

In the Highlands, family influence would have been quite important during this period and a great number of recruits would quickly volunteer upon hearing that a certain officer or family was raising a company. As recruiting became more intense and the requirement for the Highland corps began to drain off the initial volunteers, certain methods of conscription were employed, though not with the same intensity as with the ballot used by the Scottish Militia after 1797.

A method employed for the raising of the 93rd Highlanders seems to have been in use for some time when raising clan levies and was again employed in 1799. This was the use of the snuff mull or horn. A parish meeting of all the males of a prescribed age would be held and the men formed into regular ranks. The chieftain or his representative, usually the officer recruiting, would pass among the ranks with the snuff mull and a bottle of whisky. Those chosen by the officer would be given a pinch of snuff and a dram of whisky while the clerk recorded his name. The signal was the giving of the snuff and each man understood and accepted the meaning of this action. Each new recruit would receive a shilling and was given subsistence money for the period prior to mustering and then sent home.<sup>22</sup> The success of this method depended

upon the acceptance of military service as a duty to one's superior and could only be as successful as the feelings of obligation still existent in the clan.

It is reported by the Reverend John Macdonald, a veteran of the 93rd, that a method of ballot box conscription was used in the Parish of Farr where men drew black balls out of a box to signify their conscription.<sup>23</sup> It must be stated that references to these methods of recruiting by conscription for the regulars and Fencibles are rare and were apparently not used to any great extent. The Militia and the Local Militia after 1802 did utilize ballot conscription.

A more reliable method of raising volunteers for service, and one that encompassed the traditional obligations of the proprietor to tenants, involved the granting of land or lease rights to either the volunteer himself or the man's family. Colonel Gardyne, in his The Life of a Regiment, asserts that it was not unusual for officers to arrange for the families or recruits to receive extra grazing rights or similar favours.<sup>24</sup> This practice seems to have been quite common over all the Highlands and Islands. A letter from Lord Macdonald to a clansman during the raising of the 76th Regiment promises that:<sup>25</sup>

Angus Mathison in Raigil, having given one of his sons for the Service, I hereby promise the said Angus preference always to the lands he now possesses, especially as he bears exceeding good character. His children shall also have the same indulgence.

Cruidrach, 17 March 1778.

Promises to recruits or their families varied from situation to situation. A list of promises to men of the West Fencible Regiment raised by the Earl of Bredalbane during the American War gives an excellent demonstration of the diversity of grants and promises:<sup>26</sup>

James Campbell of Netherlorn - To continue his parents in the place they are now in, while able to pay the rents, and to give himself one merk land after going home.

Duncan MacIntyre of Netherlorn - A house, land and two cows for himself without rent and half a merk land for his brother at Whitsunday, 1780.

Duncan Sinclair of Glenorchy - To befriend himself and his parents.

The agreements might range from a general promise of consideration for recruits to a legal promise between landlord and tenant for land, rents or livestock. Eric, later Lord Reay, promised preferment for the granting of tacks and leases to those who enlisted in the Reay Fencibles in 1794.<sup>27</sup> In the more extreme cases, small farmers would often offer their sons for service in exchange for enlargement of holdings or the granting of leases, a system which led to some legal proceedings when either landlord or tenant renigged on the contract.<sup>28</sup>

Prior to the wars after 1792, these agreements with the small farmers and tenants were occasionally of a vague nature as seen by the Bredalbane manuscript which simply promises to befriend a recruit and his family. With the great pressure for raising troops brought on by years of prolonged hostilities, the promises became more exact and more beneficial to these enlisting on such terms. A recruiting poster for the Canadian Regiment for service in Canada, dated 8 May 1804, promises that if the Regiment is disbanded in America, those wishing to settle would be granted allotments of land, and wives and families of recruits would be able to accompany the Regiment while on service. A bounty of 5 guineas was also promised.<sup>29</sup>

The practice of settling Highland soldiers was not new, however. Following the Seven Year's War and the American War, soldiers of the Highland regiments were allowed to settle in Canada. Privates were usually allotted 100 acres, non-commissioned officers 200 acres and lower grade officers 400 acres. It was from these settled veterans of the 42nd, 77th and 78th regiments that Sir Guy Carleton was able to mount

a force to repel the American invasion of Canada in 1775. These veteran settlers were eventually brought onto the establishment in 1779 as the 84th, Royal Highland Emigrant Regiment.<sup>30</sup>

As the pressure on the population for recruits increased throughout the 1790's, landlords were forced to offer better terms to those not wishing to settle in Canada and became more bold in their promises to their tenantry. In Sutherland, General Wemyss had found recruitment extremely difficult, largely due to the great numbers of troops already taken from the area. In response to the situation, the Countess of Sutherland agreed to grant free land leases to recruits in exchange for their services. Those areas immediately available were given out at existing rents while the bulk of the leases were due at Whitsunday 1807 when the land was due to be reset.\* The terms of the lease were set at 7 years, somewhat better than the annual lease which was the bane of many small farmers at that time.<sup>31</sup> The age of the clearances and removals to make way for the large sheep farms had not come to Sutherland in 1799 and the promise of small lease holdings was considered feasible at that time. With the economic pressure to modernize and increase the rent takings, the sheep farms began to appear in Sutherland by 1807 and some difficulty was found in meeting the promises of land holdings given to recruits seven years earlier.<sup>32</sup> The Sutherland papers contain several copies of petitions for redress of grievances on this account.\*\*

When a regiment was embodied and sent on service, there was a continual need for replacement troops. This was particularly critical in the regular regiments which suffered casualties not only from enemy action, but also disease and natural disaster, especially those on

---

\* A sample letter appears in Appendix B.

\*\* See Appendix B for text of Petitions.



service in the tropical areas. Casualties in the West Indies normally ran several times the number brought about by enemy action. In addition to casualties and disease, retirement through age or general unfitness for service placed a constant drain on the strength of a regiment. Fortunately, losses through desertion were quite rare in the Highland corps of this period, and the increase in desertions after 1800 is usually credited to the influx of non-Highlanders, especially Irish recruits.

In order to maintain a regiment's strength, each corps constantly sent recruiting parties to Scotland, not only to the Highlands, but also to the market and manufacturing towns in the Lowlands and borders. In 1802-03, the Gordon Highlanders maintained recruiting stations in Dundee, Huntly, Aberdeen, Paisley, Stirling, Inverness, Fort William and Perth.<sup>33</sup> Recruiting was reasonably successful at fairs and markets where young Highlanders would travel to in search of employment.<sup>34</sup>

At any given time, a great many of a regiment's members would be assigned to recruitment in Scotland. The inspection report of Sir John Moore for the Reay Fencibles in Ireland for May 1799, lists the following as absent on recruiting duty in Scotland: Officers - 4, Sergeants - 6, Corporals - 2, Drummers - 1, Privates - 7, or a total of 20.<sup>35</sup> The report for the following year in May 1800 gives the numbers at 18 or: Officers - 2, Sergeants - 3, Corporals - 2, Drummers - 1 and Privates - 10.<sup>36</sup>

The constant need for replacements for the line regiments presented a sizeable problem for the government. Efforts to raise new replacements were often frustrated and it was not unusual for a recruiting party to report a monthly return of no men enlisted. Two policies were inaugurated in order to fill the ranks of the regulars. Men were encouraged to volunteer from the Fencibles into the regular regiments, particularly

those Fencibles serving in Ireland. A more drastic measure was taken in 1796 when all Fencible corps in Ireland were reduced to 500 rank and file. The hope of the War Office was that a number of the discharged troops would volunteer for regular service.<sup>37</sup> The Fencibles were later augmented up to their original numbers, however. Many of the retired Fencible men did join the regular regiments following the disbanding of the Fencibles by 1803. The 93rd Regiment received some 250 of its initial recruits from the ranks of the disbanded Sutherland Fencibles.<sup>38</sup> Of the Clan Alpine Fencibles, a total of 350 troops joined regular regiments and 200 of the Caithness Fencibles volunteered primarily into the 92nd and 79th Regiments.<sup>39</sup> A more striking example illustrates the great dependence on the Fencibles by the regulars. In 1800, MacLeod's Highlanders received a draft of 800 men from the Fencibles.<sup>40</sup>

A second instrument of government policy was encompassed in the Defence Act of 1804 which authorized the raising of 2nd Battalions to be used as training and replacement depots for the 1st Battalions serving overseas.<sup>41</sup> Although 2nd Battalions had existed for some time, they now took on the function of primarily supplying replacements for the active service battalions. In 1803, a 2nd Battalion was established for the Gordons and the 79th established its 2nd Battalion in 1804. The 2nd Battalion of the 91st was raised in 1804 but experienced great difficulty in finding recruits. Between September 1804 and March 1805, the 2nd Battalion, 91st was only able to raise 144 troops.<sup>42</sup> Second Battalions did occasionally serve active duty overseas; however, their primary function after 1804 was that of a training, recruiting and replacement depot. When a 2nd Battalion did serve overseas, one company would remain in Scotland to continue the function of that battalion when on home service.

### SECTION 3

#### The Financial Aspects of Raising a Regiment.

The system of purchasing commissions in the army had existed before the raising of the Highland regiments and, even with the conscious attempt to appoint local gentry to commissions, the practice of purchase existed in the Highland regiments. Vacancies in the Highland corps were open to negotiation as to cost as well as to position. A letter to Lord Seaforth from James Polson, Esq., illustrates the power exercised by the raiser over the appointment of officers and the control over the financial aspects of the regiment. The case in point is a request by Mr. Polson that his nephew, Lieutenant William Gray Polson, be allowed to purchase a vacant company with the rank of captain in Seaforth's Highlanders, prior to the regiment's departure for service in the West Indies in 1795. The convention of the times prescribed the holding of a lower commission for at least one year before being allowed to purchase a company. The episode demonstrates the great scope of power which the Highland landlords exercised over the purchase of commissions.<sup>43</sup>

The cost of commissions in the Highland regiments was apparently open to negotiation. A 1794 letter from one William Inglis offered £150 as purchase price for an Ensigny in the 78th Seaforth Highlanders. There is no indication as to whether the offer was accepted or negotiated.<sup>44</sup> The cost of commissions could vary substantially from regiment to regiment. On the raising of the 91st Argyleshire Highlanders, the price for subalterns was from £200 to £300 along with the requirement of raising 15 men. Captains were required to initially purchase their Ensigny and Lieutenancy as well as raise 50 troops.<sup>45</sup>

Financial considerations such as these were of importance to the

non-regular regiments as well. Officers of militia were required to have property qualifications. A colonel required property worth at least £400 Scots per annum, majors and captains at £300 Scots and lieutenants and ensigns at £100 Scots per annum.<sup>46</sup> The reason for the property qualifications, and ultimately, the purchase of commissions, was the attempt to insure that all officers were men of property and would thus have a desire for domestic stability and the preservation of the status quo.

Despite the high cost of commissions or property qualifications, the officer ranks of the Highland regiments were seldom vacant during the 18th Century. A great many fathers were quite willing to pay the cost of securing a commission for their sons and, indeed, by 1790, Highland regiments had begun to attract a number of full or half-pay officers who had earlier joined Lowland or English regiments when their native region had been untouched by the War Office.

Of more importance to recruiting in the Highlands was the attaining of suitable rank and file, an effort which was quite costly. The price of bounties paid rose sharply after 1793 as the need for great numbers of troops increased and competition for recruits grew more intense. In 1793, bounties paid to volunteers for the Fencibles were set at 3 to 5 guineas for ordinary recruits and could go as high as 10 per man for veterans of other regiments.<sup>47</sup> For the regular regiments, the cost per man in 1793 was set at 10 guineas, but by 1794 had doubled to 20. In areas of intense recruitment such as market towns near the Highland border, prices of 30 guineas were not uncommon.<sup>48</sup> In an attempt to check the mounting cost of bounties, the War Office issued a circular on 21 February 1795 limiting bounties to 15 guineas for regulars and 10 guineas for the Fencibles.<sup>49</sup> Despite such efforts, the pressure of supply and demand in a period of continuous warfare undermined all attempts to control the massive inflation of bounties.

By 1812, the government was paying £23.17s.6d. for every recruit over 5 foot 3 inches, under 40 years and who would volunteer for unlimited service.<sup>50</sup>

From the bounty money paid, the recruit was required to purchase certain items. In 1793, the requirement for the Fencibles was somewhere in the range of: 2 white shirts at 5s.3d. each; one pair of good black shoes at 5s.0d.; one haversack at 1s.0d.; and 3s.6d. was forwarded to regimental Head Quarters to purchase other necessities and was used as a general purchase fund by the Regimental Paymaster.<sup>51</sup>

On his enlistment, a recruit was given one shilling or "The King's Shilling" and subsistence pay granted for the period prior to his reporting to the depot for inspection and approval. Any recruit who renigged on his contract to serve, symbolized by the shilling, was required to pay £1, known as "smart money".<sup>52</sup>

The raising of a regiment was a costly business in the 18th Century as shown by the great sums expended by the regimental accounts of several corps. Not only was the cost in arming, supplying, feeding, housing, uniforming and maintaining a corps expensive, but recruiting costs were equally high. In 1794, the levy, or that amount given each officer per man recruited, was set at £15 of which £5 was earmarked for recruiting costs and £10 for the recruit's bounty, most of which was retained for necessary expenditures.<sup>53</sup> Due to the lower bounties paid to the Fencibles, the cost was somewhat lower and levy money per recruit in the Regiment of the Isles, for example, stood at only £5.5s.0d. in 1799.<sup>54</sup>

Not only were levy and bounty monies costly, but subsistence pay, or that amount paid to the recruit between the time of attestation and actually being taken into the ranks, was quite costly. The account returns for Captain John Macdonald's Company of the Regiment of the Isles for the period 7 August 1798 to 24 April 1795, amounts to

£98.6s.2<sup>1</sup>/<sub>4</sub>d. for subsistence pay on 15 recruits.<sup>55</sup> A more comprehensive view of the cost situation is given in the abstract of monies paid out to recruiters for the 93rd Sutherland Highlanders in 1799. Subsistence money paid amounted to £10,826.13s.5d. Total bounties paid amounted to £8,661 or a total paid out by General Wemyss to recruit his regiment of £19,787.13s.5d., a rather considerable sum by the standards of the time.<sup>56</sup>

While most of the cost burden of recruiting would have been paid out of public funds, great expense was often incurred by the raiser in order to fill up the ranks. Local conditions such as the availability of manpower, competition from other regiments and similar factors served to drive the costs even higher, and the colonel or raiser would often be forced to supply the extra capital. In order to stimulate recruitment, the Earl of Bredalbane went so far as to pay 2 guineas per man extra to each officer who raised more than the quota for the Bredalbane Fencibles. Those below the quota were required to pay in 2 guineas.<sup>57</sup> Considering that there was a surplus large enough for the embodiment of three battalions of the Bredalbane Fencibles, this must have meant a very considerable sum paid out by the Earl.

Lord Macdonald, in 1790, wrote to the Duke of Portland requesting a reimbursement of £2,000 for monies paid out by him for the raising of the 76th Regiment in 1777 in compensation for his not being allowed the right to choose the officers of that corps.<sup>58</sup> In other cases, the cost to the raiser and officers was much more severe. The 79th Cameron Highlanders, raised by Allan Cameron of Erracht, received no bounty money from the government, therefore, the regiment was only raised at great expense to Cameron and his officers.<sup>59</sup>

A great deal of money could be gained or lost through the purchase of uniforms. Again, a bulk sum was paid to a colonel, who was responsible for providing the uniforms of a prescribed fashion. Any

surplus funds from the uniform subsidy were his own, but in most cases, colonels lost money as the subsidies rarely met the cost of outfitting the entire regiment to the quality desired by most colonels. An interesting account of the relative costs of uniforms is found for the Regiment of the Isles in correspondence between Colonel Matthew MacAlister and the firm of James Thomson, Junior, of Stirling. The following abstract is from an order placed for tartan and hose.<sup>60</sup>

62 yards officer's plaid	-	£7..4s.8d.
60 ells fine hose*	-	£9.10s.0d.
60 ells Sergeant's plaid	-	£5. 0s.0d.
60 ells Private's plaid	-	£3. 0s.0d.
50 ells hose	-	£6. 2s.11d.

Significant monetary returns could, however, be made through the raising of a regiment. Monies paid for commissions could add to the colonel's income. Surplus funds from the government money appropriated for recruiting was divided among the company captains. Field officers continued to have companies until into the 19th Century, therefore, they also received a portion of the surplus funds should there be any. Successful manipulation of clothing funds, which did occasionally lead to substandard uniforms, was another method of creating possible revenue until 1854 when the responsibility for uniforming a regiment was removed from the colonel.<sup>61</sup>

An income source which is difficult to measure was the effect of removing a sizeable portion of the population from the land. Highland families tended to subdivide their holdings causing congestion and limiting the ability of the land to support the rising population. By removing several thousand men from the land and placing the

---

\* The hose worn in the 18th Century was not the modern knitted type, rather, it was a piece of cloth cut and fitted to the leg and then sewn.

responsibility for their subsistence, clothing and food with the government, the pressure on the small tenants was decreased and the family income was spread over a smaller number of people. In a surplus labour market, the absence of one or two males in a family rarely caused a decrease in the total income.\* Arrears in rent could more easily be paid, an important factor when land rents began to rise sharply in the late 18th Century. Army pay had the beneficial effect of injecting significant amounts of outside capital into the overpopulated and under-developed Highlands.\*\* This capital also had the effect of removing the burden of feeding and clothing the soldier from the family's household account.

While the raising of a Highland regiment could be a costly enterprise, a landowner who successfully manipulated the system of patronage, bounties, subsidies, clothing funds and the lessening of the population burden created by recruitment, could realize a sizeable return on his investment.

---

\* See Malcolm Gray's The Highland Economy for a view of the dynamics of the Highland economy during this period.

\*\* Rates of pay for 1801 are listed in Appendix C.



Section 3.1. The Importance of Clan and District Associations.

- 1) Dunn-Pattison, R.P., The History of the 91st Argyleshire Highlanders, p.23.
- 2) Scobie, An Old Highland Fencible Corps, p.28.
- 3) Op. cit.
- 4) Smout, T.C., A History of the Scottish People, p.335.
- 5) OSA, Vol. 3, p.516.
- 6) Stewart, Sketches of the Highlanders, Vol. II, p.309.
- 7) Scobie, op. cit., pp.32-37.
- 8) Op. cit., pp.37-39.
- 9) Cavendish, A.E.J., The 93rd Sutherland Highlanders, p.10.
- 10) Op. cit., p.17.
- 11) Stewart, op. cit., Vol. II, p.172.
- 12) Scobie, op. cit., p.201.

Section 3.2. The Methods of Recruiting in the Highlands.

- 13) Stewart, op. cit., Vol. II, p.256.
- 14) Bulloch, John Malcolm, Territorial Soldiering, p.xxxvi.
- 15) Op. cit., p.xxxvii.
- 16) Stewart, op. cit., Vol. II, p.253.
- 17) MacPherson of Cluny Papers, H.M. Register House, Edinburgh, GD 80/898.
- 18) Campbell of Bredalbane Papers, H.M. Register House, Edinburgh,  
GD 112/52/12.
- 19) Scobie, op. cit., p.40.
- 20) Stewart, op. cit., Vol. II, p.400.
- 21) Scobie, op. cit., p.33.
- 22) Cavendish, op. cit., p.10.
- 23) Op. cit., p.11.
- 24) Scobie, op. cit., p.30.

- 25) Lord Macdonald Papers, H.M. Register House, Edinburgh, GD 221/102.
- 26) Campbell of Bredalbane Papers, GD 112/52/7.
- 27) Scobie, op. cit., p.344.
- 28) Bulloch, op. cit., p.xxv.
- 29) Lord Macdonald Papers, GD 221/100.
- 30) Kemp, Alan, The British Army in the American Revolution, p.67.
- 31) Adam, R.J., Papers on Sutherland Estate Management, Vol. I, p.xxvii.
- 32) Adam, op. cit., Vol. II, Pp.12-14, 50-51.
- 33) Cardyne, C. Greenhill, The Life of a Regiment, Vol. I, p.132.
- 34) Op. cit.
- 35) Scobie, op. cit., p.257.
- 36) Op. cit., p.262.
- 37) Op. cit., p.96.
- 38) Op. cit., p.350.
- 39) Op. cit., p.6.
- 40) Stewart, op. cit., Vol. II, p.106.
- 41) Dunn-Pattison, op. cit., p.59.
- 42) Op. cit., p.30.

Section 3.3. The Financial Aspects of Raising a Regiment.

- 43) Seaforth Muniments, H.M. Register House, Edinburgh, GD 46/6.
- 44) Op. cit.
- 45) Dunn-Pattison, op. cit., p.2.
- 46) Bulloch, op. cit., p.xlvi.
- 47) Scobie, op. cit., p.31.
- 48) Bulloch, op. cit., p.xxxvi.
- 49) Scobie, op. cit., p.31.
- 50) Dunn-Pattison, op. cit., p.46.
- 51) Scobie, op. cit., p.31.

- 52) Op. cit., p.299.
- 53) Dunn-Pattison, op. cit., p.23.
- 54) Lord Macdonald Papers, GD/221/100.
- 55) Op. cit.
- 56) Cavendish, op. cit., p.14.
- 57) Campbell of Bredalbane Papers, GD 112/52/12.
- 58) Lord Macdonald Papers, GD 221/102.
- 59) Stewart, op. cit., Vol. II, p.208.
- 60) Lord Macdonald Papers, GD 221/100.
- 61) Scobie, op. cit., p.42.

#### CHAPTER IV.

##### The Origins and Background of the Recruits.

## CHAPTER IV.

### SECTION 1

#### Numbers of Men Enlisted, 1756 to 1815.

Following the initial raising of several Highland corps during the Seven Year's War, all but the 42nd Royal Highlanders had been disbanded by 1766. The total number of Highlanders who served in these regiments between 1757 and 1766 would have been close to 10,000 men, either in the regulars or the Fencibles. This does not represent an exorbitant number given the population of the period. Dr. Webster's figure for the population in the Highlands in 1755 is 652,000.<sup>1</sup> From his calculations of fighting men per parish, roughly taken as 20 per cent. of the total, an estimated 130,400 men were available for military service.<sup>2\*</sup> The Seven Year's War, then, did not place a great strain upon the manpower resources of the Highlands.

The outbreak of the American Revolutionary War in 1775 created an immediate need for troops. The second regiment raised by Simon Fraser was quickly embodied and readied for American service as the 71st Fraser's Highlanders. So prolific was the response to the recruitment efforts that within ten weeks, over 3,000 troops were raised in the Highlands for service in the 71st and 42nd Regiments.<sup>3</sup>

The government of Lord North did not expect the rebellion in the colonies to last for any length of time and no other regiments were drawn from the Highlands during the next two years. By late 1777, however, the situation in the colonies had altered dramatically. The surrender of General John Burgoyne's army of 7,000 troops at Saratoga in October 1777, startled the War Office into vigorous

---

\* 20 per cent. of total population, or men aged 18 to 56.

recruiting activity. The blame for this loss of thousands of trained and veteran British troops can be laid on the general indifference towards the rebellion and primarily on the incompetence of Lord George Germaine, the Secretary at War. With the surrender at Saratoga, it became highly likely that France would come into the war on the side of the American revolutionaries thus creating a need for many new regiments.

Jolted into activity, the government authorized the raising of several new Highland corps. In the first five months of 1778, 9 new battalions were raised in the Highlands. Each battalion was divided into 10 companies of 105 rank and file plus officers. These were the 73rd, 74th, 76th, 77th, 78th, 81st and the Argyle Regiment of Fencibles. A total of 12,500 recruits were raised north of the Tay between 1778 and early 1780.<sup>4</sup> Of the several regiments raised, only the 74th and 76th actually served in the American colonies while the remainder were posted to other parts of the empire, notably, Gibraltar and India.<sup>5</sup> In addition to those regiments recruited primarily in the Highlands, the 84th Royal Highland Emigrants was raised in Canada.

Following the Treaty of Paris in 1783, only the 42nd, 73rd and 78th Regiments were retained on the establishment. But the greatest need for Highland troops did not occur until after 1792 with the outbreak of hostilities with Revolutionary France. Between November 1793 and March 1794, over 30,000 troops were raised in Scotland for both the regular and Fencible regiments.<sup>6</sup> A great many of these troops were from the Highland districts. During the period of 1793 to 1800, 30 regiments of the line and Fencibles were established. From 1800 to 1804, a further 7 battalions were raised, some of which were 2nd Battalions for the existing regiments.<sup>7</sup>

Not only was there a sizeable turnout for the regulars and Fencibles, but service in the Volunteers and Militia after 1797 drew

off a great number of men, though it must be remembered that many of these would have been veterans of other corps while some eventually volunteered into the regulars or the Fencibles. At the Peace of Amiens in 1801, there were 11,500 men under arms in either the Militia or Volunteers in the Highlands. With the declaration of War against France in 1803, a total of 13,323 troops were serving and by the termination of hostilities in 1815, a total of 34,785 Highlanders had served in the Militia, Volunteers or Local Militia.<sup>8</sup>

The year 1803-04 might be taken as representative of the period following the great surge of new regiments between 1793 and 1800. The figure for that year may be somewhat higher due to the raising of new battalions of reserves; however, the returns for the year give an indication of the numbers enlisted from the Highlands after 1801. It must also be noted that the Fencible corps raised between 1793 and 1800 were disbanded by 1803 as a result of the Peace of Amiens and that many of those represented in the 1803-04 returns would have been veterans of the former Fencible corps. The years 1803-04 are important in that the government was recruiting heavily following the renewal of war with France in May 1803:<sup>9</sup>

Reserve	-	1651
Militia	-	2599
Supplementary Militia	-	870
Canadian Fencibles	-	850
2nd Battalion 78th	-	714
2nd Battalion 79th	-	618
Substitutes for Militia	-	913
Recruits for line regiments	-	350*

Total for 1803-04 - 8615.

---

\* These are only the troops drawn from the Highlands and does not include those from the Lowlands, England, Ireland or elsewhere.

An example to illustrate the incredible number of men serving is the situation of the Isle of Skye, an area known for providing numerous soldiers. Between the years 1793 and 1805, 3,680 men were under arms from the estates of Lord Macdonald, MacLeod of MacLeod, the Isle of Raasay and other parts of Skye.<sup>10</sup> Finally, from 1792 to 1837, a period in which 21 years were in warfare, the Isle of Skye provided for the British Army:<sup>11</sup>

21 Lieutenant-Generals or Major-Generals,  
48 Lieutenant-Colonels,  
600 other officers,  
120 Pipers,  
10,000 Private soldiers.

This figure represents a significant proportion of the population of the Isle of Skye and illustrates the number of troops drawn from the Highlands and Islands prior to the end of the 18th Century wars in 1815.

The creation of such a large number of corps meant a serious drain on the Highland population, despite the growth experienced during the latter half of the 18th Century. From 1793 to 1808, an estimated 70,000 Highlanders served in the British army. Excluding those who served in the navy, this represents an incredibly high proportion of the total number of males of military age. Based upon the unofficial census figures of the early 1790's from the Statistical Account and the official government census of 1801, the approximate percentage of Highlanders in Army service during this time was roughly 14 per cent. of the total male population.<sup>12</sup>

It is difficult to determine exactly the numbers of men enlisted in the services during this period. The extremely long period of warfare, coupled with the shifting about from unit to unit by volunteering for regular service from the non-regular corps, makes this figure difficult to estimate simply from the returns of the regiments. Based upon the total amount of troops given for the various corps, it would probably not be out of line to advance the figure of somewhere near 100,000 Highlanders serving in all corps. Even allowing for the rapid growth



in population, this figure represents a proportion totally unknown to previous British experience. Perhaps no more than 10,000 total men served the Young Pretender in 1745-46. The figure in government service somewhat overwhelms that and proved that Mr. Pitt's gamble in 1757 was worthwhile.

## SECTION 2

### Areas Where Troops Drawn From.

In order to understand the patterns of recruitment by geography in the Highlands, it might be instructive to examine the regimental returns with particular attention to references to Parish, county, district or surname. The latter is especially helpful in plotting the geographic patterns in the Highlands due to the phenomenon of clanship which led to common surnames being widespread in a given district. The main areas of recruitment for several regiments, primarily those of the post-1793 period, are here listed and patterns of recruitment by district examined. In general, the policy of the Highland corps was to raise the bulk of troops from the estates of the raiser or his family. The remainder would be obtained from those estates of the officers. In practice, however, this system was only partially successful and as the pressures for increasing numbers of troops grew, more and more men were sought in the urban and non-Highland areas. Several regiments are now analyzed with respect to geography:

- 1) 73rd Regiment, Lord MacLeod's Highlanders, 2 battalions raised in 1777.

Of a total of 2,200 troops in both battalions, 1,800 were drawn from the lands and district associated with the MacLeods. The 2nd Battalion was raised in Dumbarton, consequently, a great many were drawn from the Glasgow area. The regiment was later to become the 71st Regiment in 1786 and in 1808, the Glasgow Highland Regiment owing to the great numbers of Glaswegians in the ranks.<sup>13</sup> The estates of Lord MacLeod would have covered a goodly portion of the Isle of Lewis and parts of the mainland, especially the northwest.

- 2) 76th Regiment, Macdonald's Highlanders, raised 1777 and disbanded 1784.

780 Highlanders, 200 Lowlanders and 100 Irish in one company - Total of 1,086 troops.

Most of the native Highlanders were recruited in the areas owned or influenced by Lord Macdonald and the branches of the Clan Donald, particularly Skye, Uist, Rum and Raasay.<sup>14</sup> Many of the Lowland recruits were found in Edinburgh as evidenced by a letter to Lord Macdonald from Lieutenant David Barclay dated 1 April 1778. Barclay had found 40 men by that date and reported having tremendous success in recruiting.<sup>15</sup>

- 3) 78th Regiment, Seaforth's Highlanders, raised 1778, later renumbered 72nd Regiment.

On the initial raising of the 78th in 1778, a total of 500 men were recruited from Lord Seaforth's estates and a further 400 were raised from the estates of the MacKenzies of Scatwell, primarily the Parishes of Applecross and Red Castle. Of the remainder, 157 were Lowlanders and 43 were Irish, though Stewart gives no indication of the county of origin of the Lowlanders.<sup>16</sup> In 1793, the estates of the Earl of Seaforth on Lewis furnished 732 men in the first months of the war for the new 78th Seaforth's Highlanders raised by Francis

Humberstone MacKenzie of Seaforth and known as the Ross-Shire Buffs.<sup>17</sup>

- 4) 81st Aberdeenshire Highlanders, raised 1778, disbanded in 1783. Commanded by Colonel William Gordon.

Of the 980 men enlisted initially, 650 were from the Highland districts near Aberdeen and mostly from the extensive estates of the Duke of Gordon. Many others were recruited from the city of Aberdeen.<sup>18</sup>

- 5) The 74th Regiment, raised in 1787 by Sir Archibald Campbell.

This regiment was later removed from the Highland establishment in 1809 and had, from its inception, been made up of large numbers of Lowlanders, especially from the Glasgow region. Of the 960 of all ranks mustered in 1787, 400 were Lowlanders.<sup>19</sup> The bulk of the Highlanders came from the estates of the Duke of Argyle. The minister of the Parish of Inverary in Argyle reports that the county of Argyle supplied the bulk of the recruits for the 74th and almost one entire battalion of the 71st (raised as 73rd in 1777).<sup>20</sup>

- 6) 98th Argyleshire Highland Regiment, later renumbered 91st, raised by Duke of Argyle in 1794.

This regiment experienced great difficulty in raising its required number of recruits. Initially, only  $\frac{1}{3}$  were Highlanders and the majority of those were drawn from the estates of the Duke of Argyle. The bulk of the troops were Lowlanders from Glasgow and Edinburgh with a large number drawn from Ireland.<sup>21</sup> In addition to the Lowlanders, the 91st was forced to recruit heavily in England where men were found primarily in Wiltshire and 50 were obtained in the city of London in early 1795.<sup>22</sup> The high proportion of non-Highlanders in this regiment caused it to be taken off the Highland establishment in the reforms of 1809.

- 7) 92nd Gordon Highlanders, originally numbered 100th, raised 1794 by the Duke of Gordon.

Colonel Gardyne in The Life of a Regiment, gives an excellent account of the recruits of the Gordons in 1794. It is interesting to note that there were only 20 officers and men of the name Gordon on the rolls for 1794.<sup>23</sup> Since  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the original recruits came from the Gordon estates, this phenomenon illustrates the great number of families and districts under the sway of the House of Gordon. Of the remaining  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the troops, most came from Aberdeen, Moray, Banff and from the non-Highland districts.<sup>24</sup> From the original muster rolls for 1794, the following numbers per region are found.<sup>25</sup>

Inverness-shire*	-	241
Aberdeenshire	-	92
Banffshire	-	58
Argyle	-	33
English	-	15
Welsh	-	1
Irish	-	45
Edinburgh	-	26
Glasgow	-	54

The remaining Highlanders were drawn from the counties of Caithness, Sutherland, Ross, Moray, Perth, Nairn and Stirling. In 1794, roughly 15 per cent. of this regiment was drawn from non-Highland areas. This contrasts sharply with the returns for the earlier Highland regiments and is especially important when it is remembered that the Gordons were considered a true Highland regiment unlike others such as the 91st or 74th. By way of comparison, the returns for the 42nd Regiment at the beginning of the American War for 10 April 1776 are here given:<sup>26</sup>

---

\* This figure would have included troops from the West Highlands as well as from the Hebrides.

Highlanders	-	931
Lowlanders	-	74
English	-	5
Welsh	-	1
Irish	-	2

A pattern of growing reliance on Lowland and non-Scottish troops was developing after 1793 which was to have significant influences on the character of several Highland regiments. The most drastic result was the reform of 1809 which is discussed in Chapter V.

A further complication for recruiting for the 92nd was the conflict of territorial interests with the 109th Regiment being raised by Colonel Hay. Since the 109th was disbanded after a brief existence, many of the recruits were taken into the Gordons.<sup>27</sup> Again, a situation whereby territorial magnates competed for the dwindling supply of manpower needed to fill up the ranks of the regiments, placed strains upon the ability of the Highlands to meet the demand.

8) 93rd Sutherland Highlanders, raised 1799-1800 by Colonel William Wemyss.

This was the last of the regular regiments raised in the Highlands. By that late date, the over-recruiting of the Highlands had begun to be apparent as evidenced by the extraordinary promises of land leases given by the Countess of Sutherland in exchange for service in this regiment. Although 40 per cent. of the original recruits were obtained from the disbanded Sutherland Fencibles, difficulty was had in filling up the ranks of the 93rd.<sup>28</sup> Eventually, however, the Regiment was embodied with only 3 Irish or English recruits. Of the total, 519 were Sutherland men, 97 were from Caithness and only 37 were from other parts of Scotland.<sup>29</sup> It is rather remarkable that with the difficulties experienced in finding willing recruits that the proportion of Sutherlanders and Highlanders was so high. A return of the principal

surnames from the original draft illustrates the propensity of the major clans of the area for service in this regiment. From the muster rolls are found:<sup>30</sup>

Mackay	-	91
Sutherland	-	60
Grant	-	17
MacLeod	-	25
Gunn	-	25
Mathieson	-	15
Ross	-	19
MacDonald	-	27
Munro	-	26
Gordon	-	15
MacKenzie	-	10
MacPherson	-	12
Fraser	-	14

The 93rd was perhaps the most regional of the Highland regiments raised after 1793 and the muster roll resembles a list of the principal clans of the northwest Highlands. Very few recruits were obtained south of Lock Arkaig or east of Loch Ness. The regional nature of the 93rd was maintained while other regiments were forced to take on large numbers of men from Ireland and England. By 1811, of 1,014 of all ranks, the Sutherland Highlanders still had only a total of 35 non-Scots.<sup>31</sup>

The Fencible regiments tended to be somewhat more regional in nature than the regulars. The terms of limited service within the country often attracted men who were otherwise unwilling to enlist in the regulars for unlimited service. Five regiments of Fencibles are here presented with the same purpose as that of the aforementioned regulars, to determine regional patterns of recruitment.

#### 1) Sutherland Fencibles.

Three regiments of Sutherland Fencibles were raised, in 1759, 1779 and 1793. These troops were raised largely from the estates of the Sutherland family and of Lord Reay. The proportion of family and regional names in the Fencibles is roughly the same as that of

the 93rd. This is not surprising given that 250 volunteers went from the Sutherland Fencibles to the 93rd Sutherland Highlanders. The family names given again indicate the highly regional nature of this Fencible regiment. Muster rolls for 1793 show that of a total of 1,084 of all ranks, there were:<sup>32</sup>

Mackay	-	211 (7 were officers)
Sutherland	-	128
Murray	-	42
Ross	-	34
MacLeod	-	29
MacDonald	-	29
Munro	-	28

## 2) Bredalbane Fencibles.

Three battalions of the Bredalbane Fencibles were raised between 1793 and 1799 and the whole was commanded by the Earl of Bredalbane whose estates stretched from western Argyleshire into Perthshire. In order to fill the ranks of these battalions, a mammoth effort was undertaken by Bredalbane. In 1793, the population of the Bredalbane estates was 13,537 persons. In that year alone, 1,600 men enlisted in the Bredalbane Fencibles.<sup>33</sup> Using the figure of 20 per cent. of the population being of military service age, this figure represents approximately 12 per cent. of the total population of the estates enrolled in the Regiment. Despite the incredible turnout of volunteers, there were not enough Highlanders to fill the three battalions which would have required some 2,500 to 3,000 men. To meet the demand, the rural Lowland areas were heavily recruited and some troops were obtained from as far away as Dublin and Nottingham.<sup>34</sup> A return of recruits from 12 April 1793 by county and parish shows the numbers drawn from the estates and neighbouring counties:<sup>35</sup>



<u>County</u>	<u>Troops</u>
Perth	- 132
Forfar	- 2
Stirling	- 4
Inverness	- 3
Argyle	- 5
Caithness	- 2
Sutherland	- 1
Lanark	- 1

While many of the above recruits came from Lowland areas, these men were generally from areas bordering immediately on the Highland line and directly adjacent to the Bredalbane Highland estate, especially the Perthshire Lowlanders.

### 3) The Northern, or Gordon Fencibles.

The Duke of Gordon was active in the raising of a corps of Fencibles from his estates in the districts of Strathspey, Badenoch and Lochaber. Another 150 troops were raised from the Duke's Lowland estates.<sup>36</sup>

### 4) Glengarry Fencibles.

This regiment was raised by the chief of the Glengarry MacDonald's, Alexander MacDonnell of Glengarry in 1794 and was reduced in 1802. Stewart of Garth reports that over one-half of the troops were raised from the Glengarry estates, but no mention is made of the origins of the remainder.<sup>37</sup> It would not be unreasonable to suppose that a good many were enlisted in the neighbouring districts and from among the Camerons, MacDonalds, MacLeods and Grants.

### 5) Reay Fencibles, or Mackay's Highlanders.

The Reay Fencibles were raised primarily on the estates of Lord Reay by his heir, the Honourable Eric Mackay, and by Colonel Hugh Mackay Baillie. The Regiment was embodied in 1794 and was reduced in 1802. Of the original drafts of recruits in 1794, some

600 were from the Reay country and a large number were obtained in the surrounding counties of Ross and Caithness. As with the Sutherland Fencibles and the 93rd Regiment, an examination of the muster rolls for 1794 reveals that a significant number of the Reays were of the principal clans of the northwest.<sup>38</sup>

Mackay	-	209
MacLeod	-	63
MacKenzie	-	40
Sutherland	-	35
Morrison	-	32

Despite the great success in raising recruits from the Highland districts, the vast numbers of men required to fill the ranks quite often caused the eruption of old regional and family jealousies. As seen from the returns of several of the regiments, a number of troops were recruited from districts within the traditional areas of influence of other magnates also raising recruits, either for line or Fencible regiments. Since the War Office had left the details of raising troops to the colonels, and, since the Highland landlords exercised no legal control over the military services of their tenantry, a great amount of competition for recruits led to such excesses as bounties of £50 to £60 being paid in some areas.<sup>39</sup> Despite these factors, it may generally be concluded that a regiment's primary area of recruitment was the district in which the colonel or raiser either held estates or exercised some influence and the incidents of poaching on a rival raiser's estates was not that common until well after 1794 when the majority of regiments had already been initially raised.

### SECTION 3

#### Variations in Proportions Raised by Region.

John Mackay of Hereford writes that "no part of the Highlands sent forth more gallant soldiers in proportion to its population than that part of Sutherland called Duthaich Mhic Aoidh.<sup>40</sup> A thorough examination of the evidence provided by the regimental histories, estate records and accounts by parish clergy tend to show Mackay's assertion as being reasonably accurate. A tremendous proportion of the population of the northwest Highlands and Islands did do service of some form in the British army in the period of 1756 to 1815. The reasons for this are complex and are related to the state, both socially and economically, of the northwest Highlands in the 18th Century.

To simplify the problem, a line may artificially be drawn through the Highlands, starting in the Islands of Coll and Tiree, extending northeasterly through the Frith of Lorn and through northern Argyleshire and running just east of the Great Glen to western Perthshire and finally curving westward and ending at Inverness. To the north and west of this imaginary line is found the area of heaviest recruitment for the army, and especially the far northwestern areas of the Hebrides and the counties of Ross, Sutherland and Caithness. Within this area are found the Frasers, Grants, Mackays, MacDonalds, Camerons, MacKenzies, MacLeods and Munros. Examination of the muster rolls of the period demonstrate an extraordinary number of these surnames among the ranks. Below the line, recruiting for the army seems to have been less favourable. Of the 23 principal regiments raised between 1757 and 1800 in the Highlands, a full 10 were recruited almost exclusively in this

northwestern region. A great many of the remaining regiments, while geographically situated in the southern or eastern Highlands, drew a sizeable proportion of their recruits from the northwest. The largest representation for the 92nd Gordon Highlanders, for example, was drawn from Inverness-shire, reaching from east of the city of Inverness into the western areas and including parts of the Hebrides.

From the evidence, three principal reasons for the preponderance of northwestern Highlanders in the regiments emerge: the northwest was a more traditional area and less developed; the problem of rising population with an excess of manpower; and the propensity for naval service in the southern Highlands and Islands.

Although General Wade's roads had begun the process of opening up the inner Highlands to easier access from the Lowlands, the northwestern areas were the last to be affected by this process and remained the bastion of the old clan patriarchy. It was not until the early 16th Century that the Crown of Scotland was able to exercise sovereignty over the area following the decline of the Lordship of the Isles. During the Jacobite uprisings from 1689 onwards, several great houses consistently supported the Orange and Hanoverian governments, notably the Campbells of Argyle, who maintained hegemony throughout most of the southwest. Though some members of the Houses of Athole and Gordon in the east and northeast did support the Stuarts, these Houses remained on reasonably good terms with the government. Through these great regional magnates, much of the government's policies for the Highlands were carried out. The main centres of disaffection, then, were largely in the central and northwestern Highlands and it was to these areas that the policy of reconciliation was directed. With the great rise in the need for troops, a good deal of attention was turned to this area, not only to the loyal clans of the Mackays, Munros and Grants, but the former Jacobite

clans as well. Although the legal right to force one's tenantry into arms had been abolished, the clans of the northwest were able to appeal to the ties of kinship in supplying the massive numbers of troops which were drawn from the area.

The distance from and geographical hinderances to intercourse with the Lowlands aided the northwest in maintaining its traditional culture long after the legal breakdown of the clan system. With the extension of the rationalization and modernization of agriculture, which advanced out of the Lowlands, those areas of the south and east in close proximity to the Lowlands showed a swifter breakdown of the old practices and economics. The old clan society had been founded on the land and land tenantry was the central bond of society. The Highland areas of the northwest were the last to begin the transformation to modern agriculture, a change which ultimately destroyed the last remnants of the clan system.

Since the less accessible regions of the northwest retained their traditional ties over a longer period than did the south and east, appeals to clan loyalty and obligation were still potent and the remnants of the traditional mode of raising troops generally meant a far better chance for recruiting from this region than from other parts of the country.

A second important factor influencing the success of recruitment from the northwest was the dynamic of population growth. From the period 1755 to 1790, the area from southern Argyleshire, through Perthshire and north to Inverness experienced a moderate population growth. From Morvern to Cape Wrath and the more northerly islands, rates of growth as high as 34 per cent. were experienced in this 35-year period.<sup>41</sup> A more stark figure from the region is found in the northwest counties when taken from 1755 to 1831 where a 48 per cent. increase was experienced. The outer Hebrides islands of Lewis, Harris and Uist encountered a phenomenal 139 per cent. population increase in this 75-year period.<sup>42</sup>

The great increase in population, coupled with a general introduction of improved agriculture, especially sheep farming, during the period after 1745, created a tremendous surplus manpower pool in the northwest.\* Seasonal migration to the Lowland areas for employment was much more difficult from these regions due to poor travel conditions and distance. A great deal more men from the south and east were able to find seasonal or permanent work in the growing border towns and urban centres such as Glasgow and Aberdeen. Despite seasonal migration and emigration to the colonies or other parts of Britain, a severe surplus manpower pool in the northwest usually meant better success for army recruiters when coupled with the persuasive appeal to clan and regional loyalties. Although clan loyalties could be successfully appealed to in the south and east, the desperate nature of overpopulation and under-employment were not as heavily felt in those areas where the surplus could more easily travel out of the Highlands.

The growing aversion to a military career on the part of many southern Highlanders can be seen in the comments of The Reverend James MacLagen for the Parish of Blair Athole in Perth:<sup>43</sup>

... and though the common people have learned to despise a soldier's pay and to hate a life of servitude, yet they still have a deal of martial spirit remaining and make very good soldiers when once they undertake it.

A soldier's pay to an unemployed labourer in the northwest could be the difference between starvation and survival. The comment illustrates the growing influence of a moneyed economy which was rapidly developing in the southern and eastern Highlands. Well into the 19th Century, the military life was considered an honourable occupation by

---

\* Chapter V deals with the problem of population growth and changing economic and social conditions.

the natives of the northwest, a natural extension of the warrior ideal of clan culture.

So great were the pressures of population growth and its concurrent lack of employment, that the Reverend Mr. John Downie in the Parish of Urray in Ross credits the loss in population of the Parish, from 2,456 in 1755 to 1,860 in 1792, to emigration to the harvests in the south and the great numbers enlisted in the Highland regiments in the two previous wars.<sup>44</sup> From the Parish of Fearn, again in Ross, a similar phenomenon occurred and prompted men to join the 71st, 73rd, 75th and 42nd Highland Regiments. This Parish experienced a population loss from 1,898 to 1,600 people in the years after 1755 in a period when the entire region was undergoing rapid population acceleration.<sup>45</sup>

A third factor which caused the south to be less fertile than the northwest for recruiting was the naval conflict. This phenomenon occurred especially in the island areas off the coast of Argyle where seafaring was a more natural endeavour than in the inland mountain regions. Though some Highlanders and Islanders on the northwest coast did serve in the navy, the majority opted for army service. For the American War, the Parish of Dunoon in Argyle sent a total of 90 men to the navy from a total population of near 1,700.<sup>46</sup>

Other parishes in Argyle and the islands experienced similar conflicts between the services for recruits. The Reverend Dougal MacDougal states that the people of Lochgoilhead in Argyle were: "never fond of a military life, and few of them ever enlisted in standing regiments". This parish did, however, raise a company of Fencibles, but most of those in the services went to the navy.<sup>47</sup> The Parish of Kilmalie and Kilmanivaig in Argyle furnished 750 men for service in the Seven Year's War, but again, recruitment for the Highland regiments was hampered by conflict with the navy which obtained the majority of the volunteers.<sup>48</sup>

This pattern of conflict between the services was fairly widespread

over the southwestern mainland coast and islands. Advancing up the imaginary line towards Inverness and Perth, the naval conflict decreases; however, from these areas, men were drawn into the farm lands of the Lowlands or into the developing urban and manufacturing area between Glasgow and the Lothians to Edinburgh.

A traditional society which espoused the virtue of military service and one burdened with an excess population and underemployment proved to be a fertile region for army recruitment. A lieutenant of the 101st Johnstone's Highlanders commented that:<sup>49</sup>

It was not necessary, in those days (1760), to go to manufacturing towns to bribe with whisky and high bounties, the idle and profligate; we got plenty of men in the country.

And finally, Stewart of Garth comments:<sup>50</sup>

When a man of address and knowledge of human nature meets with proper encouragement, recruiting has seldom failed in the north.

The system was to break down. After 1793, not even the northwest could supply the vast numbers of troops demanded by the government for the wars against Revolutionary France and Napoleon. The great storehouse of troops, the northwest Highlands of Ross, Sutherland, Cromarty, Inverness and the Hebrides, ultimately failed to meet the demand. It can generally be demonstrated, however, that the region of the northwest did supply the bulk of the recruits for the Highland regiments and only after the area had been drained and over-recruited to the limit that the northwest ultimately failed to supply the manpower for the Highland regiments.



## SECTION 4

### Age, Social and Economic Background of the Recruits.

Before turning to the discussion of the ultimate breakdown of recruiting in the Highlands and the reasons for and consequences of, a short examination of the individual recruits obtained from the Highlands is in order. Muster rolls for the various regiments are quite instructive of this account with regard to age, physical features and socio-economic background.

Regimental returns for the Bredalbane Fencibles of 1793 provide an excellent illustration of age and occupation. The return of 6 April 1793 for Captain MacLean's Company shows that the majority of the men were between the ages of 17 and 25; however, some older men were recruited as seen from a reproduction of the roll's figures by age:<sup>51</sup>

<u>Age</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>	
17	- 7	17 to 20	- 52% - 31
18	- 10	21 to 25	- 33% - 20
19	- 5	26 to 30	- 9% - 7
20	- 9	31 to 36	- 5% - 3
21	- 6		
22	- 2	Total	<u>61</u>
23	- 4		
24	- 5		
25	- 3		
26	- 2		
27	- 2		
28	- 0		
29	- 0		
30	- 3		
31	- 0		
32	- 0		
33	- 0		
34	- 0		
35	- 2		
36	- 1		

The official War Office requirement at the beginning of the wars of 1792 to 1815, was set at ages 18 to 35 for the Highland regiments

and 5 foot 5 inches in height.<sup>52</sup> As early as 1794, variations in this pattern are seen. The Reay Fencibles, for example, ranged between the ages of 16 and 55 officially, though it is reported that some of the privates listed as 16 were actually younger.<sup>53</sup>

As the war continued and replacements were needed for casualties and retirees, the age standards were relaxed. In 1805, the War Office authorized the enlistment as privates of not more than 10 boys per company, not to be over 16 years of age and to be paid 10d. per day. These youngsters were to be taught trades or to serve as drummers.<sup>54</sup> Although young boys, usually starting at age 14, had traditionally served as drummers in the army, the allowing of up to 10 per company was a radical change from previous years when only 2 or 3 would have been allowed.

The 2nd Battalion of the 78th Regiment serves as an excellent example of the use of increasingly younger men to fill up the ranks of the regiments. In 1806, there were nearly 600 men under age and with a majority of the officers having very little experience.<sup>55</sup> By 1814, the extreme youth of this battalion had not altered greatly and there were only 43 rank and file over the age of 22.<sup>56</sup>

Again, looking at Captain MacLean's Company of the Bredalbane Fencibles, an idea of the civilian occupations of the rank and file is indicated:<sup>57</sup>

Parish

Coll	-	Labourer	30,	Tailor	5
Tiree	-	do.	1,	Weaver	1
Small Isles	-	do.	11		
Kilnian	-	do.	1,	Tailor	1
Ross	-	do.	1		
Kilmore	-	do.	4,	Weaver	1
Kilfinch	-	do.	1		

The return shows that by occupation percentages, the labourers total 49 or nearly 85 per cent. with the tailors and weavers substantially behind. Those enlisted in urban areas show a somewhat more diverse

occupational background, especially in the skilled trades. A return for those men enlisted in Perth during March 1793 for the Bredalbane Fencibles show:<sup>58</sup>

<u>Craft</u>		<u>Number</u>		<u>Percentage of Whole</u>
Wright	-	2	-	4%
Weaver	-	11	-	22%
Smith	-	1	-	2%
Barber	-	1	-	2%
Musician	-	1	-	2%
Shoemaker	-	1	-	2%
Tailor	-	1	-	2%
Butcher	-	1	-	2%
Mason	-	1	-	2%
Sawyer	-	1	-	2%
Flaxdresser	-	1	-	2%
Labourer	-	20	-	48%
Total		42		

Again, in this list as with the first, the labouring group tends to be overwhelmingly predominant. What is curious about the returns is not what is included, rather, it is the total exclusion of any mention of "small farmers". This may perhaps be explained if the system of recording lists the son of a farmer simply as a labourer. Again for the Bredalbane Fencibles, a list of 12 April 1793 presents a description for each new recruit under the heading "By Whom Presented":<sup>59</sup>

Volunteers or "of himself"	-	34
Given by father, brother or other relative	-	75
Listed as given by tacksman or as tenant of	-	42

In all likelihood, the sons of the small farmers would have been given to the service by their fathers and simply recorded as labourers since they would not have had a tack of their own. Most of the volunteers or "given of himself" category are of the tradesmen and artisan group and no apprentices were allowed to be recruited.

Similar patterns are found in the regular regiments as well. The

muster roll for the Duchess of Gordon's Company of the 71st Fraser's Highlanders in 1776 show:<sup>60</sup>

Labourers	-	60
Shoemakers	-	3
Gardeners	-	3
Hecklers	-	2
Squarewrights	-	2
Merchants	-	2
Tailors	-	4
Daylabourer	-	1
Mason	-	1
Tobacconist	-	1
Butcher	-	1
Lent Dresser	-	1
Wool Comber	-	1
Fiddler	-	1
Miner	-	1
Chapman	-	1
Weaver	-	1
Brickmaker	-	1

The major occupations found in the 92nd Gordon Highlanders are:<sup>61</sup>

Labourers	-	442
Weavers	-	185
Shoemakers	-	31
Tailors	-	42
Blacksmiths	-	17
Wool Combers	-	20
Wrights	-	13
Stocking Makers	-	6
Gardeners	-	8
Miners	-	8
Masons	-	11
Servants	-	7
Slaters	-	6
Sawyers	-	5
Butchers	-	5
Carpenters	-	5
Nailers	-	5
Cotton Spinners	-	4
Farmers	-	4

The muster rolls are rather useful in exploring the economic and social background and occupational status of the Highland recruits. The high number of labourers listed may be a reflection of the lack of skilled tradesmen in the Highlands or it may simply have been the manner of recording the sons of small farmers. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore this aspect of recruiting in any depth;

nevertheless, this examination provides an insight into the background of the soldiers who enlisted for service in the Highland regiments of the 18th Century.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER IV.

Section 4.1. Numbers of Men Enlisted, 1756 to 1815.

- 1) Kyd, James Gray, Scottish Population Statistics, p.xviii.
- 2) Op. cit., p.9.
- 3) Stewart, Sketches of the Highlanders, Vol. II, p.46.
- 4) Op. cit., p.146.
- 5) Kemp, Alan, The British Army in the American Revolution, p.67.
- 6) Bulloch, John Malcolm, Territorial Soldiering, p.xxxvii.
- 7) Stewart, op. cit., p.440.
- 8) Op. cit., p.438.
- 9) Op. cit., p.256.
- 10) Op. cit., p.395.
- 11) Adam, Frank, The Clans, Septs and Regiments of the Scottish Highlands, p.442.
- 12) Kyd, op. cit., p.xvii.

Section 4.2. Areas Where Troops Drawn From.

- 13) Stewart, op. cit., Vol. II, pp.85, 106.
- 14) Op. cit., p.117.
- 15) Lord Macdonald Papers, H.M. Register House, Edinburgh, GD 221/102.
- 16) Stewart, op. cit., Vol. II, p.128.
- 17) Op. cit., p.308.
- 18) Op. cit., p.139.
- 19) Op. cit., p.114.
- 20) OSA, Vol. 5, p.306.
- 21) Dunn-Pattison, The History of the 91st Argyleshire Highlanders, p.3.
- 22) Op. cit., p.7.
- 23) Gardyne, C. Greenhill, The Life of a Regiment, Vol. I, p.16.
- 24) Adam, op. cit., p.473.

- 25) Gardyne, op. cit., pp.16-17.
- 26) Stewart, Vol. I, p.367.
- 27) Bulloch, op. cit., p.xxx.
- 28) Cavendish, A.E.J., The 93rd Sutherland Highlanders, p.10.
- 29) Op. cit., p.12.
- 30) Op. cit.
- 31) Stewart, op. cit., Vol. II, p.242.
- 32) Scobie, I.H. Mackay, An Old Highland Fencible Corps, p.26.
- 33) Stewart, op. cit., Vol. II, p.317.
- 34) Campbell of Bredalbane Papers, H.M. Register House, Edinburgh,  
GD 112/52/12.
- 35) Op. cit.
- 36) Stewart, op. cit., Vol. II, p.324.
- 37) Op. cit., p.397.
- 38) Scobie, op. cit., p.41.
- 39) Bulloch, op. cit., p.xxix.

Section 4.3. Variations in Proportions Raised by Regions.

- 40) Cavendish, op. cit., p.2.
- 41) Gray, Malcolm, The Highland Economy, 1750-1850, p.60.
- 42) Macdonald, D.F., Scotland's Shifting Population, p.145.
- 43) OSA, Vol. 2, p.471.
- 44) OSA, Vol. 7, p.254.
- 45) OSA, Vol. 4, p.298.
- 46) OSA, Vol. 2, p.393.
- 47) OSA, Vol. 3, p.184.
- 48) OSA, Vol. 8, p.445.
- 49) Stewart, op. cit., Vol. II, p.41.
- 50) Op. cit., p.136.

Section 4.4. Age, Social and Economic Background of the Recruits.

- 51) Campbell of Bredalbane Papers, GD 112/52/12.
- 52) Dunn-Pattison, op. cit., p.1.
- 53) Scobie, op. cit., p.42.
- 54) Cavendish, op. cit., p.25.
- 55) Stewart, op. cit., Vol. II, p.265.
- 56) Op. cit., p.287.
- 57) Campbell of Bredalbane Papers, GD 112/52/12.
- 58) Op. cit.
- 59) Op. cit.
- 60) Bulloch, op. cit., pp.34-35.
- 61) Op. cit., p.231.



CHAPTER V.

The Breakdown of Highland Recruiting After 1793.

## CHAPTER V.

### SECTION 1

#### The Difficulty in Raising Recruits After 1793.

The Highlands supplied an *enormous* number of troops between 1793 and 1800. By the year 1800, however, the situation had begun to alter in terms of ease in recruiting in the Highlands. Although no regular Highland corps were raised in the Highlands after 1799 and the Fencibles were disbanded shortly thereafter, the regiments, in their need for replacement troops, had drained the area of men far beyond the limit which the Highlands might be reasonably expected to supply. The period of almost limitless recruits available was past and the problem of maintaining the already established corps became the great challenge to recruiters. Their success was only limited. The over-extension of the Highland's ability to supply men led to the influx of non-Highlanders, mainly English, Irish and Lowlanders, who changed the character of the Highland regiments to some degree.

There is a wealth of evidence demonstrating the degree of difficulty in finding suitable men and of the collapse of Highland recruiting. Despite the continually high bounties being paid by 1803 at the start of the Napoleonic Wars, the difficulty in obtaining men had become acute. Muster rolls of the various regiments reflect this difficulty and some selected examples show the general state of recruiting after 1800.

The Clan Alpine Fencibles, the last of these regiments raised prior to the Peace of Amiens, reported in 1800 that recruiting was very difficult due to the great numbers of recruits already raised in the Highlands.<sup>1</sup> This was in contrast to the ease with which such

regiments as the Reay and Bredalbane Fencibles had been raised six years earlier. It had been traditionally less difficult to raise troops for the Fencibles due to the limitation of service to the British Isles.\*

In early 1799, when General William Wemyss undertook the raising of the last of the Highland regular regiments, the 93rd Sutherland Regiment, it required from April 1799 to August 1800 to raise 653 troops despite the enlistment of 259 rank and file who had served with the Sutherland Fencibles.<sup>2</sup> Earlier regiments of the line had seldom required more than three months to raise 1,000 or more troops. So difficult was the task, that General Wemyss was given permission to raise his troops from any county or area of Scotland in late April 1799.<sup>3</sup> This emergency measure was not resorted to as evidenced by the singularly high proportion of Sutherlanders on the original muster rolls. There were, however, no supernumeraries as had been the case with earlier regiments.<sup>4</sup>

Other Highland regiments experienced similar difficulties in raising troops. The 91st Argyleshire Highlanders found recruits so scarce in 1803, that some monthly reports show no men attested. In order to stimulate the numbers brought in, the expedient of recruitment for rank was used and in 1804, four officers were assigned to recruiting duty in the north with the promise of promotion.<sup>5</sup> Between the years 1798 and 1800, the 72nd Seaforth's Highlanders could only find 200 men to fill up the ranks.<sup>6</sup> And, finally, three years, from 1810 to 1813, were required to raise only 400 replacement troops for the 2nd Battalion of the 78th Regiment.<sup>7</sup>

The example of these several regiments is repeated over and over in the various Highland corps. Not only were new men difficult to find,

---

\* Although the Royal Clan Alpine regiment was the last home service Fencible regiment raised in Scotland, the Canadian Fencible Regiment was raised in the Highlands in 1804 for service only in Canada.

but many of the veterans of the Fencible regiments were unwilling to enlist in the regulars after 1802 and the numbers who did volunteer were insufficient to complete the ranks of the regulars for renewed operations against the French. Many veterans who served overseas did not return as evidenced by the numbers of the 42nd, 77th and 78th Regiments who settled in Canada. The Isle of Tiree had sent 57 men to the army from 1757 to 1763, however, only 12 eventually returned.<sup>8</sup>

By the late 1790's, the situation had become so severe that the responsibility for raising replacements was gradually removed from the colonels, a practice which had existed since the initial raisings of the Highland regiments, and was placed in the hands of the various corporations of Scotland. The need for troops had outstripped the colonel's abilities to meet the demand.<sup>9</sup> Militia ranks were drawn upon and large drafts of troops were found not only from the Scottish, but also the English and Irish Militia. By the end of the wars, the majority of the replacement troops were drawn from the Local Militia and very few were actually raised within the Highlands, other than from this source.

Despite the length of the wars from 1793 to 1815, casualties\* in the Highland regiments do not seem to have been particularly heavy. This has been attributed to the usually high state of discipline and aggressiveness of the Highland regiments, characteristics which usually mean a low rate of casualties in combat. Disease took a much greater number of lives than did combat. The casualty counts of the Highland regiments were approximately 1 in 30 as seen from the returns of men killed in action of five regiments from 1793 to 1814. Of these 5 regiments, a total of 20,500 served during this period;<sup>10</sup>

\* Casualties here and on page 103 refer only to killed in action and not missing, captured or wounded.

<u>Regiment</u>	<u>Casualties.</u>	
42nd	-	235
78th (1st Btn)	-	103
79th	-	89
92nd	-	181
93rd	-	60
		<hr/>
Total	668	Killed in action.

An average, then, of 4,000 men served in each of these regiments during the twenty-year period; however, casualties in battle average only 133 per battalion. The more important figures than that of casualties are the number of replacements required to fill the depleted ranks owing to disease, discharges and natural attrition.

A factor which cannot be overlooked was the extreme longevity of the war, a situation which always places strains upon the ability of regiments to maintain their numbers. Very few men actually served the entire period of warfare, though this was not totally uncommon as demonstrated by the casualty figures for the rank and file of the 92nd Gordon Highlanders at Waterloo where 2 of the killed in action had served in the regiment since 1794.<sup>11</sup>

In order to demonstrate the very marked use of non-Highlanders in the regiments after 1800, as the Highlands failed to meet the requirement, an examination of the rolls of several of the regular regiments of the line is in order.

#### 1) 42nd Royal Highland Regiment.

Colonel Gardyne states that a return for the Black Watch of October 1815 shows the following national proportions of men in the ranks: Scottish 444, Irish 40 and English 16.<sup>12</sup> A detailed examination of the Regimental Adjutant's Roll of the rank and file who fought at Quatre Bras and Waterloo (15-18 June 1815) gives a more accurate idea of the regional origins of the rank and file. Of 547 total rank and

file, there are 159 total identifiable English, Irish or Lowland surnames or those having no clan affiliation.<sup>13</sup> Of the clan surnames, a goodly number are from the border or non-Highland families such as Douglas, Hamilton, Cunningham, Scott, Lindsay, Inglis and Wallace.\* It is highly unlikely that those with border or Lowland names would have been recruited in the Highlands. Among the obvious Highland surnames, there seems to be no clear clan or district preponderance, indicating a general area of recruitment rather than a specific clan or district attachment, a feature common to the other Highland corps. The most commonly occurring Highland surnames and their numbers are here listed:<sup>14</sup>

Campbell	-	9
MacDonald	-	24
MacGregor	-	19
MacLean	-	6
MacLeod	-	5
Cameron	-	6
Stewart	-	5
Henderson	-	5
MacPherson	-	5
MacIntosh	-	8
Fraser	-	8
MacKay	-	19
Sutherland	-	11
Munro	-	8
Ross	-	7
MacKenzie	-	10

The high proportion of those names from the northwest such as Ross, Munro, MacKenzie, MacKay, Sutherland and MacDonald lends some validity to the theory of higher rates of recruitment from the northwest and islands. The relative lack of Campbells is especially curious since this regiment was largely recruited from among the Campbells in 1739 and afterwards.

## 2) 78th Ross-shire Highlanders.

---

\* See Black, The Surnames of Scotland for description of geographic origin of Scots surnames.

Upon embarkation for the Cape of Good Hope in June 1796, the rolls of the regiment show the following national proportions:<sup>15</sup>

Highlanders	-	970
Lowlanders	-	129
Irish and English	-	14

The returns for March 1811 show a sharp drop in the number of Highlanders, a slight increase in the proportion of Irish and English and a substantial increase in the percentage of Lowlanders in the ranks:<sup>16</sup>

Highlanders	-	835
Lowlanders	-	184
Irish and English	-	17

The 2nd Battalion experienced difficulty in raising native Highlanders and initially showed a return of 560 Highlanders and 190 Lowlanders.<sup>17</sup>

### 3) 93rd Sutherland Highlanders.

The Regimental Digest of this regiment for 1813 comments on the situation of the new recruits:<sup>18</sup>

Notwithstanding the great influx about this period of recruits into the Regiment of much more questionable character than the respectable men of whom it was originally composed, the 93rd still continued to be distinguished, above all corps, by the general propriety of demeanour upon every occasion.

The men of bad character usually referred to those brought in from the Irish Militia. A number of writers commented upon the difficulties faced by regiments in being forced to rely upon these recruits. It is also interesting to observe that the reporting of incidents of desertion and severe punishments, almost unknown in the pre-1793 Highland regiments, rose proportionate to the number of non-Highlanders used to fill up the ranks.

While stationed in Ireland in 1808, the 93rd was comprised of the following numbers by nationality:<sup>19</sup>

<u>Ranks</u>		<u>Officers</u>	
Scottish	- 856	Scottish	- 36
English	- 16	English	- 6
Irish	- 21	Irish	- 4
Foreign	- 5	Foreign	- 1

It should be pointed out that the foreigners were listed as to place of residence rather than nationality, though some battalions did take on genuine foreigners by 1813. The foreign officer of the 93rd was a Scot and the privates listed as such were sons of men in the ranks whose place of residence was overseas.

The unfortunate problem in returns of this type is that no differentiation is made as to Scots Highlanders and Scots Lowlanders, therefore, one can only guess as to their place of origin or by finding the original muster rolls which list the recruit by parish. Again, there is no easy way to determine how many of the recruits were native Highlanders who had migrated to the Lowlands in search of employment, a factor which would cause them to be listed as being Lowlanders.

Upon embarkation for the New Orleans expedition in 1814, the 1st Battalion of the 93rd showed a return of 929 rank and file of whom 690 were Highlanders, 225 were Lowlanders and 14 were English.\* A full 544 of the 690 Highlanders were Sutherland men, a rather large percentage for 1815, by which time, even Sutherland recruiting was breaking down under the strain of continuous recruiting.<sup>20</sup>

#### 4) 91st Argyleshire Highlanders.

This regiment depended even more heavily upon non-Highlanders than

---

\* This figure for Lowlanders included the lowland plains on the coast of Sutherland and Caithness, but these men would have the characteristics of Highlanders.



did other corps. The proportion of Highlanders to Lowlanders is given in the casualty reports of the 1st Battalion between 1794 and 1803. From the reports can be found 68 Highland names, 128 Lowland names and 4 Irish, indicating the heavy reliance of this regiment on Lowland recruits.<sup>21</sup> Again, there is no indication as to the number of Lowlanders who were actually transplanted Highlanders. A better indication of the reliance on non-Scots is shown by the collected returns for the years 1800 to 1818 for the 1st Battalion. Within this period, there were enlisted some 970 Scots (Highland and Lowland), 218 Irish, 171 English and 22 foreigners.<sup>22</sup> These figures represent only 2 to 1 ratio of Scots to foreigners. The figures for the 2nd Battalion between 1807 and 1814 are even more surprising. They show enlisted 559 Scots, 168 English, 142 Irish and 197 foreigners, many of whom were Swedes, Pomeranians and Germans who were obtained while the 2nd Battalion was on service in the Low Countries in 1813.<sup>23</sup> Recruiting parties were sent to all parts of the British Isles in addition to the Lowland cities and towns. Recruiting stations were established in London, Nottingham, Limerick and Dublin and a number of men were drawn from the Irish Militia. Recruits were apparently easy to find in Ireland at this time due to the worsening economic and land situations as evidenced by a letter from the Colonel, Campbell of Lochnell, to the Lieutenant-Colonel, Catlin Crauford:<sup>24</sup>

Armagh, Ireland  
17 January 1801.

I think I can get you plenty of good men from this county; the times here are particularly hard, linen cloth (the staple of the county) at a very low price, and provisions dear, men enlisting by the hundreds.

The experiences of these Highland regiments seems to have been universal. Some regiments were not as fortunate as the original 79th Cameron Highlanders, which in 1794, had only 278 Highlanders of

an original return of 600 men.<sup>25</sup> The situation in the case of this regiment resulted more from Cameron of Lochiel supporting the efforts of the Duke of Gordon and the 92nd over those of his kinsman, Cameron of Erracht and the 79th. Erracht managed to raise an almost completely Gaelic-speaking regiment by recruiting a great number of young Highlanders who had emigrated to the Lowlands in search of employment. This resource of Highlanders ceased to be lucrative as other later efforts depleted this source of Highlanders as they had done in the Highlands themselves.

In addition to the lack of manpower, added burdens were imposed by the War Office from time to time as prompted by the necessities of war. Prior to 1800, the British army had relied upon hired mercenaries to perform the duties of the Rifle Corps. In 1794, the Crown hired 34,000 troops, mostly Hessians and some Hanoverians, to serve as light cavalry or riflemen (Jägers).<sup>26</sup> In order to create a British rifle corps, the War Office raised in 1800, the Duke of York's Rifle Corps which drew heavily upon the Highland Fencibles in Ireland.<sup>27</sup> This action placed an added burden on recruitment as several hundred replacement troops had to be raised from the Highlands.

By 1809, a large proportion of the Highland regiments were not natives and much of the old character of the regiments had been lost. This state of affairs prompted the War Office into removing several of the Highland regiments from the Highland establishment and placing them on the same footing with the Lowland regiments.<sup>28</sup>

As the population of the Highlands of Scotland is found insufficient to supply recruits for the whole of the Highland corps on the establishment of His Majesty's army, and as some of these corps, laying aside their distinguishing dress, which is objectionable to the natives of South Britain, would in a great measure tend to facilitate the completing of the establishment, as it would be an inducement to the men of the English Militia to extend their services in greater numbers to these regiments: it is in consequence most humbly submitted for

approbation of His Majesty that His Majesty's 72nd, 73rd, 74th, 75th, 91st and 94th Regiments should discontinue to wear in future the dress by which His Majesty's regiments of Highlanders are distinguished; and that the above corps should no longer be considered on that establishment.

In consequence of this action, the 72nd, 73rd, 74th, 75th, 91st and 94th Highland regiments all adopted trews and Highland bonnets and discarded kilts and belted plaids. The 71st or MacLeod's Highlanders were made the 71st Glasgow Highland Regiment in 1808.

In 1809, it became the 71st Glasgow Highland Light Infantry and became part of the first Light Infantry Brigade under Sir John Moore.<sup>29</sup>

Although most of these regiments were eventually returned to the Highland establishment, the implication of the action was clear; there simply were not enough Highlanders available to fill the ranks of the many Highland regiments serving in the British Army.

## SECTION 2

### The Changing Highland Economy.

Two events of paramount significance to the state of the Highlands and Highland society in the 18th Century were the introduction of the potato into the region and the coming of the sheep farms. The potato was first introduced into the Highlands in 1743 by Macdonald of Clanranald. Although it was slow in becoming popular as a staple food crop, by 1790, it had become the principal food source for the common Highlander. The greatest advantage of the potato was that it could be grown abundantly on tiny plots of land which were low in mineral resources and required only a modicum of labour. The result of the introduction and cultivation of the potato was that a greater number of persons could subsist on a smaller portion of land, a factor which tended to aggravate the already precarious subsistence and reinforce the Highlander's uneconomical habit of constantly subdividing holdings among the family.

The second monumental occurrence was the introduction of improved agriculture, notably, the clearing of the land for large sheep runs, after 1760. With this new type of improved land usage, thousands of former small tenants were removed from their traditional holdings and forced into the newly developed towns and fishing villages such as Tobermory, or were compelled to migrate to the colonies or the Lowlands in search of work. Before looking further at the clearances and the transformation of the Highland economy, the root causes of these occurrences should be delved into.

Prior to the Jacobite risings of 1745, agricultural methods were quite primitive and inefficient. The use of the run-rig and infield-

outfield systems of cultivation produced barely a subsistence crop for feeding the population and any external capital was generated from the sale of the black cattle in the Lowland markets. According to Malcolm Gray, land holding in the Highlands was set up not so much to insure an effective and efficient agricultural economy, as to "stabilize a class structure and to verify mutual obligations".<sup>30</sup> The holding of land, not by lease or contract, but rather through traditional and hereditary right and the return of services, both labour and military, were the underpinnings of the clan system.\*

Following the rebellion of 1745, many Highland landlords attempted to stimulate the yield of their estates through the use of improved agricultural techniques imported from the Lowlands. An attempt to root out the inefficient system of run-rig agriculture began initially in the south and east where close proximity to the Lowlands encouraged the adoption of efficient methods of agricultural production. In 1776, the Duke of Argyle ordered the break-up of the run-rig system on his estates and the placing of farmers on individual plots of land. By 1783, the Bredalbane estates had followed this example. The breaking up of the run-rig system came substantially later to the northwest and islands, but by 1820, run-rig agriculture was practically non-existent.<sup>31</sup>

Concurrent with the stress on improved agriculture came the rise of materialism among the aristocracy. Prior to the latter 18th Century, the gentry and landlords were not as inclined towards ostentatious living as their Lowland and foreign counterparts, though they did live comfortably. By the middle of the century, a goodly portion of the Highland aristocracy had become assimilated into the general British aristocracy, thus causing a rise in the standard of living and, consequently, a need for increased incomes in order to live in the

\* See Chapter 1 for explanation of land holding.

fashion prescribed by that society. In order to finance such luxuries as travel, town houses in London and Edinburgh and expensive imported goods, landlords set in motion a series of rent increases and improvements which ultimately destroyed the old clan ties of tenant to landlord as the common clansmen began to see the landlord less in terms of the patriarchal leader and more as simply the owner of the land.

The coming of the sheep farms to the Highlands and the resultant clearances were natural extensions of the need to produce higher revenues from what was relatively poor land. Sheep farms required large tracts of uncultivated land, but the benefits in terms of income were enormous and collected rents from these enterprises rose far above that collected from the small tenants and tacksmen. Sheep farming began on a large scale in the south and gradually moved north. By 1785, MacDonnell of Glengarry had begun clearing his estates for sheep farming.<sup>32</sup> The most notorious case of sheep farm introduction and the removal of tenants occurred on the Sutherland estates after 1805. Colin MacKenzie, the agent of the Countess of Sutherland until 1807, proposed a combination of sheep farms, fishing villages, the reduction of tacksmen and the resettlement of the population on muir ground or in newly raised villages.<sup>33</sup> The eventual result of the Sutherland clearances and the experiment in improved land use led to a bitter and often violent series of confrontations such as the Kildonan riots of 1813.

Sheep farming also introduced into the Highlands a new aristocracy of outsiders who supplanted the old tacksman gentry. Sheep farming required great amounts of capital in order to stock and lease the land. Local gentry rarely had the capital resources and the majority of the sheep farmers were from the Lowland or English areas. Therefore, the old gentry class was breaking down and a new group of outsiders were supplanting them. Unfortunately for Highland recruiting, these new men

could not command the loyal following as had the older body of tacksmen who had been displaced.<sup>34</sup>

A second great source of income for the proprietors of the west coast and islands was the harvesting of kelp. The surge of this industry created not only great profits for the landlord, but allowed for an excess of population to be sustained on a largely stagnant agricultural base.\* The height of the boom came in the first decade of the 19th Century when kelp was sold at a record high of £20 per ton in 1810. By the end of the second decade of the century, though, the market had collapsed and prices of only £3 per ton were paid.<sup>35</sup> The profits of the kelp boom to certain landowners was phenomenal. At its height, the annual income from kelp for Lord Macdonald was near £20,000 while that of Clanranald stood at £18,000 per annum.<sup>36</sup>

These changing patterns of economy were to have devastating effects on the state of the Highlands. The south and east were relatively unaffected by the changes in the fundamentals of the old economy in comparison to the northwest. These areas generally had more arable land, access to employment in the Lowlands for the surplus manpower and a generally healthier total economy. On Islay, for example, improved agriculture had very positive results. In 1775, the island imported 3 - 4,000 bolls of meal per year. By 1786, Islay was exporting 5,000 bolls of meal per year despite a significant population increase.<sup>37</sup>

The north and west suffered the effects of improvement somewhat more severely. These areas were faced with a rapidly growing population, stagnant modes of agricultural production and physical

---

\* Some land reclamation was carried out in parts, but these activities were of limited success in an area as mountainous as the Highlands.

limitations to the spread of cultivated land.<sup>38</sup> Malcolm Gray summarizes the effect of the new modes of agriculture and land usage in these years in the northwest:<sup>39</sup>

The formative years had formed nothing but the enlarged image of an old society, but a society that worked in economic conditions that were in some ways disastrously new.

The new economy was to have totally opposite effects on army recruiting, at least, in the initial stages. The Lowland areas where the press of population was less heavily felt and where wages for labour were rising fairly evenly with economic growth did not rely as heavily on the services as did the northwest as an outlet for surplus manpower or unemployed tenants. The Reverend Mr. Patrick Grant writes of the Parish of Duthil and Rothil Murchas in Inverness-shire and Moray:<sup>40</sup>

Until of late, the people were very fond of a military life, but the wages of servants, increasing so exceedingly, that the spirit is almost totally overcome. Formerly none would enlist but in a Highland corps. Bounty money now determines the choice.

In the overcrowded and under-developed northwest, a totally opposite effect to the improvement was seen. The great surplus of labour working smaller holdings created a vast reserve of excellent soldiers, a resource which was to become quickly drained off with the rush of Highland corps raised between 1793 and 1800. The pastor of the Parish of Wick in Caithness, the Reverend Mr. William Sutherland writes:<sup>41</sup>

Want of manufactures and other means of employment, made young men, who are averse to labour in husbandry and have no way of livelihood, readily betake themselves to the army and navy, more especially when a Highland corps is to be raised.



### SECTION 3

#### The Breakdown of the Traditional Society.

The introduction of Lowland agricultural improvements in the Highlands brought not only displacement but began a series of changes in the fundamental structure of Highland society. Within a very few years, the old patriarchal culture based upon land tenure had succumbed to the new commercial values of capitalism based upon the rational and optimum use of land resources. To the common Highlander, brought up in the traditional values and beliefs of kinship and subsistence agriculture, the rapidity with which these changes came about were both unsettling and frightening. The ultimate result of these changes was the total collapse of the old clan culture as it had existed for centuries. Commercialism did, in a few years, what government legislation and suppression had been unable to do for decades, the destruction of the old clan system.

The expanding of a wealthier aristocracy, either as a result of kelp production or improved agriculture, created a wedge which was to separate the clansman from his traditional leaders, a situation which was to effect, perhaps not so much numbers, but very definitely the spirit with which the Highlanders enlisted in the army. The bulk of the new wealth generated by the aristocracy in the late 18th Century was spent on conspicuous consumption rather than efforts to improve the life of the people, a break with the traditional mode of life from which the Highland society was not able to recover. The minister of the Parish of Applecross in Ross commented in the early 1790's that:

The influx of money, and their communications with other countries hath introduced a desire for better living; and with a desire for better

living; and with the rapacity of the superiors in applying all the advantages of the times to their own private interest, that he effectually relaxed those attachments.

Reverend MacQueen went on to state that the traditional attachment to superiors held by the lower classes "hath for some time back, been gradually abating".<sup>42</sup>

An indication of the extent of the adoption of Lowland manners and lifestyles is reflected in the changing patterns of dress. By the provisions of the "Diskilting Act" of 1747, the traditional Highland clothing had been outlawed and despite the restoration of the right to wear Highland clothing after 1782, many areas had lost their native costume almost completely. The minister of the Parish of Cromarty reports that many were wearing English dress and that printed cotton was becoming very popular.<sup>43</sup> Even in the more conservative Islands, fashions were altering, particularly among the gentry. The Reverend Donald Martin of the Parish of Kilmuir in Skye states that:<sup>44</sup>

Fifty years ago, the old Highland dress universally prevailed. Hats, long coats, boots, spurs, watches etc. were rare. Now every gentleman wears them, and persons of substance, of both sexes, dress fashionably, and like in a style so elegant, as those of the same rank in the southern parts of Scotland.

The changing patterns of dress, either from the introduction of cheap manufactured goods or through a conscious desire to emulate the English and Lowlanders, and the rise in conspicuous consumption did not, in themselves, break down the old Highland society. These new life styles merely reflected the revolutionary changes which were taking place in the Highlands in the late 18th Century as old customs and values were assimilated into the pattern of the country as a whole.

Perhaps the most significant change in the social structure which influenced the state of recruiting for the army was the demise of the tacksman class. These gentry families had served as the middlemen

between the chief and the common clansmen. The tacksmen had officered the clan regiment and had served as the military elite of the clan. The tacksmen families had been responsible for rousing the tenantry for military action. With the end of the clan armies and the introduction of government service on a grand scale into the Highlands, the tacksman class played an equally vital role in the recruiting for the regiments. Entire companies were frequently raised from one tacksman's estates, a company which was often officered by the tacksman and his relatives, thus maintaining the blood kinship and district ties which had been a foundation of the old clan army. In the 73rd Regiment, commanded by Colonel MacKenzie, 19 officers had the surname MacKenzie. The list of the officers originally gazetted to the 98th (91st) Argyleshire Regiment shows that the Colonel, a major, 4 of 7 captains and 7 of 13 lieutenants were all of the name Campbell. Of the remaining officers, many Argyleshire names such as MacDougal, Stuart, MacNab and MacLaine are in evidence.<sup>45</sup> The case of almost every regiment indicates a reliance on the local gentry class not only to officer, but also to raise the rank and file.

The destruction of the tacksman class as a viable social force in the Highlands and their replacement by a new aristocracy based on capital rather than traditional social standing occurred throughout the Highlands and not only in the more modernized areas of the south and east. The tacksmen of the estates of Lord Macdonald on Skye were removed in 1777. The Argyle tacksmen had begun to be removed as early as 1737 and the Duke of Argyle replaced the traditional gentry with business-minded tenants.<sup>46</sup>

The removal of and eventual emigration of much of the tacksman class broke down clan cohesion and undercut the authority of the chief. Further, it removed from the scene one of the cornerstones of clan

society and created a two-tier system of large holders and small farmers. By 1844, only 3 of 23 parishes in one section of the northwest had more than a 6 per cent. middle class population and the high figure for any area was only 15 per cent.<sup>47</sup>

For the army and recruiting, appeals to clan kinship ties, initially very potent, became progressively weaker and the government eventually found that the only effective recruiting was brought about by high bounties and the desperation created by overpopulation and under-employment, neither of which tended to produce the best quality recruits. By removing the tacksman class, the landowners destroyed the most important tool for recruitment available and the ranks of the Highland regiments began to be filled with men brought in not by love of clan and kinship, but by strictly economic motivations.

Not only did the economic changes alter Highland society, but other external influences were making an impression on the culture, notably, the introduction in the 18th Century of popular education. Government education acts in 1696 and 1708 legalized the establishment of parish schools and required the tacksman to financially support these schools.<sup>48</sup> Perhaps the single most important organization was the Scottish Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge (SPCK), established in 1709 primarily to teach English in the charity schools.<sup>49</sup> So great was the effect of these schools in certain areas that Lachlin Shaw wrote in 1775 that "heathenish customs are abandoned".<sup>50</sup>

From 1811 onwards, Gaelic Societies of Inverness, Edinburgh and Glasgow were formed to teach children in the Highlands. In 1826, of 500 schools operating in the Highlands,  $\frac{1}{3}$  were parochial,  $\frac{1}{4}$  were SPCK and 40 per cent. were operated by the Gaelic Societies.<sup>51</sup> The educational habits of the aristocracy changed as well after 1700. Prior to the 18th Century, the sons of chiefs and chieftains were

reared by foster parents who imbued the young men with the ideals of the clan culture. By the 18th Century, many sons were sent out of the Highlands to Lowland schools and were reared at home. In this manner, ties with the common clansmen, highly important to the structure of clan society, were being broken up. Education from the Lowlands was also breaking up and undermining the old clan values. Had not the government abolished the legal structure of the clans in 1748, they would surely have eventually succumbed to the pressures exerted from the outside as a traditional, tribal society inevitably does when overcome by a more advanced, modern culture.

The breakdown of the society came swiftly and military recruitment suffered. While the population growth and unemployment created by the changing economics did initially produce a surplus manpower force beneficial to the regiments, the breakdown of the clan values and attitudes insured that Highland recruiting failed once the surplus was drained off and recruiting became more difficult than even that of England, which was traditionally poor. Argyle was particularly susceptible to the change in attitudes. This change in military values in the southwest is demonstrated by the refusal of the population of Iona to enter military service in 1799.<sup>52</sup> While he may be overstating the case, the comments of Dr. Samuel Johnson on the state of the Highlands in his Works is instructive in its assertion regarding the decline of the old Highland society.<sup>53</sup>

There was perhaps never any change in national manners so quick, so great, and so general as that which has operated in the Highlands by the last conquest and the subsequent laws. We came hither too late to see what we expected - a people of peculiar appearance, and a system of antiquated life. The clans retain little now of their original character: their ferocity of temper is softened, their military ardour is extinguished, their dignity of independence is depressed, their contempt of government subdued, and their reverence for their chiefs abated. Of what they had before the late conquest of their country there remains only their language and their poverty.

## SECTION 4

### Shifting Population and Emigration.

The problem of a rapidly increasing population in the Highlands has been discussed in previous sections. Generally stated, the Highlands, and particularly the northwest and Islands, experienced a rapid growth in the population after 1750, a trend which was only reversed in the mid-19th Century. Not only did the increase in population provide a surplus manpower, but it also set in motion a period of increasing emigration, a process which eventually reduced the Highlands to a sparsely populated region of small crofters. The shifting patterns of the Highland population did play an influential role in the success of Highland recruiting.

Initially, landowners were reluctant to allow massive emigration from their estates and a deliberate policy of emigration did not evolve until after 1800, and especially in the 1820's when clearances for sheep runs were in full operation.<sup>54</sup> Emigration from the Highlands began about 1740 and was mainly organized by tacksmen who took large numbers of the tenantry with them, usually to either New York or North Carolina in the American colonies.<sup>55</sup> The removal of the tacksmen from their traditional landed status prompted many to opt for emigration, especially those from areas such as Skye and the Macdonald estates. With the clearances, many of those removed emigrated, and it is reported that of those deposed by sheep farms on Skye, 2/3 emigrated, generally to North Carolina.<sup>56</sup> The return of the discharged soldiers after the Napoleonic Wars added further pressure on the population, and between 1815 and 1834, over 30,000 persons emigrated from the Highlands to the overseas colonies or the United States.<sup>57</sup>

Not all emigration from the Highlands was to overseas destinations. Of the total number of emigrants, 69 per cent. went to other counties of Scotland, notably Renfrew, Lanark, Dumbarton, Ayr and Lothian, in search of employment in the growing industrial areas of the south.<sup>58</sup> It was in these areas that Highland recruiters were quite successful in the enlisting for service of expatriate Highlanders.

Some examples from various parishes illustrate the nature and number of emigrants in the late 18th Century. The greatest areas of emigration were the Islands, especially Skye, Lewis, Harris and Uist. Following the Islands in numbers of emigrants were the western seaboard areas of Sutherland and Inverness-shire. Far behind in total numbers were the counties of Cromarty, Ross, Caithness and Argyle.<sup>59</sup> The Isle of Skye, however, illustrates most graphically the situation encountered in the Islands and northwestern Highlands. The massive emigrations began in 1769 when a goodly number of tacksmen on the MacDonald estates left.<sup>60</sup> This process continued until interrupted by the American War. The most famous of the MacDonald gentry emigrants were Flora MacDonald and her husband Allan MacDonald of Kingsburgh, who settled in North Carolina in 1774. Flora returned to Skye in 1778 while her husband remained a prisoner-of-war in New York.

From the Parish of Braccadale, the following statistics are given:<sup>61</sup>

<u>Dates</u>		<u>Number</u> <u>Emigrated</u>		<u>Destination</u>
1771 - 1774	-	128	-	America
August 1780	-	200	-	do.
October 1790	-	200	-	do.

Total population of 2,250 in 1792.

The Parish of Durnish experienced similar numbers. Between 1772 and 1775, 204 males and 207 females emigrated from Durnish to North America.<sup>62</sup> Between August 1771 and October 1790, a total of 8 large transports sailed from Skye to America carrying a total of 2,400 people

from that island.<sup>63</sup> By 1803, over 4,000 persons had emigrated from the Isle of Skye.

Other parishes suffered similar population losses. The report from the Parish of Glenshiel in Ross states:<sup>64</sup>

In 1769 and again in 1772, a number of substantial farmers emigrated to North Carolina with their families and their connexions, which not only at that time, but for some years after, very sensibly diminished the number of inhabitants.

The Reverend Mr. Patrick Campbell of the Parish of Kilmelfort comments that:<sup>65</sup>

The great and chief cause of the frequent and numerous emigrations from the Highlands to America, is the natural fertility of the soil, which does not furnish the means of subsistence proportional to the increasing population and the number of inhabitants: and therefore when they cannot procure employment in their native country, they are of necessity obliged to search for it in distant and more fertile climes.

Attempts were made to control the emigration of Highlanders and to maintain a reasonable standard for their passages. The Passenger Vessel Act was enacted in 1803 and made such provisions as a surgeon on board each vessel per every 50 passengers and limited the numbers per ship by requiring at least 2 tons of ship's burden per passenger.<sup>66</sup>

The problem created for army recruiting by emigration was not the drain of the population. The rapidly rising population of the Highlands could certainly support a certain amount of emigration as a safety valve. Two difficulties in recruiting did arise, however. Firstly, the age factor of the males emigrating and secondly, the loss of substantial farmers and tacksmen.

A full 52 per cent. of those Highlanders who emigrated from 1770 to 1815 were between the ages of 20 and 35.<sup>67</sup> This was, of course, the prime age for military service. Of the remainder, many were children whose services would have been subsequently removed for future years.



Of those under 30 years of age, a high proportion were unmarried men who were more prone to serve in the army than were married men. Through heavy emigration, thought to have been as high as 12,000 people to the colonies between 1782 and 1803, a great many potential recruits were lost to the Highland regiments.<sup>68</sup>

The second important loss through emigration was that of the tacksmen. Many of those displaced by the landowners emigrated and carried with them a substantial number of their tenants, or those likely to enlist in the army had the tacksmen remained and undertaken recruiting for a regiment. The loss of the tacksmen was particularly acute in the western isles and on Skye. Not to be overlooked was the removal of the traditional link between the clansman and the clan chief, a role filled by the gentry tacksmen.

Although emigration in itself did not threaten Highland recruiting in terms of population depletion, it did remove a sizeable number of those men most eligible for service or most capable of raising troops for His Majesty's service, a factor which cannot be overlooked when examining the breakdown of Highland recruiting after 1793. Although the Highland population was generally increasing at a high rate during this period, those most amenable to military service were often lost either through emigration to the colonies or to the industrial Lowlands, where the traditional clan and kinship ties were undercut by a society with vastly differing concepts of the virtue of military service.

Section 5.1. The Difficulty in Raising Recruits After 1793.

- 1) Stewart, David, Sketches of the Highlanders, Vol. II, p.873.
- 2) Cavendish, A.E.J., The 93rd Sutherland Highlanders, p.12.
- 3) Op. cit., p.11.
- 4) Op. cit., p.13.
- 5) Dunn-Pattison, The History of the 91st Argyleshire Highlanders, p.29.
- 6) Stewart, Op. cit., Vol. II, p.137.
- 7) Op. cit., p.286.
- 8) Cregeen, Eric, Argyle Estate Instructions, p.xxi.
- 9) Bulloch, John Malcolm, Territorial Soldiering, p.xliv.
- 10) Stewart, op. cit., Vol. II, p.430.
- 11) Gardyne, C. Greenhill, The Life of a Regiment, Vol. I, p.460.
- 12) Op. cit., p.519.
- 13) Brown, William, The Royal Highland Regiment, The Black Watch, Medal Roll, 1801 to 1911, pp.3-8.
- 14) Op. cit.
- 15) Stewart, op. cit., Vol. II, p.199.
- 16) Op. cit.
- 17) Op. cit., p.187.
- 18) Cavendish, op. cit., p.37.
- 19) Op. cit., p.34.
- 20) Op. cit., p.50.
- 21) Dunn-Pattison, op. cit., p.3.
- 22) Op. cit., p.42.
- 23) Op. cit.
- 24) Op. cit., p.16.
- 25) Op. cit., p.3.
- 26) Scobie, I.H. Mackay, An Old Highland Fencible Corps, p.243.
- 27) Op. cit., p.276.

- 28) Dunn-Pattison, op. cit., p.41.
- 29) Adam, Frank, The Clans, Septs and Regiments of the Scottish Highlands, p.472.

Section 5.2. The Changing Highland Economy.

- 30) Gray, Malcolm, The Highland Economy, 1750-1850, p.23.
- 31) Op. cit., pp.67-68.
- 32) Smout, T.C., A History of the Scottish People, p.356.
- 33) Adam, R.J., Papers on Sutherland Estate Management, Vol. I, p.xxxii.
- 34) Gray, op. cit., pp.91-93.
- 35) Op. cit., p.156.
- 36) MacDonald, D.F., Scotland's Shifting Population, p.156.
- 37) Gray, op. cit., p.81.
- 38) Op. cit., p.102.
- 39) Op. cit., p.75.
- 40) OSA, Vol. 4, p.315.
- 41) OSA, Vol. 10, p.29.

Section 5.3. The Breakdown of the Traditional Society.

- 42) OSA, Vol. 3, p.377.
- 43) OSA, Vol.12, p.260.
- 44) OSA, Vol. 2, p.557.
- 45) Dunn-Pattison, op. cit., p.20.
- 46) Cregeen, Eric R., Argyle Estate Instructions, p.xvi.
- 47) Gray, op. cit., p.196.
- 48) Smout, op. cit., p.344.
- 49) Op. cit., p.463.
- 50) Op. cit., p.464.
- 51) Op. cit.

52) Cregeen, op. cit., p.195.

53) Smout, op. cit., p.342.

Section 5.4. Shifting Population and Emigration.

54) Gray, p.63.

55) Op. cit., p.353.

56) MacDonald, op. cit., p.144.

57) Willcox, Walter F., International Migrations, Vol. I, p.99.

58) Gray, op. cit., p.66.

59) MacDonald, op. cit., p.141.

60) MacLeod, Rev. Canon Roderick C., "The Western Highlands in the Eighteenth-Century", p.34.

61) OSA, Vol. 3, p.247.

62) OSA, Vol. 4, p.133.

63) Op. cit.

64) OSA, Vol. 7, p.132.

65) OSA, Vol. 10, p.324.

66) Donaldson, Gordon, The Scots Overseas, p.99.

67) MacDonald, op. cit., p.150.

68) Op. cit., p.143.

CONCLUSION.

## CONCLUSION.

### SECTION 1

#### Patterns of Recruitment.

As demonstrated in the previous sections, the Highlands of Scotland provided an incredible number of troops for the British army in the period following the final military defeat of Jacobitism as a serious political force. The need for troops was imperative for the colonial and continental wars of the 18th and early 19th Centuries. Traditional mistrust of the army in England, aggravated by the unattractiveness of the army life, hampered recruiting efforts for the rank and file. It is to the great credit of William Pitt the Elder that he set in motion a policy which was to have significant results. Not only did the government receive the services of thousands of loyal, reliable, disciplined and first-rate troops, but the policy of raising regiments from the Highlands sealed the reconciliation of the Highland aristocracy to the Act of Union. The Highlands genuinely became a viable partner in the Union with the raising of the regiments. The reconciliation of the Scottish political nation as a whole, ended centuries of hostilities between the Highlands and Lowlands, between Scotland and England, and especially, extinguished the smouldering Jacobitism which had threatened the political stability of the nation since 1689.

From 1757 until the end of the century, the Highlands provided a storehouse of troops which seemed inexhaustable. Population growth, improved agriculture and the lack of industrial development created a manpower surplus of unemployed Highlanders who, when imbued with the clan ideals of a warrior society, were eager to take the King' Shilling

for service in the Highland regiments.

But, a fundamental change was taking place in the Highlands after 1745, the roots of which lay in the dominant philosophy of 18th Century western Europe, that of rationalism, improved agriculture and the emergence of capitalism as a positive force in economics. The traditional Highlands, burdened with generally unproductive land and with a patriarchal, tribal-orientated culture, could not accommodate and assimilate the new forces and the old society crumbled under the impact of the new influences. The result of these changes, brought about over a period of half a century, set in motion such processes as massive emigration out of the Highlands, the breakdown of the clan and kinship ties of the patriarchy and altered the rudiments of the Highland economy to a point which was unworkable to the average Highlander.

A result of these changes in the nature of the Highlands was the eventual breakdown of Highland recruiting after 1793. Emigration carried away a number of potential recruits. The decline of the clan feeling coupled with the replacement of the old gentry by newcomers destroyed the single most important mechanism for raising Highland troops prior to 1800, the appeal to clan and kinship ties. And, finally, by that date, the previous success in raising troops from the Highlands had totally drained away the surplus manpower to an extent that the existing Highland regiments were unable to maintain their required numbers and began the process of non-Highland recruitment. The eventual demise of Highland recruiting is best symbolized by the War Office action of 1809 which removed several Highland regiments, some of 30 year's standing, from the Highland establishment.

Despite the eventual breakdown of Highland recruiting in the early 19th Century, the Highlands provided thousands of able troops for the services of the nation during a most vital period in the formation of

the modern British state and at a time when their services were most needed.



## SECTION 2

### The Sources.

This thesis has relied heavily on 5 ~~princip~~<sup>al</sup> sources of information: The Honourable J.W. Fortescue's monumental History of the British Army; Colonel David Stewart's histories of the regiments; the regimental histories of the individual corps; the Statistical Account of Scotland by Sir John Sinclair, Bart.; and, finally, muniments of several Highland landowners who were involved in the raising of Highland troops. An analysis of each source and its importance to the thesis is in order.

J.W. Fortescue's History of the British Army is the definitive work on the 18th and 19th Century history of the British army, its campaigns, battles, strengths, weaknesses and character. Although very little factual evidence on the recruitment of the Highland regiments per se is found in Fortescue, the context in which the Highlanders fought and the military events which shaped the period have no better source than this work and it was used as a structural background to add shape and dimension to the history of the Highland regiments.

For the actual regimental histories, two areas of research were delved into. Colonel David Stewart of Garth, writing in the period just after Waterloo, must be considered as a ~~reliable~~ historical source. Stewart actually served with and commanded Highlanders throughout the period of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. In addition, this source provides numerous statistics such as numbers recruited, strength and nationality of regiments, casualties and the general service of every regiment. In the same line as Stewart are the individual regimental histories. Although these were compiled several decades after the period being considered, the authors generally relied upon regimental

documents, muster rolls and returns, therefore, their figures and statistics are presumably reasonably accurate.

The Statistical Account of Scotland again provides first hand source material. It must be admitted that the writers of these accounts were clergy rather than professional historians and their comments must be viewed in that respect. Nevertheless, these sources do provide valuable insight into the workings of Highland society in the 1790's and particular attention was paid to the comments on the breakdown of clan society, emigration, population growth and the numbers of men serving in the armed forces from each parish. In these areas, the Statistical Account proved invaluable.

Finally, estate papers, letters and other muniments, either in original form or edited and printed, provided not only information on the nature of the Highlands of the period, but, more importantly, primary military research material. The Bredalbane estate papers were perhaps the most useful and hundreds of military documents, primarily muster rolls, are preserved in the Bredalbane collection in H.M. Register House.

### SECTION 3

#### The Significance of the Work.

The study of the Highland regiments in the 18th and early 19th Centuries may perhaps be accused of drawing too much attention. The Celtic Revival of the Regency Period kept alive the more romantic and colourful aspects of clan culture. The new Celtic Revival, most noticeable in the United States in the past 20 years, has set off a new fascination with the clan system and especially the regiments. The Highland regiments have always played an important role in Highland affairs simply because they were such a dominant part of Highland life in the post-'45 period and were an integral part of that society. For this reason, the accumulation of knowledge on the regiments is valuable to the study of the Highlands and not simply for the Celtophiles of the 20th Century.

Most important, perhaps, to the study of and appreciation of the clan culture, is the fact that the regiments were the sole agents in maintaining at least the accoutrements of clan culture. The bagpipe and tartan clothing were proscribed by law until 1782, except in the army. Colonel Stewart, a Highland officer as well as an historian, may be credited for much of the Celtic Revival of the 1820's, not only through his writings, but also his role in staging the visit of King George IV to Scotland in 1822. As evidenced by remarks of the various ministers writing for the Statistical Account, the aristocracy down to the common people were wearing garments of non-Highland fashion by the 1790's, a result of the assimilation of the Highland aristocracy into the general British pattern and the growth in the manufacture of cheap textiles. Therefore, the army, through the wearing of the kilt, hose and bonnet, the playing of the bagpipe and the method of recruiting through clan ties, preserved some of the clan culture

which most surely would have disintegrated under the stress of legal restriction and cultural assimilation.

The Highland regiments reflected the events in the Highlands after 1745 more than any other institution. The reconciliation of the aristocracy to the Union, the economic changes, population growth, emigration, clearances and the eventual breakdown of the old clan system are not only reflected but magnified by the history of the Highland regiments. Through the study of these corps, the broader spectrum of Highland society, culture and history are seen and for this reason, the study of this subject is not just of value to the military historian, but also to social, economic and political historians as well.

It is rather surprising that no significant work on Highland recruiting has been produced considering the importance of this area of inquiry. Most writers of the history of the Highland regiments such as Colonel Stewart or Frank Adam, do go into some detail as to numbers of troops, areas where raised and so forth, but no work strictly based on the mechanics of recruiting has yet been produced. Peripheral studies to this field are in print, notably, John Prebble's work on the Highland mutinies. The majority of the mutinies of the Highland regiments were caused by the government breaking the terms of service and attempting to send Highlanders out of the country or to the colonies in violation of the terms of enlistment. This evil was not confined to the Highland regiments or to any one government and was the factor most responsible for creating disturbances when Militia were being raised, in Scotland in 1797 and in England in 1757. Works such as Prebble's do touch upon certain aspects of recruitment which are important, in this case, the terms of service promised.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to delve too deeply into any one area of recruitment patterns, and, for this reason, it has necessarily been confined to the broader aspects of whom, when, what,

where, how many and why the regiments were raised. An aspect which has been touched upon and which would prove to be an interesting topic for further in-depth analysis is that of the occupational and social status of the recruits. A good deal of first hand evidence is provided by the muster rolls still extant. A second topic for more intensive research is the parish by parish analysis of how many men were recruited. The general pattern of geographical recruiting is touched upon in Chapter III, but again, this is necessarily sketchy. And finally, the relationship between the breakdown of the old Highland Society and the effects on the success of Highland recruiting could be a topic of intensive study with particular attention to instances of some form of local conscription such as that used in the raising of the 93rd Regiment in 1799.

There is, in short, a wide range of areas covered by this M.Litt research thesis which might be examined on a deeper level. Despite the necessary shortcomings of this research work, it is hoped that it can be of use in future to the understanding and study of the Highland regiments in particular and the history of the Highlands in general and will also add to the accumulation of knowledge.

APPENDICES

and

SOURCES.

A Listing of the Highland Fencibles and Regular Regiments  
of the Line, with Dates of Service and Colonels.

SECTION 1. The Fencibles.

- 1) Argyle Regiment, raised July 1759, disbanded 1763, Colonel, Duke of Argyle, served in Scotland.
- 2) Sutherland Regiment, raised July 1759, disbanded 1763, Colonel, Earl of Sutherland, served in Scotland.
- 3) Argyle, or Western Fencible Regiment, raised February 1778, disbanded April 1783, Colonel, Lord Frederick Campbell, served in Scotland.
- 4) Duke of Gordon's North Fencibles, raised May 1778, disbanded 1783, Colonel, Duke of Gordon, served in Scotland.
- 5) Sutherland Regiment, raised January 1779, disbanded 1783, Colonel, William Wemyss of Wemyss, served in Scotland.
- 6) 1st Argyleshire Regiment, raised March 1793, disbanded 1799, Colonel, Marquis of Lorne, served in Scotland.
- 7) Bredalbane Regiment, Colonel, Earl of Bredalbane,  
     1st Battalion, raised March 1793, disbanded April 1799,  
         served in Scotland.  
     2nd Battalion, raised March 1793, disbanded April 1799,  
         served in Ireland.  
     3rd Battalion, raised December 1794, disbanded July 1802,  
         served in Ireland.
- 8) Grant or Strathspey Regiment, raised March 1793, disbanded April 1799, Colonel, Sir James Grant of Grant, served in Scotland.
- 9) Sutherland Regiment, raised March 1793, disbanded March 1799, Colonel, Major-General William Wemyss of Wemyss, served in Scotland and Ireland.
- 10) The Northern or Gordon Fencibles, raised March 1793, disbanded 1799, Colonel, Duke of Gordon, served in England.
- 11) Rothsay and Caithness Highlanders, Colonel, Sir John Sinclair of Ulbster.  
     1st Battalion, raised March 1794, disbanded May 1799,  
         served in Scotland and England.  
     2nd Battalion, raised November 1794, disbanded July 1802,  
         served in Ireland.
- 12) Dumbarton Regiment, raised August 1794, disbanded October 1802, Colonel, Colin Campbell of Stonefield, served in Guernsey and Ireland.

- 13) Glengarry or British Highland Regiment, raised August 1794, disbanded July 1802, Colonel, Alexander MacDonnell of Glengarry, served in Jersey, Guernsey and Ireland.
- 14) Reay Highland Regiment, raised October 1794, disbanded October 1802, Colonel, Hugh Mackay Baillie of Rosehall, served in Ireland.
- 15) Princess of Wales' (Aberdeen Highland) Regiment, raised October 1794, disbanded September 1803, Colonel, Sir James Leith, served in Ireland.
- 16) 2nd Argyleshire Regiment, raised October 1794, disbanded July 1802, Colonel, Henry Clavering, served in Ireland.
- 17) Caithness Legion, raised November 1794, disbanded 1802, Colonel, Sir Benjamin Dunbar of Hempriggs, served in Ireland.
- 18) Ross-Shire Highland Regiment, raised November 1794, disbanded 1799, Colonel, Major Colin MacKenzie of Mountgerald, served in Scotland.
- 19) Royal Inverness Highlanders, raised November 1794, disbanded August 1802, Colonel, John Baillie of Dunearn, served in Ireland.
- 20) Fraser Regiment, raised November 1794, disbanded July 1802, Colonel, James Fraser of Belladrum, served in Ireland.
- 21) The Regiment of the Isles or Macdonald Fencibles, raised May 1798, disbanded July 1802, Colonel, Lord Macdonald, served in Scotland and England.
- 22) 3rd Argyleshire Regiment, raised June 1798, disbanded July 1802, Colonel, Archibald MacNeill of Colonsay, served in Gibraltar.
- 23) Lochaber Fencibles, raised June 1798, disbanded June 1802, Colonel, Donald Cameron of Lochiel, served in Ireland.
- 24) Princess Charlotte of Wales' or Loyal MacLeod Fencibles, raised June 1798, disbanded June 1802, Colonel, John MacLeod of Colbecks, served in Ireland and England.
- 25) Ross and Cromarty Rangers, raised August 1798, disbanded July 1802, Colonel, Lewis MacKenzie of Scatwell, served in Scotland and Ireland.
- 26) Royal Clan Alpine Regiment, raised September 1798, disbanded July 1802, Colonel, Alexander MacGregor Murray of Napier Rusky, served in Ireland.
- 27) Perthshire Highlanders, raised October 1794, disbanded February 1799, Colonel, William Robertson of Lude, served in Scotland. (very few Highlanders).
- 28) Canadian Regiment, raised 1804, served in West Indies, disbanded because of violation of terms of service.



SECTION 2. The Regulars of the Line.

- 1) Argyleshire Highlanders, raised 1689, disbanded 1697, Colonel, Earl of Argyle, served in Scotland and Flanders.
- 2) 43rd Regiment, later 42nd Royal Highland Regiment, The Black Watch, raised 1739, Colonel, Earl of Crawford.
- 3) Loudon's Highlanders, raised 1745, disbanded 1748, Colonel, Earl of Loudon, served in Scotland and Flanders.
- 4) 77th Regiment, Montgomery's Highlanders, raised 1757, disbanded 1763, Colonel, Archibald Montgomery, served in North America.
- 5) 78th Regiment, Fraser's Highlanders, raised 1757, disbanded 1763, Colonel, Simon Fraser of Lovat, served in North America.
- 6) 87th Regiment, Keith's Highlanders, raised 1759, disbanded 1763, Colonel, Robert Murray Keith, served in Europe.
- 7) 88th Regiment, Campbell's Highlanders, raised 1759, disbanded 1763, Colonel, John Campbell of Dunoon, served in Europe.
- 8) 89th Regiment, Duke of Gordon's Highlanders, raised 1759, disbanded 1765, Colonel, Staates Long Morris, served in India.
- 9) 101st Regiment, Johnstone's Highlanders, raised 1760, disbanded 1763, Colonel, Sir James Johnstone of Westerhall, served in Scotland.
- 10) 100th Regiment, raised 1761, disbanded 1763, Colonel, Colin Campbell of Kilberrie, served in West Indies.
- 11) 105th Regiment, Queen's Highlanders, raised 1761, disbanded 1763, Colonel, David Graeme of Gorthie, served in Ireland.
- 12) MacLean's Highlanders, raised 1761, disbanded 1763, Colonel, Allan Maclean of Torloisk, furnished recruits to regiments serving in Germany and America.
- 13) 113th, Royal Highland Volunteers, raised 1761, disbanded 1763, Colonel, James Hamilton, served in Scotland.
- 14) 71st Regiment, Fraser's Highlanders, raised 1775, disbanded 1783, Colonel, Simon Fraser of Lovat, served in America.
- 15) 73rd Regiment, MacLeod's Highlanders, later 71st Glasgow Highland Light Infantry (1808), raised 1777, Colonel, Lord MacLeod, served America, India, Europe.
- 16) 74th Regiment, The Argyle Highlanders, raised 1778, disbanded 1783, Colonel, John Campbell of Barbreck, served in America.
- 17) 76th Regiment, Macdonald's Highlanders, raised 1778, disbanded 1784, Colonel, John MacDonnell, served in America.
- 18) 77th Regiment, Atholl Highlanders, raised 1778, disbanded 1783, Colonel, Duke of Atholl, served in Ireland.

- 19) 78th Regiment, Seaforth Highlanders, later 72nd Regiment (1786), raised 1778, Colonel, Lord Seaforth, served India and Europe.
- 20) 81st Regiment, Aberdeenshire Highland Regiment, raised 1778, disbanded 1783, Colonel, The Honourable William Gordon, served in Ireland.
- 21) 84th Regiment, Royal Highland Emigrants, raised 1775, disbanded 1784, Colonel Allan Maclean, served in Canada and America, composed of settled veterans of 42nd, 77th and 78th Regiments.
- 22) 2nd Battalion 42nd, later 73rd Perthshire Regiment (1786), raised 1780, Colonel, MacLeod of MacLeod, served in India.
- 23) 74th Regiment, raised 1787, Colonel, Sir Archibald Campbell, served in India and Ireland.
- 24) 75th, Stirlingshire Regiment, raised 1787, Colonel, Robert Abercromby of Tullibody, served in India.
- 25) 78th Regiment, Ross-shire Highlanders, raised 1793, Colonel, Francis Humberstone MacKenzie of Seaforth, 2nd Battalions raised in 1794 and 1804.
- 26) 79th Regiment, Cameron Highlanders, raised 1793, Colonel, Allan Cameron of Erracht, served in Europe and West Indies, 2nd Battalion raised 1804.
- 27) 97th Strathspey Regiment, raised 1794, disbanded 1795, Colonel, Sir James Grant of Grant, served as Marines and drafted into other regiments.
- 28) 98th Argyleshire Highlanders, later 91st (1798), raised 1794, Colonel, Duke of Argyll, served South Africa and Europe.
- 29) 100th Regiment, The Gordon Highlanders, later 92nd (1799), raised 1794, Colonel, Duke of Gordon, served in England, Ireland and Europe.
- 30) 116th Perthshire Regiment, raised 1794, disbanded 1794, Colonel, Alexander Campbell of Monzie, served in Ireland and drafted into other regiments.
- 31) 132nd Highland Regiment, raised 1794, disbanded 1794, Colonel, Duncan Cameron of Callart, drafted into other regiments.
- 32) 133rd Highland Regiment, raised 1794, disbanded 1794, Colonel, Simon Fraser, drafted to other regiments.
- 33) 93rd Sutherland Highlanders, raised 1799, Colonel, William Wemyss of Wemyss, served Guernsey, South Africa, Europe and America, 2nd Battalion raised 1813.

This list only includes those regiments actually placed on the establishment and not those which failed to reach their numbers and thus cancelled. It also only pertains to the situation and service until 1815.

Letters and Documents.

Graham of Gartmore Manuscript. From page 6, Section 1.1.

The confusions and disorder of the country were so great, and the Government so absolutely neglected it, that the sober people were obliged to purchase some security to their effects, by shameful and ignominious contracts of blackmail. A person who had the greatest correspondence with the thieves, was agreed with to preserve the lands contracted for from thefts, for certain sums to be paid yearly. Upon this fund he employed one half of the thieves to recover stolen cattle, and the other half to steal, in order to make this agreement and blackmail contract necessary. The estates of those gentlemen who refused to contract, or give countenance to that pernicious practice, are plundered by the thieving part of the watch, in order to force them to purchase their protection.

Mitchell, History of the Highlands, p.583.

Letter from the Marquis of Tweeddale to Lord President Duncan Forbes.  
From page 10, Section 1.2.

The Earl of Stair has proposed, that a number of blank commissions be sent down to be distributed among the well - affected clans. As Your Lordship shall think proper. This I heartily second; as I know Your Lordship will make a right use of this mark of His Majesty's confidence. Such a number of Highlanders being joined into regular Companies will not only prevent more men raising for the Pretender's Service, but a part of them may go and live in the Country which the Rebels leave; or, if it shall be thought more necessary, either the whole or any part of them may march into the South Country with Sir John Cope, according to the orders they shall receive.

This proposal His Majesty has agreed to, and accordingly, a number of blank commissions are sent down by this Express, which will be forwarded to Your Lordship without loss of time.

Culloden Papers, p.219.

Letter from Duncan Forbes to Lord Milton, Lord Justice-Clerk, dated 1738.  
From page 18, Section 1.3.

I propose that Government should raise four or five regiments of

Highlanders, appointing an English or Scottish officer of undoubted loyalty to be colonel of each regiment: and naming the lieutenants, majors, captains and subalterns from this list in my hand, which comprehends all the chiefs and chieftains of the disaffected clans, who are the very persons whom France or Spain will call upon in case of war to take arms for the Pretender. If Government pre-engaged the Highlanders in the manner I propose, they will not only serve well against the enemy abroad, but will be hostages for the good behaviour of their relatives at home; and I am persuaded it will be absolutely impossible to raise a rebellion in the Highlands.

Mitchell, History of the Highlands, p.594.

Circular letter to Fencible Colonels from Adjutant-General's Office, Dublin, 26 June 1800. From page 40, Section 2.4.

Sir,- I have the honour to enclose to you a copy of a circular letter which has been written by the Lord-Lieutenant's directions to the General Officers of the Staff in Ireland, on the subject of procuring from the regiments of Scotch Fencibles of Infantry to complete certain Scotch regiments of the line therein named, and His Excellency is persuaded that the exertions of the officers will co-operate with the ardour of the men in giving effect to so serviceable an object.

Lord Cornwallis desires that you will make known and explain to the regiment under your command that the men who will volunteer for general service will be transferred to the regiment of which they make choice on their arrival at Newry or Fermoy, as far as the superintending officers at those places can do it consistently with the object of equalising the regiments of the line which are to receive volunteers.

You will observe that the regiment is to continue to recruit to replace the men who volunteer, and to have credit on its establishment for the number so volunteering.

Lord Cornwallis requests your attention to the circular letter enclosed, addressed to the General Officers on the Staff, which fully explains the terms on which the men are permitted to volunteer, and His Lordship hopes that as a proportion of the officers of the regimented will be permitted to accompany the men the number of volunteers required will be furnished in a very short time.

Scobie, An Old Highland Fencible Corps, pp.265-266.

Warrant to raise Reay Fencibles to Colonel Hugh Mackay Baillie.  
From page 48, Section 3.1.

Whereas we have thought fit to order a Regiment of Fencible men, to be forthwith raised under your command, which is to consist of ten companies, of 4 sergeants, 5 corporals, 2 drummers and 95 private men

in each, with 2 fifers to the Grenadier Company, besides a sergeant-major and quartermaster-sergeant, together with the usual commissioned officers; which men are to serve in Great Britain and Ireland only.

These are to authorize you, by beat of drum or otherwise, to raise so many men in any county or part of our Kingdom of Great Britain, as shall be wanted to complete the said regiment to the above-mentioned numbers. And all Magistrates, Justices of the Peace, Constables, and other of our civil officers whom it may concern, are hereby required to assisting you in providing quarters, impressing carriages, and otherwise, as there shall be occasion.

Given at our Court at St James, this 24th day of October 1794, in the 34th year of our Reign.

By His Majesty's Command.  
(Signed) W. Windham

Scobie, An Old Highland Fencible Corps, pp.365-366.

Letter to Donald Sutherland from Colin MacKenzie, John Fraser and General Wemyss dated Dunrobin Castle, 21 September 1799.  
From page 60, Section 3.2.

As you have voluntarily enlisted yourself in the Sutherland Highland Regiment now raising by General Wemyss, we as agent and Factor for the Right Honourable Earl Gower and Countess of Sutherland do hereby agree how soon the present lease of the Davybeg of Strathbrora expires to put you, or your Father in your name in possession of any of the four possessions on Amat and Dalbreack that you or your Father may fix on; that you shall continue thereon for Seven Years after your entry, at such rent as shall be made thereto by two, or four Men mutually chosen; or if you prefer, we shall put your Father in possession at Whitsunday next, of that half of Crislich presently possessed by the Widow of Alexander Clyne, and William her Son, and to continue thereon for seven years at the present rent after Whitsunday next which you may rely.

Adam, Sutherland Estate Management, Vol. II, p.25.

Petition for Grievance of Donald MacLeod dated 14 August 1805.  
From page 60, Section 3.2.

Unto the Right Honourable Marchioness of Stafford The Petition of Donald MacLeod in the Lyne Parish of Assint Most Humbly Sheweth That about six years ago Mr Fraser Your Ladyship's Factor and Colin MacKenzie Esquire, Edinburgh, were pleased to grant a letter of obligation extended upon your stamp paper to your Petitioner promising him ten Merks Old Rent of the lands of Ryancraich on account of your Petitioner's Brother going

to the 93rd Regiment. Notwithstanding of all this your Petitioner was driven away in the 1803 by Mr Isaac Jopling Marble Cutter Assint as he got the tack of Ryancraich, hoping he might safely continue on account of said obligation. Mr Jopling brought officers from Dornach who not only discovered your Petitioner's house but also drove away your Petitioner's Cattle, so the your Petitioner being destitute of said lands has been mostly ruined in regard of his Effects having no settled habitation where he may pasture his Cattle. Besides the above soldier of the 93rd your Petitioner and his Brother served Your Ladyship in the late Fencibles and after all your Petitioner is treated is above said:

May it therefore please Your Ladyship to consider the promises and grant such redress to your Petitioner as to you shall seem proper and if it be not convenient for Your Ladyship to relieve your Petitioner at this period your Petitioner expects that Your Ladyship shall be pleased to tell your Petitioner that Your Ladyship shall grant him redress again the next sett, and your Petitioner shall ever pray.

Enclosed: Obligation by John Fraser, attested by Colin MacKenzie to Donald MacLeod: Dunrobin Castle, 24 July 1799.

I Factor for the Right Honourable Earl Gower and Countess of Sutherland Considering that William MacLeod Your Brother has voluntarily enlisted himself as a Soldier in the Sutherland Highlanders now raising by General Wemyss Do therefore as Factor aforesaid Bind and Oblige myself to put Donald MacLeod brother to William in possession of ten Merks Pay of Old Rent of the lands of Rhincreach and that of the term of Whitsunday next Eighteen hundred and to continue you therein for Seven Years thereafter at the present rent. The part to be given is the  $7\frac{1}{2}$  Merks possessed by Donald MacKenzie and to add  $2\frac{1}{2}$  Merks more to it. I also agree to continue your father in his present possession of 10 Merks Old Rent of Leadmore during the continuance of the present lease thereof, at the present rent, and to implement this obligation to you under the penalty of paying the rent of ten Merks of Rhincreach yearly till it is implemented. On witness whereof I have written and subscribed this.

Adam, Sutherland Estate Management, Vol. II, pp.50-51.

Charts and Statistics.SECTION 1. Rates of Pay in 1801. From page 68, Section 3.3.

Rates of pay for Regulars per annum.

		<u>Pounds</u>	<u>Shillings</u>	<u>Pence</u>
Colonel	-	410	12	6
Lieutenant-Colonel	-	290	9	7
Major	-	257	0	5
Captain-Lieutenant	-	171	17	1
Lieutenant	-	85	3	4
Ensign	-	66	18	4
Sergeant	-	28	10	3 3/4
Corporal	-	21	13	5 1/4
Drummer	-	20	18	2 3/4
Private	-	18	5	0
Chaplain	-	114	13	0
Paymaster	-	273	15	0
Adjutant	-	73	0	0
Quartermaster	-	85	3	4
Surgeon	-	171	17	1
Assistant Surgeon	-	91	5	0
Surgeon's Mate	-	63	17	6
Quartermaster-Sergeant	-	37	12	9 3/4
Sergeant-Major	-	37	12	9 3/4
Paymaster-Sergeant	-	28	10	3 3/4

For private soldier, 1s. per day in 1797: 4s. per week deducted for mess; 1s.6d. for necessaries; 1s.6d. for washing and cleaning; 3d. to barber; stoppage while in hospital was 3s.3d. per week; beer and bread allowance in camp of 5 1/4d. per week.

Scobie, An Old Highland Fencible Corps, p.131.  
Cavendish, The 93rd Sutherland Highlanders, p.21.

SECTION 2. Population Statistics.

	<u>Area in</u> <u>Sq. Miles</u>	<u>Fraction</u> <u>of Whole</u>	<u>Population</u> <u>1755</u>	<u>%</u>
Highlands	21,230	5/7	652,000	51
Lowlands	4,269	1/7	464,000	37
Central	4,196	1/7	149,000	11

Kyd, Scottish Population Statistics, p.xviii.

Population Growth by County.

<u>County</u>	<u>Webster 1755</u>	<u>1801</u>	<u>1811</u>	<u>1821</u>
Argyle	66,286	81,277	86,541	92,316
Bute	7,125	11,791	12,033	13,797
Caithness*	22,215	22,609	23,149	29,181
Inverness	59,563	72,672	77,671	89,961
Ross and Cromarty	48,004	56,318	60,853	68,762
Sutherland**	20,774	23,117	23,629	23,685

Kyd, Scottish Population Statistics, pp.82-83.

\* Caithness, while not suffering greatly from overseas emigration, did lose a substantial number to the Lowland areas.

\*\* The west coast of Sutherland lost many to overseas emigration and to the Lowlands on the east. Also, a great many migrated to Ross and Caithness in search of employment, thus keeping the population growth figure somewhat depressed.



Photocopies of Original Documents.

- 1) Recruiting Instructions ---- Perth Highland Fencibles.
- 2) Commission of Alexander Campbell in 77th Montgomery's Highlanders.  
Signed by William Pitt, 1757.
- 3) Letter to Lord Macdonald regarding the raising of the 76th Regiment  
of Foot in 1777.

# RECRUITING INSTRUCTIONS

For the Officers of the PERTH Highland Fencible Regiment of Foot,  
commanded by Colonel WILLIAM ROBERTSON.

- I. **Y**OU must obey implicitly all Orders you may receive from the Colonel, or Officer commanding at Head Quarters, to whom you will punctually transmit weekly Returns of the Recruits you have got, according to the Form herewith sent. You will also acquaint him of all your Proceedings, and be careful to let him know your Address.
- II. You are not to deviate in the least from the Letter of Service, of which Extracts are annexed, to prevent all Possibility of Doubt or Misunderstanding.
- III. You must take care not to enlist any indented Apprentices, without previously getting up their Indentures discharged. Nor are you to enlist Deserters from other Corps, nor any Weaver engaged with an unfinished Web, unless he agrees to purchase it out of his Bounty, previous to his being attested; for all Men not properly attested and enlisted, or who desert, or may be rejected by the Officer who may be appointed to inspect the Regiment, will be at your own Risque.
- IV. All your Recruits must be enlisted entirely as private Soldiers, and no absolute Promises must be made of appointing them Non-commissioned Officers: but the Colonel however permits each Captain to appoint one Serjeant and one Corporal; each Lieutenant a Serjeant, and each Ensign a Corporal; but it is to be understood, their being regimented as such will depend upon their own Conduct and Abilities.
- V. Each Captain may enlist a Drummer for his own Company, if he is perfectly acquainted with his Duty as such, but not otherwise.
- VI. It must be particularly understood, that the Men are all to be regimentally engaged, and that no Officer is to have any Claim on particular Men, who must be entirely at the Disposal of the Commanding Officer in forming the Companies, who at the same time will pay particular Attention in accommodating both Officers and Men in that Respect.
- VII. You are on no Account to make over any Man enlisted for this Regiment to any other Corps whatever.
- VIII. Previous to a Recruit's being attested, you must have him carefully and strictly examined by a Surgeon of Character; and, to prevent Imposition, endeavour to wait upon the Surgeon yourself.
- IX. Officers employed on the Recruiting Duty are to make themselves acquainted with, and strictly adhere to, the standing Orders of the Army, by procuring Copies of the Articles of War.
- X. Immediately on your Arrival in any Town, Fair, &c. where you intend to beat up, you must wait upon and acquaint the chief Magistrate of the Place, and Commanding Officer of the Troops, and shew them your Beating Order.
- XI. The Colonel allows you the full Levy-Money he receives from Government, viz. Ten Guineas for each Man approved of, at the Inspection of the Regiment.
- XII. No Bread Money to be paid to the Recruit, till he is approved of by the Inspecting Officer.
- XIII. Each Recruit must purchase, out of his Bounty, Necessaries according to the List annexed; the Recruiting Officer reserving the Sum of Three Guineas out of the Bounty Money, for which the Recruit will be supplied with Slop Cloathing, immediately on his joining at Head Quarters. If the Officer neglects to reserve the above Money, he will be answerable for the Price of the Slop Cloathing, which is to be provided by the Colonel, and other Necessaries which may be wanting.
- XIV. To prevent any Complaint on the part of the Recruit, you will, before sending him to Head Quarters, settle with him for his Subsistence and Bounty promised him, after reserving the Three Guineas as above mentioned.

XV. On procuring Five Recruits you may send them to the Head Quarters of the Regiment under the Charge of a careful Person; but all who die or desert before the Regiment is inspected, will be at your own Risque.

XVI. One Hundred Pounds to be drawn at a time by the Captains, and Fifty Pounds by the Subalterns. The Recruiting Accounts, agreeably to the annexed Form, to be sent once a Fortnight to the Agents, Messrs. COX and GREENWOOD, London; and to the Pay-master of the Regiment. When you have Occasion to draw for a second Sum, it will be necessary to send in your Account how the former Sum has been expended.

*List of Slop Cloathing and Necessaries to be furnished for each Recruit out of his Bounty,*

Slop Cloathing	{	A scarlet Jacket, with white Cuffs, Collar, and Buttons
	{	A twilled white Flannel Waistcoat
	{	A Pair of Flannel Drawers
Necessaries	{	A Bonnet and Feather
	{	Three Shirts with Frills
	{	Two Pair of Hose
	{	Two Pair of Shoes
	{	A Comb
	{	A Pair of Brushes and Black-ball
	{	A black Leather Stock and Buckle
	{	A Leather Hair Rose
	{	A Haversack

*Extract from the Letter of Service.*

The Pay of the Officers to commence from the Dates of their Commissions, and the Pay of the Non-commissioned Officers and private Men from the Dates of their respective Attestations, and not from the Date of Inlistment.

Levy Money of Ten Guineas per Man will be allowed in aid of the Expences of raising this Corps.

None of the Officers are to have Rank longer than while the Corps remains on the Establishment; nor, when reduced, are they to be intitled to Half-pay. These Circumstances are, I know, perfectly understood by yourself; yet I must take the Liberty to add, that you cannot too fully explain them to the Gentlemen you mean to propose for Commissions, in order that they may not, either now or in future, conceive that they have derived any Claim to permanent Rank in the Army, or to Half-pay from their Service in this Regiment.



It may however be proper to mention, that Officers taken from Half-pay into the Situation of Field Officers or Captains of Companies on the Fencible Establishment, will, on Reduction, be restored to their former Half-pay; and such as may be appointed to the Subaltern or Staff Commissions, will be entitled to receive their Half-pay, together with their Pay in the Fencibles.

The Men are to serve in any Part of Great Britain or Ireland, but not elsewhere. They are not to be draughted; and in the Event of their Removal from North Britain, they are not to be disembodied until their Return to the County in North Britain where they were principally raised, or as near thereto as possible.

The King hopes that the Corps will be compleated in three Months; and although it has been customary in new Levies to limit the Age and Size of the Recruits, yet His Majesty thinks it unnecessary to prescribe such Limits on the present Occasion, in full Confidence that every Exertion will be used, &c.

**SOME PAGES BOUND  
INTO/CLOSE TO SPINE.**

George



Entered with the  
Secretary at War  
J. W. Smith

George the Second, by the Grace of  
Faith &c. To Our Trusty and Wellbelov'd  
especial Trust and Confidence in your Loyalty, Courage  
you to be our Major of the Highland Battalion  
by Our Trusty & Wellbelov'd Lieutenant Colonel Commandant  
in Our said Battalion; You are therefore to take Our  
Captain into your Care and Charge, and duly to Exercise  
best Endeavours to keep them in good Order and Discip  
A & A & Major and Captain respectively, And y  
time to time as you shall receive from Us, your Lieut  
Rules and Discipline of War, in pursuance of the Tru  
St. James's the Seventh 20 day of Anna

Entered in the Office  
of Thomas Gore Esq.  
Surveyor General of Masters.  
John B. Bessie



Extracts from Letters

{ Mr. Macdonald

{ Decr 19<sup>th</sup> 1777 -

2. - opportunity offers to you to distinguish yourself in the  
Eyes of Administration &c. - I was asked whether you would  
exert yourself in person to raise a Regiment among the subordi-  
nate Chieftains of your name and from your own strength  
- accept of the Charte Blanche which Lord Barrington gave  
me and which you find enclosed. Send Lord Barrington or  
me your names and plans. I am given to understand that  
the old Proverb a friend &c will not be forgot.

Call together every respectable man of your name, or of any  
other connected with you. your family will for ever be bene-  
fited and respected, and I have ventured to use your name  
as ready to go in Person.

If you cannot with your friends compleat a Regiment  
you will lose nothing as Government will buy your men  
from you.

I send this by Express that one hour may not be  
lost.

Copy Lord Barringtons Letter of 11. Jan<sup>y</sup>. -  
Do - Do - 7<sup>th</sup> Jan<sup>y</sup>.

23<sup>d</sup> Decr Mr. Brummels

## SOURCE MATERIAL.

### Manuscript Sources:

Campbell of Bredalbane Papers. Scottish Records Office, H.M. Register House, Edinburgh.

Lord Macdonald Papers. Scottish Records Office, H.M. Register House, Edinburgh.

MacKay of Bighouse Papers. Scottish Records Office, H.M. Register House, Edinburgh.

MacPherson of Cluny Papers. Scottish Records Office, H.M. Register House, Edinburgh.

Seaforth Muniments. Scottish Records Office, H.M. Register House, Edinburgh.

### Printed Sources:

Adam, R.J., ed. Papers on Sutherland Estate Management, 1802-1816, Vol. I. Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, T. and A. Constable, Ltd., 1972.

\_\_\_\_\_. Papers on Sutherland Estate Management, 1802-1816, Vol. II. Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, T. and A. Constable, Ltd., 1972.

Culloden Papers. London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1815.

Cregeen, Eric R., ed. Argyll Estate Instructions, Mull, Morvern, Tiree, 1771-1805. Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, T. and A. Constable, 1964.

MacPhail, J.R.W., ed. Highland Papers, Vol. IV., Series III. Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, T. and A. Constable, 1934.

### General Sources:

Adam, Frank and revised by Sir Thomas Innes of Learney. The Clans, Septs and Regiments of the Scottish Highlands. Edinburgh and London: W. and A.K. Johnston and G.W. Bacon, Ltd., 1965.

Anderson, William. The Scottish Nation; or the Surnames, Families, Literature, Honours and Biographical History of the People of Scotland, Vol. I. Edinburgh: A. Fullarton and Company, 1862.

\_\_\_\_\_. The Scottish Nation; ..., Vol. II. Edinburgh: A. Fullarton and Company, 1862.



- \_\_\_\_\_. The Scottish Nation; ..., Vol. III. Edinburgh: A. Fullarton and Company, 1863.
- Ayling, Stanley. The Elder Pitt, Earl of Chatham. London: William Collins and Sons, Ltd., 1976.
- Barnes, R. Money and C. Kennedy Allen. The Uniforms and History of the Scottish Regiments. London: Seeley Service and Company, Ltd., 1956.
- Brown, Peter Hume. History of Scotland, from the Revolution of 1689 to the Disruption of 1843, Vol. III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911.
- Bulloch, John Malcolm. Territorial Soldiering in the North-east of Scotland During 1759-1814. Aberdeen: The New Spalding Club, The University Press, 1914.
- Cavendish, A.E.J. An Reismeid Chataich, The 93rd Sutherland Highlanders, 1799-1927. London: Published privately. 1928.
- Daiches, David. The Paradox of Scottish Culture: the Eighteenth-Century Experience. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.
- Donaldson, Gordon. The Scots Overseas. London: Robert Hale, 1966.
- Dunn-Pattison, R.P. The History of the 91st Argyleshire Highlanders. Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1910.
- Fraser-Mackintosh, C. "Macdonald and MacLeod at the '45", The Celtic Magazine, Vol. XII., Alexander MacKenzie, ed. Inverness: A. and W. MacKenzie, 1887. pp.344-348.
- Fortescue, The Honourable J.W. A History of the British Army, Vol. II. London: MacMillan and Company, Ltd., 1910.
- \_\_\_\_\_. A History of the British Army, Vol. III. London: MacMillan and Company, Ltd., 1902.
- \_\_\_\_\_. A History of the British Army, Vol. IV., Part I. London: MacMillan and Company, Ltd., 1906.
- \_\_\_\_\_. A History of the British Army, Vol. IV., Part II. London: MacMillan and Company, Ltd., 1906.
- \_\_\_\_\_. A History of the British Army, Vol. V. London: MacMillan and Company, Ltd., 1910.
- \_\_\_\_\_. A History of the British Army, Vol. VI. London: MacMillan and Company, Ltd., 1910.
- Fortescue, The Honourable J.W. A History of the British Army, Vol. VII. London: MacMillan and Company, Ltd., 1912.
- \_\_\_\_\_. A History of the British Army, Vol. VIII. London: MacMillan and Company, Ltd., 1917.

- \_\_\_\_\_. A History of the British Army, Vol. IX. London: MacMillan and Company, Ltd., 1920.
- \_\_\_\_\_. A History of the British Army, Vol. X. London: MacMillan and Company, Ltd., 1920.
- Gailey, R.A. "Mobility of Tenants on a Highland Estate in the Early Nineteenth-Century", The Scottish Historical Review, Vol. 40. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1961.
- Gardyne, C. Greenhill. The Life of a Regiment, the History of the Gordon Highlanders from its Formation in 1794 to 1816, Vol. I. Edinburgh: David Douglas, 1901.
- Gray, Malcolm. The Highland Economy, 1750-1850. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1957.
- Green, Walford Davis. William Pitt, Earl of Chatham and the Growth and Division of the British Empire, 1708-1778. London: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1901.
- Grimble, Ian. Scottish Clans and Tartans. London: Hamlyn Publishing Group, Ltd., 1973.
- Hayes, James. "Scottish Officers in the British Army, 1714-63", The Scottish Historical Review, Vol. 37. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1958.
- "Highland Battles and Highland Arms", The Celtic Magazine, Vol. II., Alexander MacKenzie, cond. Inverness: A. and W. MacKenzie, 1877.
- "Highland Soldiers in France", The Celtic Magazine, Vol. X., Alexander MacKenzie, cond. Inverness: A. and W. MacKenzie, 1885.
- Holden, Robert MacKenzie. "The First Highland Regiment: The Argyllshire Highlanders", The Scottish Historical Review, Vol. 3, Glasgow: James Macklehorse and Sons, 1906. pp.27-40.
- Johnston, S.H.F. "The Scots Army in the Reign of Anne", Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Series 5, Vol. 3. London: Offices of the Royal Historical Society, 1953.
- Kemp, Alan. The British Army in the American Revolution. London: Almark Publishing Company, Ltd., 1973.
- Kermack, W.R. The Scottish Highlands, A Short History, (c.300-1746). London and Edinburgh: W. and A.K. Johnston and G.W. Bacon, Ltd., 1957.
- Kyd, J.G. "Scotland's Population", The Scottish Historical Review, Vol. 28. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1949.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Scottish Population Statistics, Series III, Vol. XLIII. Edinburgh: The Scottish Historical Society, T. and A. Constable, Ltd., 1952.

- Lawson, Cecil C.P. A History of the Uniforms of the British Army, Vol. II. London: Norman Military Publications, Ltd., 1941.
- \_\_\_\_\_. A History of the Uniforms of the British Army, Vol. IV. London: Kaye and Ward Ltd., 1966.
- \_\_\_\_\_. A History of the Uniforms of the British Army, Vol. V. London: Kaye and Ward, Ltd., 1967.
- Logan, James. The Scottish G  el. Hartford, Conn.; S. Andrus and Son, 1845.
- MacDonald, D.F. Scotland's Shifting Population. Glasgow: Jackson, Son and Company, 1937.
- MacLeod, Rev. Canon Roderick C. "The Western Highlands in the Eighteenth-Century", The Scottish Historical Review, Vol. 19. Glasgow: James Macklehorse and Sons, 1922.
- Mason, John. "Conditions in the Highlands after the 'Forty-five", The Scottish Historical Review, Vol. 26. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1947.
- Millar, A.H. "Killiecrankie Described by an Eye-Witness", The Scottish Historical Review, Vol. 3. Glasgow: James Macklehorse and Sons, 1908.
- Mitchell, Dugald. A Popular History of the Highlands and Gaelic Scotland, from the Earliest Times till the Close of the 'Forty-Five. Paisley: Alexander Gardner, 1900.
- Paton, James, ed. Scottish History and Life. Glasgow: James Macklehorse and Sons, 1902.
- Prebble, John. Culloden. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1967.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Highland Clearances. London: Secker and Warbury, 1963.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Mutiny, Highland Regiments in Revolt, 1743-1804. London: Secker and Warbury, 1975.
- The Royal Highland Regiment, The Black Watch, Medal Roll, 1801-1911. Edinburgh: William Brown, 1913.
- von Ruville, Albert. William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, Vol. I. Translated by H.J. Clayton. London: William Heinemann, 1907.
- \_\_\_\_\_. William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, Vol. III. Translated by H.J. Clayton. London: William Heinemann, 1907.
- Scobie, I.H. Mackay. An Old Highland Fencible Corps, the History of the Reay Fencible Highland Regiment of Foot, or Mackay's Highlanders, 1794-1802, with an Account of its Services in Ireland during the Rebellion of 1798. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1914.

The Scottish Clans and Their Tartans, 42nd Edition. Edinburgh: W. and A.K. Johnston and G.W. Bacon, Ltd., 1972.

Sinclair, Sir John, Bart. The Statistical Account of Scotland, Drawn Up From the Communications of the Ministers of the Different Parishes, Vol. 1. Edinburgh: William Creech, 1791.

\_\_\_\_\_. OSA, Vol. 2. Edinburgh: William Creech, 1792.

\_\_\_\_\_. OSA, Vol. 3. Edinburgh: William Creech, 1792.

\_\_\_\_\_. OSA, Vol. 4. Edinburgh: William Creech, 1792.

\_\_\_\_\_. OSA, Vol. 5. Edinburgh: William Creech, 1793.

\_\_\_\_\_. OSA, Vol. 6. Edinburgh: William Creech, 1793.

\_\_\_\_\_. OSA, Vol. 7. Edinburgh: William Creech, 1793.

\_\_\_\_\_. OSA, Vol. 8. Edinburgh: William Creech, 1793.

\_\_\_\_\_. OSA, Vol. 9. Edinburgh: William Creech, 1793.

\_\_\_\_\_. OSA, Vol.10. Edinburgh: William Creech, 1794.

\_\_\_\_\_. OSA, Vol.11. Edinburgh: William Creech, 1794.

\_\_\_\_\_. OSA, Vol.12. Edinburgh: William Creech, 1794.

\_\_\_\_\_. OSA, Vol.13. Edinburgh: William Creech, 1794.

\_\_\_\_\_. OSA, Vol.14. Edinburgh: William Creech, 1795.

\_\_\_\_\_. OSA, Vol.15. Edinburgh: William Creech, 1795.

\_\_\_\_\_. OSA, Vol.16. Edinburgh: William Creech, 1795.

\_\_\_\_\_. OSA, Vol.17. Edinburgh: William Creech, 1796.

\_\_\_\_\_. OSA, Vol.18. Edinburgh: William Creech, 1796.

\_\_\_\_\_. OSA, Vol.19. Edinburgh: William Creech, 1797.

\_\_\_\_\_. OSA, Vol.20. Edinburgh: William Creech, 1798.

\_\_\_\_\_. OSA, Vol.21. Edinburgh: William Creech, 1798.

Skelton, Constance Oliver and John Malcolm Bulloch. Gordons Under Arms, A Biographical Muster Roll of Officers in the Navies and Armies of Britain, Europe, America and in the Jacobite Risings, Gordon Papers, Vol. III. Aberdeen: The New Spalding Club, The University Press, 1912.

Skene, William F. The Highlanders of Scotland. Alexander MacBain, ed. Stirling: Eneas Mackay, 1902.

Smout, T.C. A History of the Scottish People, 1560-1830. London: Collins, 1969.

Steuart, A. Francis. "Scottish Officers in Sweden", The Scottish Historical Review, Vol. 1. Glasgow: James Macklehole and Sons, 1904.

Stewart, David. Sketches of the Character, Manners, and Present State of the Highlanders of Scotland; with Details of the Military Service of the Highland Regiments, Vol. I. Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and Company, 1822.

\_\_\_\_\_. Sketches of the Character, Manners, and Present State of the Highlanders of Scotland; with Details of the Military Service of the Highland Regiments, Vol. II. Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and Company, 1822.

Thomson, Gladys Scott. "A Scots Officer in the Low Countries, 1714", The Scottish Historical Review, Vol. 27. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1948.

Western, J.R. "The Formation of the Scottish Militia in 1797", The Scottish Historical Review, Vol. 34. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1955.

Wickes, H.L. Regiments of Foot. Reading: Osprey Publishing, Ltd., 1974.

Willcox, Walter F. ed. International Migrations, Vol. I. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1929.